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‘But no art has been as yet composed of it; for in fact it was not till late that that of composition made any advance: and it (ἡ ὑποκριτική) is thought low and vulgar’ (in the sense of popular and unsubstantial, directed to show, not substance) ‘and rightly so considered’ (or, ‘when considered aright’; so Victorius. But the other is the more natural interpretation of ὑπολαμβάνειν; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius ‘Si vere iudicare volumus’: ‘consider’ in the two renderings has different senses). φορτικός, see note on II 21. 15, opposed to χαριείς in the sense of mental refinement and cultivation, Molestos et illepidos, quos Graeci μοχθηροὺς καὶ φορτικούς dicerent; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Attici 18. 4 (Gaisford). See Twining on Poet. note 263, pp. 540—544, where a number of examples illustrative of its various applications are collected. φορτικῶς, ἐπαχθῶς, ἐπιπλάστως (Suidas). The last of these two equivalents helps to explain a distinction in Eth. Eudem. I 4. 2, of arts φορτικαί, περὶ χρηματισμόν (engaged in money-making, mercenary), βάναυσοι (mechanical), which is subsequently explained, λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον. This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: and ἐπιπλάστως ‘beplastered’ seems to correspond to this. And this same signification is plainly conveyed by the word here in the Rhetoric, which is immediately followed by ἀλλ᾽ ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας, i. e. not only ὑποκριτική, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικόν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind, want of mental cultivation in persons: and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial, and in this point of view too low and vulgar to be entertained by a man of science or philosopher. It has precisely the same meaning in Pol. I 11, 1258 b 35. See Eaton ad loc. ‘But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific, (directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ εἶναι: I 7. 36—37, see note,) we must bestow the requisite (τήν) pains and attention upon it, not that it is right (to do so), but as necessary (for success in persuading): for, as to strict justice, that implies, (requires, subaudi ἐστί,) looking for no more in the delivery of the speech than (to speak it) in a manner which will give neither offence nor delight: for fairness requires that the case be fought on the facts alone, and therefore everything else outside the direct proof (of them) is superfluous: but still, as has been already said, they have vast influence by reason of the vice or defects (depraved taste and judgment) of the hearer’. Quint. II 17. 27 seq. Imperiti enim iudicant, et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sunt, ne errent. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientum conciones, atque omne concilium, nihil invidia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes: perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus, et prope in sola delectatione ponatur. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt. §§ 28, 29. οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος] If it be supposed (with Vater) that ὡς is omitted in this clause, comp. c. 3 § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐδέσματι.
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