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treats very briefly of ‘jests’, as a useful accessory in debate; Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res (Hor. Sat. I 10. 14). The subject of ridiculum is treated by Cicero de Oratore, II 58. 236 seq., Quintil. VI 3.22—112, haec tota disputatio a Graecis περὶ γελοίου inscribitur (§ 22)...usus autem maxime triplex, aut enim ex aliis risum petimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis (§ 23). For other references see note on I 11. 29.

δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίαςὀρθῶς λέγων] ‘Gorgias laid it down, and rightly too, that you should confound (spoil the effect of) the seriousness of your opponents by ridicule, and their ridicule by seriousness’. In a Scholium on Plat. Gorg. p. 473 E, (where Socrates says to Polus) γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστὶν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή, the dictum of Gorgias is quoted in the following form: (δεῖ) τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν ἀντιδίκων γέλωτι ἐκλύειν, τὰ δὲ γελοῖα ταῖς σπουδαῖς ἐκκρούειν (Plato, ed. Baiter and Orelli, p. 910 b 20; Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. III 131). The only material variation between the two forms of quotation is Aristotle's probably intentional alteration of τῶν ἀντιδίκων, which would apply to the forensic branch alone, into τῶν ἐναντίων, which extends the applicability of the remark to all the three branches of Oratory. Dr Thompson observes that “the remark is one which could not have been made by an ordinary man, and the sentence is too nicely balanced for a mere colloquial dictum” (Gorgias, p. 178). The first half of Gorgias' precept may be exemplified by the familiar line, And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley by a grin (Dr Brown's Essay on Satire II 224).

One of the best classical instances of the effective use of pleasantry to neutralize over-strictness on the part of one's opponent is Cicero's goodhumoured banter of his friends Sulpicius and Cato, in the speech pro Murena (§§ 19—30 and §§ 61—65). We may also compare Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) §§ 13 and (as an illustration of meeting jest by earnest) 20, εἶτα γελάσαντες ὑμεῖς ἀφήσετε; οὐ γὰρ ἂν γέλως ὑμῶν ἔλαβεν οὐδένα, εἰ παρὼν ἐτύγχανεν κ.τ.λ. Comp. Or. 23 § 206, ἂν ἓν δὔ ἀστεῖα εἴπωσι...ἀφίετε, Arist. Vesp. 566, οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν μίθους: ἡμῖν οἱ δ᾽ Αἰσώπου τι γέλοιον: οἱ δὲ σκώπτους᾿ ἵν̓ ἐγὼ γελάσω καὶ τὸν θυμὸν κατάθωμαι. See also Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 29, Ueber Lachen und Witz.

ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς] See note on I 11. 29, διώρισται περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

ἁρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ] Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 17, τοῦ ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει. Cic. de Off. I 29. 103, ipsum genus iocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet, § 104, facilis est distinctio ingenui et illiberalis ioci.

τὸ ἁρμόττον αὑτῷ λήψεται] Cic. Orator, § 88, ridiculo sic usurum oratorem, ut nec nimis frequenti, nec scurrile sit...neque aut sua persona aut iudicum aut tempore alienum. There is a kind of quiet irony observable in Aristotle's hint that the orator is to select his special line of pleasantry according as he happens to be a gentleman or the reverse.

εἰρωνείαἑτέρον] ‘Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery: one who resorts to irony makes his joke for his own amusement only, whereas the buffoon does so for an ulterior object’. On βωμολοχία, comp. Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 4, οἱ τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοὶ, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι τοῦ λεγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον. ib. line 34, δὲ βωμολό- χος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει. On εἰρωνεία, comp. ib. c. 13, οἱ δ᾽ εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται: οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν: see also the references in note on II 2. 24, to which may be added Auctor ad Herennium IV 34. 46, where irony is called permutatio.

It is a nice question whether αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα is neuter (as Mr Cope takes it in the text of the Introd. p. 366), or ‘perhaps masculine’ (as he suggests in the note, and as I have ventured to translate it above). The latter is the view supported by Victorius: “Qui utitur dissimulatione, sibique semper in sermone detrahit, atque aliis plusquam vere concedi possit, tribuit, ut ipse oblectetur, voluptatemque ex aliorum stultitia capiat, hoc facit. quare sibi servit: contra scurra ridiculus est, et iocos undique captat, ut alii voluptatem gignat, quod illiberale ac sordidum est, omnia facere, ut alii turpiter inservias.”

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