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‘This appropriate language (proper or peculiar to the emotion to be represented) also gives a plausible air to the facts (or statements under consideration): for the mind draws a false inference to the truth of the speaker (the reality of his emotion, and hence to the truth of his statements), because every one under similar circumstances feels the same—so that they (the audience) are led to think, even though the fact is really not so, that the things (the facts of the case, the things under consideration) are as the speaker represents them (αὐτὰ ἔχειν φησί, Buhle), and (besides this) the listener always has a fellow-feeling with one who speaks with emotion, even though what he says is naught (worthless; proves nothing)’.

οἰκεία] comp. infra § 7, ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα τῇ ἕξει.

παραλογίζεται κ.τ.λ.] The fallacy is this. A speaker puts himself into a passion in describing some atrocity imputed to his opponent, assuming the tone of anger or virtuous indignation, which would naturally be provoked by the act as described. People always sympathize with the expression of emotion, and the audience, knowing what it is to be angry themselves, and perceiving by reference to their own experience the ‘appropriateness’ of the language, tone, and gestures, to the true expression of the passion, draw from this the fallacious inference that the speaker must be in earnest, as they were when they were similarly affected, and therefore that the facts that he states must be true: arguing from the truth of the delineation to the truth of the fact stated.

The logic of the fallacy is explained in de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 1 seq. It proceeds from the false assumption, in antecedent and consequent, that they are reciprocally convertible: that if a consequent always follows an antecedent the converse is likewise true, and that the consequent in variably implies the antecedent as well as the antecedent the consequent. Here, the language &c. used is the ordinary sign of the emotion represented, as they themselves know from their own experience; and does usually arise in men as a consequence of such facts as those alleged: the antecedent is then falsely inferred ‘reciprocally’ from the ordinary, but not necessary or universal, consequent. This may be otherwise represented as a confusion between the σημεῖον, the usual and ordinary, and the τεκμήριον, the universal and necessary, accompaniment of something thereby signified. Comp. Poet. XXIV 18, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τουδὶ ὄντος τοδὶ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ υ_στερόν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι γινεσθαι: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. And with the language of our text, infra παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ψυχή. Twining in his note on the passage of the Poet., at the end of n. 222, p. 488 [II p. 352, ed. 2], has quoted and translated this sentence of the Rhetoric.

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