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Jacob D. Cox, Major-General, U. S. V.
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“An affair of outposts.”
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The reasons which made it important to occupy
West Virginia with national troops were two-fold — political and strategic.
The people were strongly attached to the
Union, and had opposed the secession of
Virginia, of which State they were then a part.
But few slaves were owned by them, and all their interests bound them more to
Ohio and
Pennsylvania than to
eastern Virginia.
Under the influence of
Lincoln's administration, strongly backed, and, indeed, chiefly represented, by
Governor Dennison of
Ohio, a movement was on foot to organize a loyal
Virginia government, repudiating that of
Governor Letcher and the State convention as self-destroyed by the act of secession.
Governor Dennison had been urging
McClellan to cross the
Ohio to protect and encourage the loyal men when, on the 26th of May, news came that the
Confederates had taken the initiative, and that some bridges had been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad a little west of
Grafton, the crossing of the
Monongahela River, where the two western branches of the railroad unite, viz., the line from
Wheeling and that from
Parkersburg.
[See map, p. 129.] The great line of communication between
Washington and the west had thus been cut, and action on our part was made necessary.
Governor Dennison had anticipated the need of more troops than the thirteen regiments which had been organized as
Ohio's quota under the
President's first call.
He had organized nine other regiments, numbering them consecutively with those mustered into the national service, and had put them in camps near the
Ohio River, where they could occupy
Wheeling,
Parkersburg, and the mouth of the
Great Kanawha at a moment's notice.
Two Union regiments were also organizing in
West Virginia itself, at
Wheeling and
Parkersburg, of which the first was commanded by
Colonel (afterward General)
B. F. Kelley.
West Virginia was in
McClellan's department, and the formal authority to act had come from
Washington on the 24th, in the shape of an inquiry from
General Scott whether the enemy's force at
Grafton could be counteracted.
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The dispatch directed
McClellan to “act promptly.”
On the 27th
Colonel Kelley was sent by rail from
Wheeling to drive off the enemy and protect the railroad.
The hostile parties withdrew at
Kelley's approach, and the bridges were quickly rebuilt.
At the same time several of the
Ohio regiments were ordered across the river, and a brigade of Indiana volunteers under
Brigadier-General Thomas A. Morris was sent forward by rail from
Indianapolis.
Morris reached
Grafton on the 1st of June, and was intrusted with the command of all the troops in
West Virginia.
He found that
Colonel Kelley had already planned an expedition against the enemy, who had retired southward to
Philippi, about thirty miles from
Grafton.
Morris approved the plan, but enlarged it by sending another column under
Colonel Ebenezer Dumont of the 7th Indiana to cooperate with
Kelley.
Both columns were directed to make a night march, starting from points on the railroad about twelve miles apart, and converging on
Philippi, which they were to attack at daybreak of June 3d.
Each column consisted of about 1,500 men, and
Dumont's had with it 2 field-pieces of artillery, smooth 6-pounders.
The Confederate force was commanded by
Colonel G. A. Porterfield, of the Virginia volunteers, and was something less than a thousand strong, about one-fourth cavalry.
1
The night was dark and stormy, and
Porterfield's raw troops had not learned picket duty.
The concerted movement against them was more successful than such marches commonly are, and
Porterfield's first notice of danger was the opening of the artillery upon his sleeping troops.
It had been expected that the two columns would inclose the enemy's camp and capture the whole; but, though in disorderly rout,
Porterfield succeeded, by personal coolness and courage, in getting them off with but few casualties and the loss of a few arms.
The camp equipage and supplies were, of course, captured.
Colonel Kelley was wounded by a pistol-shot in the breast, which was the only injury reported on the
National side; no prisoners were taken, nor did any dead or wounded fall into our hands.
Porterfield retreated to
Beverly, some thirty miles farther to the south-east, and the
National forces occupied
Philippi.
The telegraphic reports had put the
Confederate force at 2000 and their loss at 15
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killed.
This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners also, and the newspapers gave it the air of a considerable victory.
The campaign thus opened with apparent éclat for
McClellan, and the “
Philippi races,” as they were locally called, greatly encouraged the
Union men of
West Virginia and correspondingly depressed the secessionists.
