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‘Metaphors should be drawn, as has been stated before, (III 2. 12, and 10. 5, also 11. 10; οἰκείων in the former, μὴ φανερῶν implied in the words μήτ᾽ ἐπιπόλαιον, in the latter,) from objects closely related, but not obvious to every one at first sight’ (i. e. not so related, so clearly resembling one another, that no one can fail to see the resemblance at once: such metaphors do not pique the curiosity, and set people thinking; and from them you learn nothing, that you did not know before); ‘just as in philosophy also, to observe the resemblances in widely distant things is characteristic of a sagacious penetrating intellect: like Archytas' saying, that arbitrator and altar were the same thing; because both are the refuge of the injured or wronged’ (thing or person, animal or man, expressed by the neuter). οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] Poet. XXII 17, μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ᾽ ἄλλου ἐστὶ λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖόν ἐστιν (this is equivalent to εὐστόχου, ‘requires quick wit, penetration, natural sagacity’)' τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν. Rhet. II 20. 7, of fables, used as arguments, ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἄν τις δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾷν, ὅπερ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, see the note, and references there given. On the use of resemblances and differences in defining, distinguishing, and the formation of concepts, see Trendelenburg, ad Categ. § 59 p. 137, and Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Vol. I p. 102, Lect. VI. This is the kind of ‘philosophy’ here referred to. Diotima's account, Pl. Symp. 211, of the formation of general conceptions or ideas will serve as an illustration. On Archytas, the Pythagorean philosopher and mathematician of Tarentum, see Diog. Laert. VIII 4. 79—83. ‘Or if one were to say that an anchor and a hook were the same: for they are both the same kind of thing, but differ in position’ (lit. ‘the above and below’). κρεμάθρα is defined by the Schol. on Ar. Nub. 218, and by Suidas, as a basket for remnants, εἰς ὃ τὰ περιττεύοντα ὄψα (the leavings of the dinner-table) εἰώθαμεν ἀποτίθεσθαι. This was usually ‘hung up’, κρεμάθρα δὲ εἴρηται διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κρεμαμένην μετέωρον εἶναι (Suidas). Hence the use of it for Socrates in the Clouds, u. s. But it is plain that that cannot be the meaning of it here, for it does not answer to the subsequent description of it, in respect either of the resemblance or the difference stated. Rost and Palm in their Lexicon translate it ‘ankertau’, the cable that holds the anchor; but this is open to precisely the same objection. It must be something in the nature of a hook, from which things may be suspended; and is literally ‘a suspending instrument’. The resemblance to the anchor lies in its hooked form, and also in the intention or design of them both, which is to keep things where they are, preservation or security. The difference is that the anchor is applied to keep the vessel safe and steady at the bottom, the hook is above, and from it the thing suspended hangs. Liddell and Scott have κρεμάστρα (the reading of three inferior MSS) with this reference, and identify it with κρεμάθρα in the Nubes. ‘And the re-equalisation of cities (in the respect of property, and powers, i. e. state offices, privileges, &c.) when the same principle is applied to (is the same for) things standing wide apart (very dissimilar, viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices, prerogatives &c.)’. The widely dissimilar things which are here brought together for comparison, are the areas of properties, and the state offices and privileges, &c., which are to be alike equalised. The Scholiast quoted by Vater, explains the word and its application in the same way of the equalisation of the properties, fortunes or conditions, duties and rights of the citizens of a state. Victorius quotes Isocr. Phil. § 40, οἶδα γὰρ ἁπάσας ὡμαλισμένας ὑπὸ τῶν συμφορῶν, all the Greek cities have been alike levelled to one condition by their misfortunes. Vahlen has again applied his perverted ingenuity to the emendation of this passage. The passage wants none: it is clear in sense and construction, and the reading of the text is retained by Bekker and Spengel. In the first place, αν in the compound verb is not α privative with ν inserted, as ἀνώνυμος, ἀνώδυνος, &c., but ἀνά is re, of breaking up (ἀναλύειν, &c.) for redistribution, restoring to an original equality: so ἀναδιδόναι ‘to distribute’ (ψήφους), ἀναδάσασθαι ‘to redistribute’ Thuc. V 4, ἀνάδαστος, ἀναδασμός, de agro ex integro aequis partibus dividendo (Herod., Plat., see Ruhnken's Timaeus p. 33), ἀνανέμειν, et sim. ἀνωμαλίσθαι therefore does not denote inequality, but re-equalisation. What the signification of the word is, appears from two passages of the Polit. II 7, 1266 b 3 and c. 12, 1274 b 9. In the first of these the word is ὁμαλισθῆναι, in the second, ἀνομάλωσις, from verbs in -ίζειν and -οῦν respectively. They both refer to the same thing, viz. Phaleas of Chalcedon's scheme for the equalisation or re-equalisation of properties, and plainly, except perhaps so far as the ἀνά is concerned, have precisely the same signification: and this is perfectly applicable here. Vahlen proposes καὶ “ὁμαλισθῆναι τὰς πόλεις” ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι ταὐτό. His objection to ἀνωμαλίσθαι seems to me to be entirely unfounded, and I can see no reason whatever for altering the text. There is another slight alteration proposed, which is not worth mentioning. ἐπιφάνεια is a surface, here area; and in Euclid, a plane figure, which has only length and breadth, a superficies.
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