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πληρώσει prepares the way for the coming argument, in which Pleasure is viewed as πλήρωσις, Pain as κένωσις (cf. Phil. 31 E ff.). So far, we have been told only that they are κινήσεις (583 E).

ὥσπερ δὲ κτλ. The equations are of course Black=Pain, Grey=Absence of Pain, White=Pleasure. Plato's simile is particularly appropriate, because Grey is a mixture of white and black (Tim. 68 C φαιὸν δὲ λευκοῦ τε καὶ μέλανος sc. κράσει γίγνεται), just as λυπῆς ἀπαλλαγή according to this discussion (584 C al.) may be regarded as a mixture of pleasure and pain (584 C, 586 B), or in other words only a ‘mixed’ pleasure. With the simile itself cf. Arist. Phys. V 1. 224^{b} 34 τὸ φαιὸν λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ μέλαν καὶ μέλαν πρὸς τὸ λευκόν and ib. 5. 229^{b} 16 ff. The best MSS omit δέ after ὥσπερ, and all the MSS have καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην instead of καὶ τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην (see cr. n.), but it is impossible to believe that they are right. On the text and other views of this passage see App. V.

ἔχει. There is slight MS authority for ἔχοι, which Neukirch (in Pl. Pol. quaest. phil. I p. 47) and Richter (Fleck. Jb. 1867 p. 147) approve. ἔχει is sound enough: cf. Prot. 315 E οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰτυγχάνει ὤν.

585A - 586C Consider the question also in this way. Hunger, thirst etc. are modes of physical depletion; and Ignorance is a form of spiritual emptiness. He who partakes of food, and he who acquires Knowledge or Reason, are each ‘filled’; but which of them is the more truly ‘filled’? Knowledge and its kindred have more reality and truth than Food etc., Soul than Body: hence the acquisition of knowledge is a truer form of replenishment than the other. The resulting Pleasure will therefore be more true. Those who are strangers to wisdom and virtue know nothing of true delights, but fight with one another for delusive and unsatisfying joys.

ὧδέ γ᾽ οὖν. “In his γε vim acuit vocabuli ὧδε, sed οὖν inservit continuandae argumentationi. Ferri non potest γοῦν, quod ad universam sententiam pertineret, habens illud vim asseverandi cum restrictione quadam” (Stallbaum). Contrast I 335 E, VII 527 D notes Here most of the MSS appear to have γε οὖν.

οὐχὶ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα κτλ. For the sense cf. Phil. 31 E and (in general) VII 519 A, B notes The form πεῖνα (see cr. n.) is supported also by IV 437 D; but πείνη is in itself legitimate and occurs tolerably often in Plato, as Schneider shews.

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  • Commentary references from this page (3):
    • Plato, Philebus, 31e
    • Plato, Protagoras, 315e
    • Plato, Timaeus, 68c
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