McClellan, however, was still of the opinion that his most promising line of operations would be by the
Great Kanawha Valley, and he retained in their camp of instruction the
Ohio regiments which were mustered into the service of the
United States, sending into
Virginia only those known as the
State forces.
Another reason for this was that the older regiments were now nearly at the end of their three-months' enlistment, and were trying to reorganize under the
President's second call, which required enlistment for “three years or the war.”
3 Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports that forces of the enemy were gathering at
Beverly,
McClellan determined to proceed in person to that region with his best-prepared troops, postponing his
Kanawha plan till north-
western Virginia should be cleared of hostile forces.
Reference to the map will show that as the
Potomac route was usually in the hands of the
Northern forces, a Confederate occupation of
West Virginia must be made either by the
Staunton and
Beverly road, or by the
Kanawha route, of which the key-point west of the mountains was
Gauley Bridge.
General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines--
General Henry A. Wise upon the
Kanawha route, and
General Robert S. Garnett to
Beverly.
Upon
Porterfield's retreat to
Beverly after the “
Philippi races,”
Garnett, who had been an officer in the United States army, was ordered to
Beverly to assume command and to stimulate the recruiting and organization of regiments from the secession element of the population.
Some
Virginia regiments, raised on the eastern slope of the mountains, were sent with him,
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and to these was soon added the 1st Georgia.
On the 1st of July he reported his force as 4500 men, but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a complete failure, only 23 having joined.
The
West Virginians, he says, “are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment.”
Other reinforcements were promised
Garnett, but none reached him except the 44th Virginia regiment, which arrived at
Beverly the very day of the action, but which did not take part in the fighting.
Tygart's Valley, in which
Beverly lies, is between
Cheat Mountain on the east, and
Rich Mountain on the west.
The river, of the same name as the valley, flows northward about fifteen miles, then turns westward, breaking through the ridge, passes by
Philippi, and afterward crosses the railroad at
Grafton.
The
Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike divides at
Beverly, the
Parkersburg route passing over a saddle in
Rich Mountain, and the Wheeling route following the river to
Philippi.
The ridge north of the river at the gap is known as
Laurel Mountain, and the road passes over a spur of it.
Garnett regarded the two positions at
Rich Mountain and
Laurel Mountain as the gates to all the region beyond, and to the
West.
A rough mountain road, barely passable, connected the
Laurel Mountain position with
Cheat River on the east, and it was possible to go by this way northward through
St. George to the
Northwestern Turnpike, turning the mountain ranges.
[See map, p. 131.]
Garnett thought the pass over
Rich Mountain much the stronger and more easily held, and he therefore intrenched there about 1,300 of his men and
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4 cannon, under command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram.
The position chosen was on a spur of the mountain near its western base, and it was rudely fortified with breastworks of logs covered with an abattis of slashed timber along its front.
The remainder of his force he placed in a similar fortified position on the road at
Laurel Mountain, where he also had four guns, of which one was rifled.
Here he commanded in person.
His depot of supplies was at
Beverly, which was 16 miles from the
Laurel Mountain position and 5 from that at
Rich Mountain.
He was pretty accurately informed of
McClellan's forces and movements, and his preparations had barely been completed by the 9th of July, when the
Union general appeared in his front.
McClellan entered
West Virginia in person on the 22d of June, and on the 23d issued from
Grafton a proclamation to the inhabitants.
He had gradually collected his forces along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which, at the time of the affair at
Rich Mountain, consisted of 16
Ohio regiments, 9 from
Indiana and 2 from
West Virginia; in all, 27 regiments with 4 batteries of artillery of 6 guns each, 2 troops of cavalry, and an independent company of riflemen.
Of his batteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a company of regulars (Company I, 4th U. S. Artillery), was with him awaiting mountain howitzers, which arrived a little later.
4 The regiments varied somewhat in strength, but all were recently organized, and must have averaged at least 700 men each, making the whole force about 20,000.
Of these, about 5000 were guarding the railroad and its bridges for some 200 miles, under the command of
Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, of the Ohio Militia; a strong brigade under
Brigadier-General Morris, of
Indiana, was at
Philippi, and the rest were in three brigades forming the immediate command of
McClellan, the brigadiers being
General W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. A.,
General Newton Schleich, of
Ohio, and
Colonel Robert L. McCook, of
Ohio.
