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ὁ ἀγαθός -- ὁ πονηρός. Socrates unfairly neglects the δοκῶν, although according to Polemarchus' amended definition the ἀγαθός who seemed πονηρός would not be a friend, nor the πονηρός who seemed ἀγαθός an enemy. Polemarchus' theory indeed points to a division of men into three classes: friends, enemies, and those who are neither (viz. those who seem good and are bad, and those who seem bad and are good). The somewhat ideal view that the ἀγαθός is φίλος and the πονηρὸς ἐχθρός is genuinely Socratic (cf. Mem. II 6. 14 ff.): it is part of the wider view that all men desire the good (Symp. 206 A, Gorg. 467 C ff.). προσθεῖναι -- βλάπτειν . ἤ after τῷ δικαίῳ must mean ‘or in other words’: cf. infra 349 E πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν and Phaed. 85 D ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, ἢ λόγου θείου τινός (so the Bodleian, but ἤ is cancelled by many editors). The late expression Φαίδων ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς involves essentially the same use of ἤ. .The clause ὡς—κακῶς is summed up in τούτῳ, and the whole sentence means: ‘do you wish us to make an addition to our account of justice, or in other words to say now—in addition to our original definition where we said it was just to do good to friends and harm to enemies—that it is just to do good to friends if they are good etc.’ This explanation is (I think) the least vulnerable one, if the text is to be retained. With προσθεῖναι used absolutely cf. 339 B. For other views see App. III.
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