that if the plan was to have been changed at all it — should have been done at Brandy Station
, near Culpepper Court-House, when we could have caught Hooker
in detail, and, probably, have crushed his army; third, that Stuart
should never have been permitted to leave the main route of march, and thus send our army into the enemy's country without cavalry for reconnoissance or foraging purposes; fourth, that the crushing defeat inflicted on the advance of the Federal
army in the casual encounter of the 1st, at Willoughby
's run, should have been pushed to extremities, that occasion furnishing one of the few opportunities ever furnished for “pursuit pell-mell;” fifth, the army should have been carried around to Meade
's right and rear on the night of the 1st, and placed between him and his capital, and thus forced him to attack us, as he certainly intended doing; sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left on the 2d, Ewell
should have moved at once against his right, and Hill
should have threatened his centre, and thus prevented a concentration of the whole Federal army at the point I was assaulting; seventh, on the morning of the 3d we should still have moved to the right, and maneuvred the Federals
into attacking us; eighth, the assault by Pickett
, on the 3d, should never have been made, as it could not have succeeded by any possible prodigy of courage or tactics, being absolutely a hopeless assault.
These points I supported with the most particular proof.
Not a single one of them has been controverted.
The truth of a single fact, or the correctness of a single opinion laid-down in that article, has not been disproved.
Very few of them have been questioned-none of them overthrown.
The first point that demands attention is the number of forces on each side engaged in the Gettysburg campaign
In my first article I claimed that we had fifty-two thousand infantry, and the Federals
ninety-five thousand men; stating, further, that those were the highest figures of our forces, and the lowest of theirs.
General R. R. Dawes
, in commenting on this estimate, disagrees with it quite widely.
The main point that he makes is to quote from Swinton
's “Army of the Potomac,” the following paragraph (page 310): “The number of infantry present for duty in Lee
's army on the 31st of May, 1863, was precisely sixty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty-two.
I learn from General Longstreet
that, when the three corps were concentrated at Chambersburg
, the morning report showed sixty-seven thousand bayonets, or above seventy thousand of all arms.”
This statement is certainly explicit, but there are discrepancies on the face of it that should have warned a cautious and capable writer not to accept it: First, any one at all familiar with the history