On the date of his proclamation
McClellan intended, as he informed
General Scott, to move his principal column to
Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence at once upon
Beverly; but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2d that he reached
Buckhannon, which is 24 miles west of
Beverly, on the
Parkersburg branch
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of the turnpike.
Before leaving
Grafton the rumors he heard had made him estimate
Garnett's force at 6000 or 7000 men, of which the larger part were at
Laurel Mountain in front of
General Morris.
On the 6th of July he moved
McCook with two regiments to Middle Fork Bridge, about half-way to
Beverly, and on the same day ordered
Morris to march with his brigade from
Philippi to a position one and a half miles in front of
Garnett's principal camp, which was promptly done.
Three days later,
McClellan concentrated the three brigades of his own column at
Roaring Creek, about two miles from
Colonel Pegram's position at the base of
Rich Mountain.
The advance on both lines had been made with only a skirmishing resistance, the
Confederates being aware of
McClellan's great superiority in numbers, and choosing to await his attack in their fortified positions.
The National commander was now convinced that his opponent was 10,000 strong, of which about 2000 were before him at
Rich Mountain.
A reconnoissance made on the 10th showed that
Pegram's position would be difficult to assail in front, but preparations were made to attack the next day, while
Morris was directed to hold firmly his position before
Garnett, watching for the effect of the attack at
Rich Mountain.
In the evening
Rosecrans took to
McClellan a young man named
Hart, whose father lived on the top of the mountain two miles in rear of
Pegram, and who thought he could guide a column of infantry to his father's farm by a circuit around
Pegram's left flank south of the turnpike.
The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go by them, but
Rosecrans offered to lead a column of infantry and seize the road at the
Hart farm.
After some discussion
McClellan adopted the suggestion, and it was arranged that
Rosecrans should march at daybreak of the 11th with about two thousand men, including a troop of horse, and that upon the sound of his engagement in the rear of
Pegram,
McClellan would attack in force in front.
By a blunder in one of the regimental camps, the reveille and assembly were sounded at midnight, and
Pegram was put on the qui vive. He, however, believed that the attempt to turn his position would be by a path or country road passing round his right, between him and
Garnett (of which the latter had warned him), and his attention was diverted from
Rosecrans's actual route, which he thought impracticable.
The alert which had occurred at midnight made
Rosecrans think it best to make a longer circuit
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than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe marching and mountain climbing to reach the
Hart farm.
The turning movement was made, but he found an enemy opposing him.
Pegram had detached about 350 men from the 1,300 which he had, and had ordered them to guard the road at the mountain summit.
He sent with them a single cannon from the four which constituted his only battery, and they threw together a breastwork of logs.
The turnpike at
Hart's runs in a depression of the summit, and as
Rosecrans, early in the afternoon, came out upon the road, he was warmly received by both musketry and cannon.
The ground was rough, the men were for the first time under fire, and the skirmishing combat varied through two or three hours, when a charge by part of
Rosecrans's line, aided by a few heavy volleys from another portion of his forces which had secured a good position, broke the enemy's line.
Reinforcements from
Pegram were nearly at hand, with another cannon, but they did not come into action, and the runaway team of the caisson on the hill-top, dashing into the gun that was coming up, capsized it down the mountain-side where the descending road was scarped diagonally along it. Both guns fell into
Rosecrans's hands, and he was in possession of the field.
The march and the assault had been made in rain and storm.
Nothing was heard from
McClellan, and the enemy, rallying on their reinforcements, made such show of resistance on the crest a little farther on, that
Rosecrans directed his men to rest upon their arms till next morning.
When day broke on the 12th, the enemy had disappeared from the mountain-top, and
Rosecrans, feeling his way down to the rear of
Pegram's position, found it also abandoned, the two remaining cannon being spiked, and a few sick and wounded being left in charge of a surgeon.
Still nothing was seen of
McClellan, and
Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp beyond
Roaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's position.
Rosecrans's loss had been 12 killed and 49 wounded. The Confederates left 20 wounded on the field, and 63 were surrendered at the lower camp, including the sick.
