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‘And further a solecism is made if, in combining (two words) in one phrase (and grammatically connected with a third; as two substs. with one verb, or two verbs with a subst.), you fail to assign one which is equally appropriate to them both (lit. and again, a solecism is made, by not assigning, that is, if you don't unite in construction with them, i. e. with the two verbs or nouns, which are not expressed, one which is appropriate to them both: in other words, if you do assign to them a third word which is appropriate only to one of them). For instance, to see is not common to sound and colour (won't combine with, is not appropriate to, both) but to perceive is’.

σολοικίζειν] See note on σόλοικοι, II 16.2 [and Dem. Or. 45 § 30, quoted on p. 55].

ἐπιζευγνύναι, which occurs again c. 6 § 5, and c. 9 § 7, seems to be technical in this grammatical application, of ‘uniting’ as it were ‘under a vinculum or bracket’; the yoke in the Greek fulfilling a similar function in uniting two animals, as a bracket, in arithmetic or algebra, unites two or more symbols that are placed under it. So that ἐπιζευγνύναι is to place the ζυγόν upon the two words, and so bring them together in one construction. This solecism, as Ar. rightly calls it, usually passes under the respectable name of a figure, grammatical or rhetorical. It is the figure ζεῦγμα or σύλληψις, the office of which has been already explained. It is illustrated at length in the note on I 4. 6.

ψόφον and χρῶμα are ‘governed’ by ἰδών following. Why Aristotle should have chosen to write the alternative, instead of καί the copula, which he clearly means, no one I suppose can guess. I have taken for granted, as Victorius has also done, that he does mean and, and not or, and have so translated it. A bad instance of ζεῦγμα is given in note 1, Introd. p. 295, from the immaculate Isocrates, Paneg. § 80 (καὶ σωτῆρες ἀλλὰ μὴ λυμεῶνες ἀποκαλεῖσθαι).

‘It tends to obscurity too (is an offence against, violation of, perspicuity) if you intend to introduce a number (of words or details) in the middle of a sentence, not to complete the sense first (πρό, before you proceed, lit. not to put first, that which will remove what would else be the obscurity). For instance, “I intended, after having talked to him about this and that and so and so”—here the details are to be introduced; but these are so long, that before the speaker has come to the end of his sentence the hearers have forgotten the beginning—“to start:” instead of, “I was about to start after my conversation with him, and then (when) this and that and so and so happened.” This is μεταξυλογία, interiectio (Quint.), or Parenthesis. See Introd. p. 295.

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