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καὶ περὶ δικαίου κτλ. This is the first appearance of the Theory of ‘Ideas’ properly so called in the Republic. It should be carefully noted that Plato is not attempting to prove the theory: Glauco, in fact, admits it from the first. The Theory was approached from two directions, from the side of Mind or Thought (οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν Arist. Met. 19. 990^{b} 12), and from the side of Existence (τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν l.c. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1, pp. 652 ff.). It is the first of these methods which is followed throughout the present investigation. The εἴδη provide objects for Knowledge, as opposed to Opinion, and they are capable of being known: see 476 C, E ff., 478 A, 479 E. Throughout a large part of the following discussion, we are not much concerned with the Ideas as strictly transcendent entities or χωριστά, existing apart not only from particulars but also from the knowing Mind, for it is only in so far as he knows the Ideas that the philosopher-king can make use of them (cf. VI 484 C, D): he cannot possibly frame political institutions on the model of Ideas which he does not know. We must admit that the philosopher's apprehension of the Ideas is the relevant consideration here (cf. VI 484 C ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα), but it is none the less true, and the fact cannot be too strongly insisted on, that the Ideas themselves are not mere concepts of the mind, but have a separate and independent existence of their own. See the Appendix to Book VII ‘On Plato's Dialectic.’ The translation ‘Class’ for εἶδος (Jowett) is inappropriate on many grounds: ‘Form’ is better: but it will be most convenient to retain the usual expression ‘Idea,’ although it is not a translation, but a transliteration, whose unfortunate identity with the English word ‘idea’ is responsible in no small measure for many imperfect and erroneous interpretations of Plato's Ideal Theory. The German translators mostly render by ‘Begriff.’ The further specifications of the Ideal Theory in this passage are as follows. Each Idea is, in and by itself, one (476 A), changeless (479 A, 479 E), and perfect (VI 484 C, D), contrasting, in each of these respects, with the phenomena which ‘partake’ of or ‘imitate’ it (476 D note). Plato does not now touch on the question how it is that Mind has knowledge of a perfection above and beyond what can be derived from observation and experience. This faculty of Mind is elsewhere—in the Meno and the Phaedo—explained by the pre-existence of the Soul. See on 476 C.

Krohn has pointed out (Pl. St. p. 96) that the examples of εἴδη now cited by Plato are all of them attributes—δίκαιον, ἄδικον, ἀγαθόν, κακόν, etc. It does not however follow from this that the theory of Ideas is still in process of formation: on the contrary, the appeal to Glauco just above (475 E) implies that it was already a recognised dogma of the Platonic school. The simple explanation is that Plato prefers to cite relevant examples. The εἴδη of δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, καλόν etc. are precisely those which it is the philosopher's duty to introduce into the practical administration of the State: cf. VI 484 C and X 596 A note

αὐτὸ μὲν κτλ.: ‘each is, in itself’ (i.e. viewed apart from its association with πράξεις etc.), ‘one, but by reason of their partnership with actions and bodies and one another, they each of them make their appearance everywhere and appear many.’ The εἷδος of Beautiful, for example, is, in itself, one, but by κοινωνία with e.g. an act of heroism, a sunset, a river, etc., it appears many. Similarly the εἷδος of Beautiful appears many by κοινωνία with other εἴδη, as when we say ‘the Good is beautiful,’ the ‘Useful is beautiful’ etc. The expression πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα is better suited to describe Ideas allied with sensible particulars, than Ideas allied with Ideas; but statements involving the κοινωνία of Ideas with Ideas ‘make their appearance everywhere’ as well as those which connect the objects of sense with Ideas. In all such cases the statements themselves are of course true or false according as the κοινωνία is real or imaginary; but whether they are false or true, the appearance of plurality which they give to the Idea is always fallacious. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 738 note 3 and see on 479 D. The words ἀλλήλων κοινωνία are further discussed in App. VII.

πρακτικούς: ‘men of action.’ These were not mentioned in 475 D, but they clearly belong to the same category.

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