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μέγιστον -- τὸ πρῶτον. The ἐπιθυμητικόν is the largest part of soul: see IV 442 A and II 379 C note

σύναπτε τοίνυν κτλ. Krohn finds fault with Plato for failing to preserve the essential unity of the individual throughout this comparison (Pl. St. p. 229). But, according to Plato, the true unity of the individual is realised only through the subjection of the two lower ‘parts’ of soul to the highest (586 E note); and this subjection is described in 589 A, B.

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