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‘The reason of this is, that the one seems to have what is his own (that which naturally and properly belongs to him), the other not; for that which constantly presents the same appearance (shews itself in the same light) is thought to be a truth (or substantial reality), and therefore it is supposed that the others (οἱ ἕτεροι δοκοῦσιν) have what does not really belong to them. Here we have a good example of the distinction between φαίνεσθαι and δοκεῖν. The former expresses a sensible presentation, a φαντασία, an appeal to the eye or other senses: δοκεῖν is an act of the understanding, an operation and result of the judgment, a δόξα an opinion or judgment, appealing to the reasoning faculty or intellect, consequently τὸ φαίνεσθαι represents a lower degree of certainty and authority than δοκεῖν. Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 b 27, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ: οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. The distinction appears again in περὶ ἐνυπνίων c. 3, 461 b 5, φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρῖνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινῆται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν. Ib. 462 a 1, οὐ μόνον φανεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἕν, ἂν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανεῖται μὲν οὐ δόξει δὲ, κ.τ.λ. See also Waitz ad Anal. Post. 76 b 17, II p. 327.
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