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‘(Here again, as in general) public speaking is more difficult than pleading (see I 1. 10); and naturally1 [so, because it is concerned with the future.]

[On the ‘times’ with which the three classes of speeches, λόγοι δικανικοί, συμβουλευτικοί and ἐπιδεικτικοί are concerned, see I 3. 4, τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι μέλλων...τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ γενόμενος κ.τ.λ.

ἐκεῖ δὲἀδήλων δέ] ‘whereas in the former case (forensic oratory) the speaker is concerned with the past, which, as Epimenides the Cretan said, is already known even to diviners; for he himself was not in the habit of divining the future, but only (interpreting) the obscurities of the past.’

καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν] as has been noticed elsewhere, “was doubtless meant by Epimenides as a sarcasm upon his prophetic brethren, who pretended to see into futurity. ‘Even diviners’, said he, ‘impostors as they are, can prophesy what is past’”. Introd. p. 358, note.

The statement that Epimenides specially devoted himself as a soothsayer to solving the riddles of the past, is exemplified by his being invited by the Athenians to advise them as to the purification of the city from the pestilence which arose in consequence of the crime of Cylon (Plutarch, reipubl. ger. pr. 27, Pausanias, I 14. 4, Diogenes Laert. I 10: Grote, H. G. chap. X sub finem). Plato, who calls him a θεῖος ἀνήρ, speaks of his foretelling the future (Legg. 642 D), and the very gift which in the text he appears to disclaim is similarly ascribed to him by Cicero, who after saying est enim ars in iis qui nouas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt, classes Epimenides among those who are destitute of this art; qui non ratione aut coniectura, observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi, aut soluto liberoque motu, futura praesentiunt (de divin. I 18. 34). But the office of the prophet, or intermediary interpreter between God and man, was not necessarily confined to the prediction of the future, but also included the expounding of the will of heaven respecting the present and the past. Spengel observes: “dicit ἐμαντεύετο, non ἐμαντεύσατο, i.e. plerumque, non semper.”

καὶ νόμοςἀπόδειξιν] ‘Besides, in forensic pleadings, the law supplies a subject; and when you once have your starting-point, it is easier to find your proof’.

‘And it (namely, public speaking) does not admit of many digressions, such as references to one's opponent or to oneself; or again, appeals to the emotions’. The subject of οὐκ ἔχει is τὸ δημηγορεῖν, all the intervening clauses from ἐκεῖ δέ down to ἀπόδειξιν being parenthetical.

By διατριβαί are meant ‘landing-places’, where the speaker may pause and linger for a while, and whence he may even expatiate into a passing digression. This use of the word, which is not noticed in Liddell and Scott, is defined in Ernesti's Lex. Techn. Gr. as commoratio, excursio et quoddam ἐπεισόδιον, quo orator subinde utitur, ornatus atque amplificationis gratia. Comp. Menander, διαίρεσις ἐπιδεικτικῶν (Spengel's Rhet. Gr. III 338), ἔπειτα (τὰς διατριβὰς) εἶναι τῷ ποιητῇ μὲν ἄλλα (ἄλλως Waitz) προσφόρους: γὰρ ἐξουσία καὶ τοῦ κατὰ σχολὴν λέγειν, καὶ τὸ περιστέλλειν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς κόσμοις καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς οὔτε κόρον οὔτε ἀηδίαν παρίστησι, (καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὡσαύτως ὅτι ἔνιοι τῶν ποιητῶν προσφέρουσι τὰς ἀκαίρους διατριβὰς) συγγραφεῦσι δὲ λογοποίοις ἐλαχίστη ἐξουσία.

ἀλλ᾽ ἥκισταἐξίστηται] ‘On the contrary, there is less room (for digression) in this than in either of the other branches of Rhetoric, unless the speaker quits his proper subject’. With ἐξίστηται, compare supra 14.1, ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ.

οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες] This does not imply that Aristotle himself was absent from Athens while writing the Rhetoric; here and elsewhere he simply uses the phrase which would be most intelligible to his readers, whether at a distance from Athens or not. Poet. V 6, 1449 b 7, τῶν Ἀθήνησιν (κωμωδοποιῶν) Κράτης πρῶτος ἦρξεν κ.τ.λ. and supra II 23. 11 Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ τῷ ῥήτορι. This usage is rather different from the suspicious phrase in c. 11 ad fin., οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.

ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ] The Panegyric of Isocrates is strictly speaking a λόγος συμβουλευτικός, as its ostensible object is to advise Athens and Sparta to unite their forces against Persia, under the lead of the former state, but incidentally it becomes a λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός, in so far as it eulogizes the public services of Athens (§§ 21—98), while it also digresses into the region of λόγος δικανικός when it attacks (κατηγορεῖ) the conduct of Sparta and her partisans (§§ 110—114).

ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ] By this is meant the pamphlet generally known as Isocratis de Pace, where the policy of the Athenian general Chares in the conduct of the Social war is criticised, though his name is not mentioned, § 27, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔξω τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐπιχειροῦντα δημηγορεῖν... τὰ μὲν ἀναμνῆσθαι τῶν δὲ κατηγορῆσαι.

1 At this point the manuscript of Mr Cope's Commentary comes to an end; the rest of the notes have accordingly been supplied by Mr Sandys.

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