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ἀλήθειαν: viz. the Ideas, and ultimately the Idea of Good (517 B). γενέσεως. See on 519 A. ἤ=‘alioquin’ (V 463 D note). Liebhold absurdly adds ἔστιν after γενέσθαι. λογιστικῷ: ‘a reasoning proficient in the art of calculation,’ with a play on λογιστικός in its deeper sense, as Shorey points out (Chicago Studies I p. 222 note 4), comparing the double meaning of παρανομία in IV 424 D. λογισμόν in 524 B prepared the way for this; and the same ambiguity partly explains why Plato puts λογιστική rather than ἀριθμητική in the forefront of this discussion (cf. λογιστικήν below and λογισμούς in C). We readily feel that λογιστική will arouse τὸ λογιστικόν. Cf. also X 602 E note καὶ πείθειν . προσῆκον ἂν εἴη is carried on: cf. I 334 B note and infra 530 B. J. and C.'s explanation, that “μάθημα (or αὐτό) is to be repeated in the accusative after νομοθετῆσαι and πείθειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι,” is untenable. τῶν μεγίστων is idiomatically used of government: cf. 534 D and Apol. 22 D with my note ad loc.
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