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μάλιστα κακουργία . μάλιστα is omitted in Ξ and one or two other MSS; but cf. VII 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία, VIII 564 A εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν (with Stallbaum ad loc.), and other examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 526. That μάλιστα should be taken with κακουργία is clear from μεγίστη βλάβη and κακουργίαν τὴν μεγίστην.

πάλιν: not ‘again,’ but ‘conversely,’ “umgekehrt” (Schneider).

ἑκάστου -- πόλει is cancelled by Herwerden as a marginal note on οἰκειοπραγία. The words add to the weight and impressiveness of the sentence, and have a decidedly Platonic sound.

τοὐναντίον ἐκείνου . ἐκείνου is ‘the other,’ i.e. πολυπραγμοσύνης (rather than ἀδικίας); and τοὐναντίον is probably nominative, and not adverbial accusative. So also Schneider. It is not necessary to add ὄν after τοὐναντίον as I formerly did. The style of argument is the familiar τόπος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων (see Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1397^{a} 7 ff.).

To sum up. Civic Justice is the fulfilment of the maxim τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττειν by the three classes in the City. There is nothing transcendental or metaphysical about it, as Krohn rightly observes (Pl. St. p. 48); it is simply the principle εἷς <*>ν κατὰ φύσιν applied to the three component units or factors of the State. Cf. II 370 A note It is moreover the soil out of which all the other virtues grow; its fruits are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, of which the last appears in the Farmers and Artisans, the last two in the Auxiliaries, while the Rulers possess all three (432 A note). Thus all the Virtues meet in Justice (ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ᾽ ἀρετή ᾿νι ap. Arist. Eth. Nic. V 3. 1129^{b} 25 ff.) and it is in Justice, not in σοφία (as the historical Socrates held Mem. III 9. 5), that the true unity of Virtue consists. Plato's Justice is in reality not so much a specific virtue, as Virtue or Righteousness in general: καὶ οὔθ᾽ ἕσπερος οὔθ᾽ ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός (Arist. l.c.): cf. 442 E note He desired to build a city, wherein Righteousness dwelleth (καινοὺς δὲ οὐρανοὺς καὶ γῆν καινὴνπροσδοκῶμεν, ἐν οἷς δικαιοσύνη κατοικεῖ 1 Pet. 3. 13), and interpreted Righteousness as the law of εἷς <*>ν κατὰ φύσιν. In taking this view of political δικαιοσύνη, there is every reason to suppose (with Krohn l.c. p. 46) that Plato was not uninfluenced by the πολυπραγμοσύνη (as he conceived it) of Athenian democracy, although it is in reality a particular psychological interpretation of Nature's law of ἁπλότης that forms the true philosophical basis of the City described in Books II—IV. See also on II 370 A.

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