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Protagoras gives up what he had contended for before, and contents himself with saying that courage alone is quite different from its sister virtues. Socrates endeavours to identify courage and knowledge in a cumbrous proof, against the validity of which Protagoras rightly protests.

2. μόρια μέν. The antithesis to μέν was already expressed in ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι 349B

4. δὲ ἀνδρεία κτλ. Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates' arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on the only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet been discussed: see on 333Cand D and Introduction, p. xiii.

7. ἀκολαστοτάτουςἀνδρειοτάτους δέ: like Otho (Tac. Hist. II. 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines of Byron, which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:

And strange to say, the sons of pleasure, They who have revelled beyond measure In beauty, wassail, wine and treasure, Die calm, and calmer oft than he Whose heritage was misery.

8. ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. The extreme difference (cf. πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον in l. 4) between courage and the other virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’: below in 359Bthe διαφερόντως is omitted as unnecessary in a recapitulation. Sauppe quotes Tim. 23C νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὖσα πόλις ἀρίστη πρός τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως: cf. also Gorg. 487B αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. Various suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.

ἔχε δή. ‘Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460A, aut revocatur, qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot. 349Drsquo; (Wohlrab on Theaet. 186B).

9. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ. Socrates proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι; (2) ἐπιστήμονες are θαρραλέοι (349E l. 16 to 350B l. 25); (3) none who are θαρραλέοι without ἐπιστήμη are ἀνδρεῖοι (350B ll. 25-30). From this he infers that σοφοί (i.e. ἐπιστήμονες) are ἀνδρεῖοι, i.e. that σοφία is ἀνδρεία. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the first place, we have to assume (it is nowhere stated) that θαρραλέοι contains two classes and no more, viz. θαρραλέοι with knowledge and θαρραλέοι without knowledge: the assumption would be (to Socrates) a natural one, since (according to the reasoning in ch. XIX ff.) every one who is not ἐπιστήμων is ἀνεπιστήμων. Now as ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι and no ἀνεπιστήμονες (in the class θαρραλέοι) are ἀνδρεῖοι, it follows that ἀνδρεῖοι are ἐπιστήμονες, but even then the conclusion of Socrates is not warranted— that ἐπιστήμονες are ἀνδρεῖοι, since ἀνδρεῖοι may be only a part of ἐπιστήμονες. Socrates —consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning by another fallacy when about to draw his conclusion in 350B, ll. 31 and 34, where see note.

10. καὶ ἴτας γ᾽, ἔφη: i.e. they not only have θάρρος (which may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In ἰέναι Protagoras contrives to give the derivation of ἴτης: Sauppe refers to the scholiast on Ar. Clouds, 444 ἴτης. ἰταμός, ἀναιδής, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρεῖος is coupled with ἴτης in Symp. 203D and with θρασύς in Ar. Clouds, loc. cit.

11. φέρε δή κτλ. This section (from φέρε δή to ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα in l. 16) is intended to prepare the way for the proof of the third proposition (see on l. 9) in 350B see note on l. 29, and cf. Laches, 192C, where the proof that ἄφρων καρτέρησις is not ἀνδρεία is introduced in much the same way: σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδαὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

14. εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε: ‘as I'm a sane man’. This and similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. Euthyd. 283E, Rep. X. 608D (εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε), Gorg. 511B οἶδαεἰ μὴ κωφός γ᾽ εἰμι.

τὸ μέν τιτὸ δέ τι. See on Euthyphr. 12A. Kroschel quotes Phileb. 13C τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τιναςκακάς.

17. αολυμβῶσιν. This and the next example are given also in Lach. 193 B ff. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving (an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see Thuc. IV. 26. 8) may have been to clean the wells and the like.

21. τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες. See Introduction, p. xxxii.

24. αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν. The notion ‘than’ is expressed twice: see note on Crito, 44C καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα δοκεῖν κτλ., and cf. below, 350Eand (with Sauppe) Hdt. VIII. 86 ἐγένοντομακρῷ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ.

29. αἰσχρὸν μεντἄνἀνδρεία: and if αἰσχρόν, not ἀρετή (which it is), since all ἀρετή is καλόν (349E. Cf. Lach. 182C δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναι and with the general sentiment Meno, 88B οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἀνδρεία ἀλλ᾽ οἶον θάππος τι: οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαππῇ ἄνθπωρος, βλάρτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;

30. λέγεις: the present is idiomatically used in referring to an earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on ὅπερ λέγω in Apol. 21A. With λέγεις followed by an accusative in this sense compare Symp. 199E πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν: Ἔρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς τινός;

31. οὐχὶτοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι. This Protagoras did not say, but only that οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι: see 349E For this reason Sauppe and others reject τούς before θαρραλέους, and in favour of this urge the reply of Protagoras (καὶ νῦν γε): but inasmuch as (1) οὐκοῦν οὗτοιμαινόμενοι φαίνονται seems to be intended to be incompatible with τοὺς ἀνδρείους οὐχὶεἷναι, (2) θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι in l. 35 clearly implies that θαρραλέοι are conceived of as ἀνδρεῖοι (no less than ἀνδρεῖοι as θαρραλέοι), we must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS. reading. Protagoras' καὶ νῦν γε is an unwary admission: he does not at first catch the difference between οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν οἱ θαρραλέοι and οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι θαρραλέοι, and Socrates avails himself of his opponent's slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this misrepresentation could only be expressed as ἀνδρεῖοι are σοφοί ( = ἐπιστήμονες), not σοφοί are ἀνδρεῖοι: see on 349Eand 350D

34. ἐκεῖ, i.e. in the case of θάρρος based on σοφία, illustrated in 350A Sauppe (after Schöne) reads οἳ σοφώτατοι, οὗτοι κτλ.: but οἱ σοφώτατοι need not go closely with οὗτοι (which is resumptive) any more than οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες with the preceding οὗτοι. There is a kind of chiasmus in the order οὗτοιοἱθαρραλέοι) (οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι.

36. οὐ καλῶςμνημονεύεις κτλ. Protagoras sees now that ‘All brave are bold’ is not equivalent to ‘All bold are brave’, and rectifies his καὶ νῦν γε by pointing out that he originally said only ‘All brave are bold’ but he confines his attention to this point, without touching on the fundamental flaws in Socrates' argument from 349Eto 350B

39. ὡμολόγησα: in 349E

40. τότε ἤρου. So B and T. In τότε there is perhaps a latent contrast to καὶ νῦν γε of l. 31. Protagoras is correcting his recent slip—had you asked me then (viz. at 349E, I should have answered rightly. τοῦτο has inferior MSS. authority.

41. τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν. The οὐ after ὡς is due to a confusion between (1) τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας and (2) οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ κτλ. The insertion of οὐ is the more natural because after verbs of refuting and the like the object clause gives what is maintained and not what is refuted, whence ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ, ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐ etc.

45. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει κτλ. Protagoras ignores Socrates' third proposition in 350B(25-30), where it is shown that θάρρος without ἐπιστήμη is not ἀνδρεία; see next note.

48. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ., i.e. you might as well argue (1) οἱ ἰσχυροί are δυνατοί, (2) οἱ ἐπιστήμονες are δυνατοί, therefore οἱ ἐπιστήμονες are ἰσχυροί. This would only be correct if for (1) we substituted οἱ δυνατοί are ἰσχυροί. To make Protagoras' picture of Socrates' argument complete, we should have to add (3) none who are δυνατοί without ἐπιστήμη are ἰσχυροί—but this is not true, whereas Socrates' third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates' reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras' objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates' conclusion as expressed in 350C(33-6), and that is why Socrates makes no reply.

58. ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμηςτὴν δύναμιν κτλ. Protagoras says in effect: δύναμις and ἰσχύς are of the body, θάρσος and ἀνδρεία of the soul. δύναμις may come from knowledge (as when one has learnt how to wrestle: above 350E, or from madness or rage (as in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for vengeance; such men have no real physical strength or ἰσχύς as it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of δύναμις). ἰσχύς comes from natural constitution (φύσις) and proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense). Similarly θάρσος may result from art (τέχνη is substituted for ἐπιστήμη in view of the illustrations in 350A, from rage or madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna); ἀνδρεία comes from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf. Rep. III. 410D τὸ θυμοειδὲςτῆς φύσεωςὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδπεῖον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληπόν τε καὶ χαλερὸν γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός).

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hide References (24 total)
  • Commentary references from this page (24):
    • Aristophanes, Clouds, 444
    • Herodotus, Histories, 8.86
    • Plato, Republic, 410d
    • Plato, Apology, 21a
    • Plato, Crito, 44c
    • Plato, Euthyphro, 12a
    • Plato, Theaetetus, 186b
    • Plato, Symposium, 199e
    • Plato, Laches, 182c
    • Plato, Meno, 88b
    • Plato, Euthydemus, 283e
    • Plato, Gorgias, 487b
    • Plato, Gorgias, 511b
    • Plato, Protagoras, 333c
    • Plato, Protagoras, 349b
    • Plato, Protagoras, 349d
    • Plato, Protagoras, 349e
    • Plato, Protagoras, 350a
    • Plato, Protagoras, 350b
    • Plato, Protagoras, 350c
    • Plato, Protagoras, 350d
    • Plato, Protagoras, 350e
    • Plato, Protagoras, 359b
    • Plato, Timaeus, 23c
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