No trustworthy report of their dead was made.
The noise of the engagement had been heard in
McClellan's camp, and he formed his troops for attack, but the long continuance of the cannonade and some signs of exultation in
Pegram's camp seem to have made him think
Rosecrans had been repulsed.
The failure to attack in accordance with the plan has never been explained.
Rosecrans's messengers had failed to reach
McClellan during the 11th, but the sound of the battle was sufficient notice that he had gained the summit and was engaged; and he was, in fact, left to
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win his own battle or to get out of his embarrassment as he could.
Toward evening
McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboring height, from which he hoped his twelve guns would make
Pegram's position untenable; but his lines were withdrawn again beyond
Roaring Creek at nightfall, and further action was postponed to the next day.
About half of
Pegram's men had succeeded in passing around
Rosecrans's right flank during the night and had gained
Beverly.
These, with the newly arrived Confederate regiment, fled southward on the
Staunton road.
Garnett had learned in the evening by messenger from
Beverly that
Rich Mountain summit was carried, and evacuated his camp in front of
Morris about midnight.
He first marched toward
Beverly, and was within five miles of that place when he received information (false at the time) that the
National forces already occupied it. He then retraced his steps nearly to his camp, and, leaving the turnpike at
Leadsville, he turned off upon a country road over
Cheat Mountain into Cheat River Valley, following the stream northward toward
St. George and West Union, in the forlorn hope of turning the mountains at the north end of the ridges and regaining his communications by a very long detour.
He might have continued southward through
Beverly almost at leisure, for
McClellan did not enter the town till past noon on the 12th.
Morris learned of
Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started in pursuit as soon as rations could be issued.
He marched first to
Leadsville, where he halted to communicate with
McClellan at
Beverly and get further orders.
These reached him in the night, and at daybreak of the 13th he resumed the pursuit.
His advance-guard of three regiments, accompanied by
Captain H. W. Benham of the
Engineers, overtook the rear of the
Confederate column about noon and continued a skirmishing pursuit for some two hours.
Garnett himself handled his rear-guard with skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively encounter was had. A mile or two farther, at another ford and when the skirmishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing his skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood which he had used as a barricade.
One of his cannon had become stalled in the ford, and, with about forty wagons, fell into
Morris's hands.
The direct pursuit was here discontinued, but
McClellan had sent a dispatch to
General Hill at
Grafton, to collect the garrisons along the railway and block the way of the
Confederates where they must pass around the northern spurs of the mountains.
His military telegraph terminated at the
Roaring Creek camp, and the dispatch written in the evening of the 12th was not forwarded to
Hill till near noon of the 13th.
This officer immediately ordered the collection of the greater part of his detachments at
Oakland and called upon the railway officials for special trains to hurry them to the rendezvous.
About one thousand men under
Colonel James Irvine of the 16th Ohio were at West Union where the
St. George road reaches the
Northwestern Turnpike, and
Hill's information was that a detachment of these held
Red House, a crossing several miles in advance by which the retreating enemy might go.
Irvine was directed to hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reenforced.
Hill himself hastened with the first train from
Grafton to
Oakland with
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about 500 men and 3 cannon, reached his destination at nightfall, and hurried his detachment forward by a night march to
Irvine, 10 or 12 miles over rough roads.
It turned out that
Irvine did not occupy
Red House, and the prevalent belief that the enemy was about eight thousand in number, with the uncertainty of the road he would take, made it proper to keep the little force
concentrated till reinforcements should come.
The first of these reached
Irvine about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, raising his command to 1,500, but a few moments after their arrival he learned that the enemy had passed
Red House soon after daylight.
He gave chase, but did not overtake them.
Meanwhile,
General Hill had spent the night in trying to hasten forward the railway trains, but none were able to reach
Oakland till morning, and
Garnett's forces had now more than twenty miles the start, and were on fairly good roads, moving southward on the eastern side of the mountains.
McClellan still telegraphed that
Hill had the one opportunity of a lifetime to capture the fleeing army, and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided with wagons or extra rations.
When, however, the
Union commander learned that the enemy had fairly turned the mountains, he ordered the pursuit stopped.
