Protagoras gives up what he had contended for before, and
contents himself with saying that courage alone is quite different
from its sister virtues. Socrates endeavours to identify courage
and knowledge in a cumbrous proof, against the validity of
which Protagoras rightly protests.
2. μόρια μέν
. The antithesis to μέν
was already expressed in
ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι 349B
4. ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία κτλ.
Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates'
arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on
the only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet
been discussed: see on 333C
and D and Introduction, p. xiii.
7. ἀκολαστοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ
: like Otho (Tac.
II. 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines
of Byron, which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:
And strange to say, the sons of pleasure,
They who have revelled beyond measure
In beauty, wassail, wine and treasure,
Die calm, and calmer oft than he
Whose heritage was misery.
8. ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως
. The extreme difference
(cf. πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον
in l. 4) between courage and the other
virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the
other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’:
below in 359B
is omitted as unnecessary in a
recapitulation. Sauppe quotes Tim. 23C ἡ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὖσα πόλις
ἀρίστη πρός τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως
cf. also Gorg. 487B αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος
suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.
. ‘Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam
viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460A, aut revocatur,
qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot. 349D
rsquo; (Wohlrab on Theaet. 186B
9. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ.
proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) ἀνδρεῖοι
; (2) ἐπιστήμονες
l. 16 to 350B
l. 25); (3) none who
From this he infers that σοφοί
) are ἀνδρεῖοι
. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the
first place, we have to assume
(it is nowhere stated) that θαρραλέοι
contains two classes and no more, viz. θαρραλέοι
knowledge and θαρραλέοι
without knowledge: the assumption
would be (to Socrates) a
natural one, since (according to
the reasoning in ch. XIX ff.)
every one who is not ἐπιστήμων
. Now as
(in the class θαρραλέοι
) are ἀνδρεῖοι
, it follows
but even then the conclusion
of Socrates is not warranted—
may be only a
part of ἐπιστήμονες
—consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning
by another fallacy when about to draw his conclusion in 350B
, ll. 31 and 34, where see note.
10. καὶ ἴτας γ᾽, ἔφη
: i.e. they not only have θάρρος
may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In ἰέναι
contrives to give the derivation of ἴτης
: Sauppe refers to the
scholiast on Ar. Clouds, 444 ἴτης. ἰταμός, ἀναιδής, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν
χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρεῖος
is coupled with ἴτης
203D and with θρασύς
in Ar. Clouds, loc. cit.
11. φέρε δή κτλ.
This section (from φέρε δή
to ὡς οἷόν τε
in l. 16) is intended to prepare the way for the proof
of the third proposition (see on l. 9) in 350B
see note on l. 29,
and cf. Laches,
192C, where the proof that ἄφρων καρτέρησις
is introduced in much the same way: σχεδὸν γάρ τι
οἶδα—ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι
14. εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε
: ‘as I'm a sane man’. This and
similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. Euthyd. 283E
608D (εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε
), Gorg. 511B οἶδα—εἰ μὴ κωφός γ᾽ εἰμι
τὸ μέν τι—τὸ δέ τι
. See on Euthyphr. 12A
13C τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ
. This and the next example are given also
193 B ff. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving
(an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see Thuc. IV. 26. 8)
may have been to clean the wells and the like.
21. τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες
. See Introduction, p. xxxii.
24. αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν—ἤ
. The notion ‘than’ is expressed twice:
see note on Crito, 44C καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ
, and cf. below, 350E
and (with Sauppe) Hdt. VIII. 86
ἐγένοντο—μακρῷ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν ἢ πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ
29. αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν—ἀνδρεία
: and if αἰσχρόν
, not ἀρετή
(which it is), since all ἀρετή
. Cf. Lach. 182C ἡ δέ
γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναι
and with the general sentiment
Meno, 88B οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ᾽ οἶον
θάππος τι: οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαππῇ ἄνθπωρος, βλάρτεται, ὅταν δὲ
σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;
: the present is idiomatically used in referring to an
earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on ὅπερ λέγω
. With λέγεις
followed by an accusative in this sense
compare Symp. 199E πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν: ὁ Ἔρως
ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;
31. οὐχὶτοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι
. This Protagoras did not say,
but only that οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι
: see 349E
For this reason
Sauppe and others reject τούς
, and in favour
of this urge the reply of Protagoras (καὶ νῦν γε
): but inasmuch as
(1) οὐκοῦν οὗτοι—μαινόμενοι φαίνονται
seems to be intended to be
incompatible with τοὺς ἀνδρείους οὐχὶ—εἷναι
, (2) θαρραλεώτατοι
δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι
in l. 35 clearly implies that θαρραλέοι
conceived of as ἀνδρεῖοι
(no less than ἀνδρεῖοι
must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS.
reading. Protagoras' καὶ νῦν γε
is an unwary admission: he does not
at first catch the difference between οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν οἱ θαρραλέοι
and οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι θαρραλέοι
, and Socrates avails himself of his
opponent's slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this
misrepresentation could only be expressed as ἀνδρεῖοι
( = ἐπιστήμονες
), not σοφοί
: see on 349E
, i.e. in the case of θάρρος
based on σοφία
Sauppe (after Schöne) reads οἳ σοφώτατοι, οὗτοι κτλ.
but οἱ σοφώτατοι
need not go closely with οὗτοι
(which is resumptive) any more than οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες
with the preceding οὗτοι
. There is a kind of chiasmus in the order οὗτοι—
) (οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι
36. οὐ καλῶς—μνημονεύεις κτλ
. Protagoras sees now that
‘All brave are bold’ is not equivalent to ‘All bold are brave’, and
rectifies his καὶ νῦν γε
by pointing out that he originally said only
‘All brave are bold’ but he confines his attention to this point,
without touching on the fundamental flaws in Socrates' argument from 349E
: in 349E
40. τότε ἤρου
. So B and T. In τότε
there is perhaps a latent
contrast to καὶ νῦν γε
of l. 31. Protagoras is correcting his recent
slip—had you asked me then (viz. at 349E
, I should have
answered rightly. τοῦτο
has inferior MSS. authority.
41. τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν
. The οὐ
is due to a confusion between (1) τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς
οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας
and (2) οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς
θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ κτλ.
The insertion of
is the more natural because after verbs of refuting and the
like the object clause gives what is maintained and not what is
refuted, whence ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ, ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐ
45. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει κτλ.
Protagoras ignores Socrates'
proposition in 350B
(25-30), where it is shown that θάρρος
is not ἀνδρεία
; see next note.
48. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ.
, i.e. you might as well argue
(1) οἱ ἰσχυροί
, (2) οἱ ἐπιστήμονες
. This would only be correct if for
(1) we substituted οἱ δυνατοί
. To make Protagoras'
picture of Socrates' argument complete, we should have to add
(3) none who are δυνατοί
is not true, whereas Socrates' third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates'
reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras'
objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates' conclusion as expressed in 350C
(33-6), and that is why Socrates
makes no reply.
58. ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης—τὴν δύναμιν κτλ.
Protagoras says in
are of the body, θάρσος
the soul. δύναμις
may come from knowledge (as when one has
learnt how to wrestle: above 350E
, or from madness or rage (as
in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for
vengeance; such men have no real physical strength or ἰσχύς
it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of
comes from natural constitution (φύσις
proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense).
may result from art (τέχνη
is substituted for
in view of the illustrations in 350A
, from rage or
madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna); ἀνδρεία
from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf.
Rep. III. 410D τὸ θυμοειδὲς—τῆς φύσεως—ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν
ἀνδπεῖον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληπόν τε καὶ χαλερὸν
γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός