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‘Another, for the accuser, is to praise some trifle at great length, and then (under cover of that) to introduce in concise (and pregnant) terms a censure of something that is of real importance; or after a preliminary enumeration of a number of advantages (virtues and accomplishments, which have little or nothing to do with the point at issue) hold up that one thing to censure which has a direct and real bearing on the question’. προφέρειν, to promote (carry forward), aid, assist, further. Hes. Op. et D. 579, ἠώς τοι προφέρει μὲν ὁδοῦ, προφέρει δὲ καὶ ἔργου. Thuc. I 93, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν. Victorius illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. I 4. 94 seq. and the following well-known passage from Cic. pro L. Flacco, IV 9. Verumtamen hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras: do multarum artium disciplinam: non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam: denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt non repugno: testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit: totiusque huius rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus, ignorant. ‘(Topics) such as these are at the same time most artful and most unfair: for they endeavour to do harm with what is good (to convert the good into an instrument of mischief) by mixing it with the bad’; like one who mixes poison with wholesome food. ‘Another topic common to both accuser and excuser is, that since the same act may always be attri buted to several (different) motives, the accuser has to depreciate (disparage, put a bad character or construction upon) it, by selecting the worse (lit. by directing his selection to what is worse), the apologist to put the more favourable interpretation upon it’ (interpretari in peius, in melius). ἐκλαμβάνειν. ἐκ of ‘selection.’ Rhet. ad Al. 10 (11). 2, ἐκληπτέον. Ib. 2 (3). 26, ἐκλάβωμεν. Top. Z 4, 141 b 4, ἐκλαβεῖν. ἐκλέγειν and ἐκλαμβάνειν—technically applied to the selection of topics—are illustrated by Poste, Post. Anal. p. 21, n. I, and p. 121, n. I. Similarly we have ἐκκεῖσθαι, Rhet. III 9. 2, ἐκθέσθαι, Phys. VI 5. 9, ἐκτιθέναι, Rhet. ad Al. 29 (30). 21, ἐκκεῖσθαι, pluries, Top. A 9. ἐκτιθέναι, ἔκθεσις, Waitz, Ind. ad Org. s. vv. Poet. XVII 5, ἐκτίθεσθαι. Ar. Pol. IV (VII) 13, sub init. ὁ σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, “the mark stands well out, full in view, prominent.” Literally, Dem. c. Mid. § 103, πλὴν ἵν᾽ ἐκκέοιτο (Euctemon, ‘publicly posted’, affiché) πρὸ τῶν Ἐπωνύμων. Dem. (?) κατὰ Θεοκρ. § 8, ἐξέκειτο δὲ πολὺν χρόνον ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ συνεδρίου ἡ φάσις. ‘For instance, (to say) that Diomede preferred Ulysses (to be his companion in the nocturnal adventure), on the one side because he supposed Ulysses to be the best (i.e. the most valiant) of men (or the best companion, for such an occasion), on the other, not for that reason, but because, from his worthlessness, he was the only (one of the heroes) of whose rivalry he (Diom.) was not afraid’. Supra II 23. 20, 24: where the same case is given, and the two sides opposed, in illustration of two different topics. See Hom. Il. K [X] 242 seq. ‘And so much for the treatment of διαβολή’.
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