Hill had used both intelligence and energy in his attempt to concentrate his troops, but it proved simply impossible for the railroad to carry them to
Oakland before the enemy had passed the turning-point, twenty miles to the southward.
During the 12th
Pegram's situation and movements were unknown.
He had intended, when he evacuated his camp, to follow the line of retreat taken by the detachment already near the mountain-top, but, in the darkness of the night and in the tangled woods and thickets of the mountain-side, his column got divided, and, with the rear portion of it, he wandered all day on the 12th, seeking to make his way to
Garnett.
He halted at evening at the
Tygart Valley River, six miles north of
Beverly, and learned from some country people of
Garnett's retreat.
It was still possible to reach the mountains east of the valley, but beyond was a hundred miles of wilderness and half a dozen mountain ridges on which little, if any, food could be found for his men. He called a council of war, and, by advice of his officers, sent to
McClellan, at
Beverly, an offer of surrender.
This was received on the 13th, and
Pegram brought in 30 officers and 525 men.
McClellan then moved southward himself, following the
Staunton road, by which the remnant of
Pegram's little force had escaped, and on the 14th occupied
Huttonsville.
Two regiments of Confederate troops were hastening from
Staunton to reenforce
Garnett.
These were halted at
Monterey, east of the principal ridge of
the Alleghanies, and upon them the retreating forces rallied.
Brigadier-General H. R,
Jackson was assigned to command in
Garnett's place, and both
Governor Letcher and
General Lee made strenuous efforts to increase this army to a force sufficient
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to resume aggressive operations.
On
McClellan's part nothing further was attempted, till, on the 22d, he was summoned to
Washington to assume command of the army, which had retreated to the capital after the panic of the
first Bull Run battle.
The affair at
Rich Mountain and the subsequent movements were among the minor events of a great war, and would not warrant a detailed description, were it not for the momentous effect they had upon the conduct of the war, by being the occasion of
McClellan's promotion to the command of the Potomac army.
The narrative which has been given contains the “unvarnished tale,” as nearly as official records of both sides can give it, and it is a curious task to compare it with the picture of the campaign and its results which was then given to the world in the series of proclamations and dispatches of the young general, beginning with his first occupation of the country and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which he announced that they had “annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure.”
The country was eager for good news, and took it as literally true.
McClellan was the hero of the moment, and when, but a week later, his success was followed by the disaster to
McDowell at
Bull Run, he seemed pointed out by
Providence as the ideal chieftain, who could repair the misfortune and lead our armies to certain victory.
His personal intercourse with those about; him was so kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches, proclamations, and correspondence are a psychological study, more puzzling to those who knew him well than to strangers.
Their turgid rhetoric and exaggerated pretense did not seem natural to him. In them he seemed to be composing for stage effect, something to be spoken in character by a quite different person from the sensible and genial man we knew in daily life and conversation.
The career of the great
Napoleon had been the study and the absorbing admiration of young American soldiers, and it was, perhaps, not strange that when real war came they should copy his bulletins and even his personal bearing.
It was, for the moment, the bent of the people to be pleased with
McClellan's rendering of the role; they dubbed him the young
Napoleon, and the photographers got him to stand with folded arms, in the historic pose.
For two or three weeks his dispatches and letters were all on fire with enthusiastic energy.
He appeared to be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation.
When he came out of it, he was as genial as ever, as can be seen by the contrast between his official communications and that private letter to
General Burnside, written just after the evacuation of
Yorktown, which, oddly enough, has found its way into the official records of the war.
5 The assumed dash
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and energy of his first campaign made the disappointment and the reaction more painful, when the excessive caution of his conduct in command of the Army of the Potomac was seen.
But the
Rich Mountain affair, when analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later.
There was the same overestimate of the enemy, the same tendency to interpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that his subordinate was engaged.
If
Garnett had been as strong as
McClellan believed him, he had abundant time and means to overwhelm
Morris, who lay four days in easy striking distance, while the
National commander delayed attacking
Pegram; and had
Morris been beaten,
Garnett would have been as near
Clarksburg as his opponent, and there would have been a race for the railroad.
But, happily,
Garnett was less strong and less enterprising than he was credited with being.
Pegram was dislodged, and the
Confederates made a precipitate retreat.
