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17. φέρε δή. From here to l. 24 Socrates tries to prove that a thing can have but one ἐναντίον. This is true only if we confine ἐναντίον to the meaning of ‘contradictorily opposite’ throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the ἐναντίον of καλόν is μὴ καλόν: as soon as we say that its ἐναντίον is αἰσχρόν we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them multiform)—since μὴ καλόν is not αἰσχρόν but may be anything in the whole world except καλόν. This part of the argument is therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between contrary and contradictory terms.

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