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ὁποτέρως is virtually indirect: translate ‘whichever you please, then.’ Hermann reads ποτέρως, but the text ought not to be changed either here or in Euthyd. 271 A τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγου;—τίς ἦν; Ὁπότερον καὶ <*>ρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων: οὐ γὰρ εἶς, ἀλλὰ δὔ ἤστην, i.e. (it depends on) which of these you are asking about etc. Cf. also <*>τις—αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή 353 C. In Rep. IX 578 E ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ ὁπόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέσθαι αὐτόν and Gorg. 522 A, the ὁπόσῳ is perhaps due to the proximity of οἴει, which gives the question a certain semblance of indirectness; ὁποίῳ in Alc. I 110 C and ὁποίου infra 400 A may be similarly explained; while in Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως—ἀλλ᾽ ὅ τι ἐστὶν τοῦτο, it is casy to supply a verb of saying. Possibly (as Heindorf thinks) ὅτι (B ὃ τί) in Euthyd. 287 B is corrupt for τί, as <*>πως for πῶς in Charm. 170 C. In Lys. 212 C ὁπότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλου ἐστιν; ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου—ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος; we ought no doubt to read ὁ πότερος (with Hermann). 348B - 350C Thrasymachus now identifies Justice with Simplicity, Injustice with Discretion. Injustice he assigns to Virtue and Wisdom, Justice to their opposites. He further declares that Injustice is strong and beautiful, and is ready to predicate of it all that is usually predicated of Justice (348 B—349 B). Socrates then commences a very subtle refutation, addressing himself to the assertion that Injustice is Virtue and Wisdom (349 B—350 C). (1) The just man endeavours to overreach the unjust, but not the just: the unjust man to overreach both the just and the unjust. Therefore, generally, the just man endeavours to overreach the unlike; the unjust man to overreach both the like and the unlike. Further, the unjust man, being wise and good, resembles the wise and good, while the just man, being foolish and evil, resembles the foolish and evil; in brief, each is as those whom he resembles. (2) Again, from the analogy of the arts it is seen that the man who knows tries to overreach the unlike, while the ignorant man tries to overreach both the like and the unlike. But the man who knows is wise, and the wise man good; we may therefore in the last sentence substitute ‘wise and good man’ for ‘the man who knows,’ and ‘foolish and evil’ for ‘ignorant.’ Comparing, then, conclusions (1) and (2), we see that the just are like the wise and good, that is, are wise and good (since they are such as those whom they resemble), while the unjust in like manner are foolish and evil. Thus is refuted the thesis that Injustice is Virtue and Wisdom. ff. The second division of Socrates' reply begins here. Though professedly attacking the section of Thrasymachus' speech contained in 343 C— 344 C, and summed up in the theory that the life of the Unjust is better than that of the Just (347 E), it is not till 352 D that Socrates directly grapples with this theory. In the meantime, certain further deliver ances of Thrasymachus on the nature of Injustice are refuted by means of arguments which have an indirect bearing on the question at issue (see 352 D φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν: ὅμως δ᾽ ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον). This part of Socrates' reply may therefore be regarded as itself subdivided into two parts—the first being an indirect, the second a direct refutation of Thrasymachus. Cf. 352 D note
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