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‘The written style is the most exact’ (or finished: on ἀκρίβεια and its various senses, see Grant ad Eth. Nic. I 7. 18, and the references in Introd. ad h. l. p. 334, note 4), ‘that of debate lends itself most to acting’ (or delivery: is the ‘most capable of being acted’). Comp. III 1. 4. The reason of this as far as declamation is concerned, viz. why the graphic style admits of more ornament and artificial arrangement than the other, is thus stated by Cicero, Orat. LXI 208. After the invention of the period, &c., he says, nemo qui aliquo esset in numero scripsit orationem generis eius, quod esset ad delectationem comparatum remotumque a iudiciis forensique certamine, quin redigeret omnes fere in quadrum numerumque sententias. Nam quum is est auditor, qui non vereatur ne compositae orationis insidiis sua fides attemptatur, gratiam quoque habet oratori voluptati aurium servienti.

‘Of this (ἀγωνιστική) there are two kinds; one that (includes, conveys,) represents character, the other emotion (in the speech)’. That is, not that ἀγωνιστική is a genus, containing two species under it, moral and emotional: for this is not the fact, and also any speech may have both: but that these two elements belong specially, not exclusively, to the two debating branches of Rhetoric, of which they are very prominent ingredients: the reality of the interests at stake giving more room for the play of passion and the assumption of character than the cold unimpassioned, deliberate written compositions. The ethical part is of two kinds, the ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, I 2. 4, II 1. 4, and the characters ἤθη of the several ages and conditions, II 12. 17. The emotional is of course that which is partially described I 2. 5, and treated at length in II 2. 16. Of these ‘appeals to the feelings’, δείνωσις and ἔλεος, the earlier rhetorical treatises were full, I 1. 3, of which Thrasymachus' ἔλεοι (III 1. 7) described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C, was a well-known specimen. Quint. III 8. 12, (In concionibus deliberatio) affectus, ut quae maxima, postulat, seq. Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas (this is principally due to ἦθος) plurimum, seq. See III 7. 1, 3, 6, where the two are described. The ἦθος is there confined to those of age, nation, station, &c. Compare with all this, Demetr. π. ἑρμηνείας § 193, ἐναγώνιος μὲν οὖν ἴσως μᾶλλον διαλελυμένη λέξις, αὕτη καὶ ὑποκριτικὴ καλεῖται: κινεῖ γὰρ ὑπόκρισιν λύσις. γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις εὐανάγνωστος. αὕτη δέ ἐστιν συνηρτημένη καὶ οἷον ἠσφαλισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Μένανδρον ὑποκρίνονται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, Φιλήμονα δὲ ἀναγινώσκουσιν.

‘And this is why actors also (as well as debaters) hunt after (διώκουσι) plays of this kind (that is, plays of which the subjects give scope for the exhibitions of passion and character), and the poets after persons (whether actors to represent the πάθη, or characters in the dramas to be represented with them) of the same kind. At the same time, the poets that can be read (that write to be read as well as acted or rhapsodised) become pocket-companions, or favourites’.

βαστάζεσθαι is said of anything that is carried about in the hand or arms, fondled, cherished, fondly and familiarly treated, like a baby or pet lapdog; and hence when applied to a book naturally means one that people are fond of, and carry about with them in their pockets. There are several instances in Sophocles—see Ellendt's Lex.—that illustrate this sense of βαστάζεσθαι, as Philoct. 655 of the favourite bow and 657, (Neopt.) ἔστιν ὥστε...καὶ βαστάσαι με (be allowed to nurse it), προσκύσαι θ᾽ ὥσπερ θεόν; Aesch. Agam. 34, εὐφιλῆ χέρα ἄνακτος τῇδε βαστάσαι (to press and caress) χέρι (Blomfield's Glos. ad loc.). Quint. VIII 3. 12, of any striking sentiment or expression, intuendum (to be narrowly looked into) et paene pertractandum.

‘Chaeremon for instance who is as exact (highly finished) as a professional speech-writer (such as Isocrates), and Licymnius amongst the dithyrambic poets’. On Chaeremon, see note II 23. 29, ult. [The ἀκρίβεια of Chaeremon may be illustrated by his partiality for minute details, such as enumerating the flowers of a garland, e.g. Athenaeus XV p. 679 F, κίσσῳ τε ναρκίσσῳ τε τριέλικας κύκλῳ στεφάνων ἑλικτῶν.] On λογογράφος, see II 11. 7; Shilleto on Dem. de F. L. § 274. Licymnius is mentioned above, III 2. 13, where reference is made to Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7, for an account of what is known of him; and again III 13. 5.

‘And upon comparison the (speeches, λόγοι) of the writers when delivered in actual contests have a narrow, confined, contracted (i.e. poor, mean, paltry) appearance, whilst those of the orators (meaning particularly the public speakers, in the assembly), which by their skilful delivery succeed or pass muster’ (none of this is expressed but ‘well delivered’1), ‘when taken in the hands (to read) look like the work of mere bunglers or novices’. στενός is the Latin tenuis, and the English slight and slender, in a contemptuous and depreciatory sense. In its primary sense of narrow it stands in opposition, in respect of style, to the wider range, and the broader, larger, freer, bolder, tone required by the loftier and more comprehensive subjects, and also by the larger audiences, of public speakers; the high finish and minute artifices of structure, as well as the subtler and finer shades of intonation and expression, are lost in a crowd and in the open air. So Whately, Rhet. ch. IV (Encycl. Metrop. p. 301 a), describes the agonistic style, as “a style somewhat more blunt (than the graphic) and homely, more simple and, apparently, unstudied in its structure, and at the same time more daringly energetic.” στενοί then represents the comparative narrowness or confined character of the graphic style, with its studied artificial graces, careful composition, and other such ‘paltrinesses’, ‘things mean and trifling’—a sense in which it occurs in a parallel passage of Pl. Gorg. 497 C, where σμικρὰ καὶ στενά are contemptuously applied by Callicles to Socrates' dialectics. This is actually said of Isocrates, in the passage of Dionysius, de Isocr. Iud. c. 13, by Hieronymus, the philosopher of Rhodes; ἀναγνῶναι μὲν ἄν τινα δυνηθῆναι τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ (Isocr.) καλῶς, δημηγορῆσαι δὲ τήν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸν τόνον ἐπάραντα, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ κατασκευῇ μετὰ τῆς ἁρμοττούσης ὑποκρίσεως εἰπεῖν, οὐ παντελῶς.

ἰδιωτικοί] such as have only the capacity (-κός) of unprofessional persons, or laymen in art, &c. as opposed to clerks, when all science and learning were in the hands of the clergy. ἰδιώτης is opposed to δημιουργός, a practitioner of any art, science, profession, or pursuit: and especially to philosophy and its professors, as in the adage, ἰδιώτης ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος ἐν ἰδιώταις.

Spengel follows MS A^{c} (or A) in reading τῶν λεχθέντων for εὖ λεχθέντες. But I confess that I do not see who could be intended by τῶν λεχθέντων besides the orators. Certainly not the preceding ἀναγνωστικοί.

ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν] This must have been the case with Cicero's rival, Hortensius. Quintilian [XI 3. 8], after telling us that Hortensius was, during his lifetime, first thought to be chief of all orators, secondly Cicero's rival, and thirdly second to him alone, adds, ut appareat placuisse aliquid eo dicente quod legentes non invenimus (the same may be said of many sermons). Isocrates' Phil. §§ 25, 26, an excellent commentary on this, is unfortunately too long to quote.

‘The reason is that their appropriate place is in an actual contest or debate’ (with ἁρμόττει supply, if you please, ταῦτα as the nomin.—it means at all events the subject of the immediately preceding clause): ‘and this also is why things (speeches) intended to be acted or delivered (lit. proper to be, or capable of being, -κός), when the delivery is withdrawn don't produce their own proper effect (or perform their special function, ἔργον), and so appear silly: for instance asyndeta, and the reiteration of the same word in the written, graphic style’—with which the agonistic divested of its acting or delivery is now (surreptitiously) associated—‘are rightly disapproved; whereas in debating the orators do employ them, because they are proper for acting’. Aquila c. 30 (ap. Gaisford, Not. Var.), Ideoque et Aristoteli et iteratio ipsa verborum ac nominum et repetitio frequentior, et omnis huius modi motus actioni magis et certamini quam stilo videtur convenire.

1 [So in Introd. p. 325, after Victorius and Majoragius, but compare Mr Cope's second thoughts as given in the note on the same page: “εὖ λεχθέντες can mean nothing but ‘well spoken of’, ῥήτορες being understood.”]

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