had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz
He had been promised by the administration a very much larger force,
or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity.
Twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants.
Then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended.
In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruz
to the City of Mexico
that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa
, the other by Cordova
, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the City of Mexico
after the range of mountains is passed.
It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz
as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North
, was arriving very slowly.
It was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to Jalapa
, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast.
At that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of General Scott
's could subsist there for an indefinite period.
Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong.
This force was composed of three divisions, under Generals Twiggs
, and Worth
The importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced.
On the 8th of April, Twiggs
's division started for Jalapa
He was followed very soon by Patterson
, with his division.
was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage.
It was the 13th of April before this division left Vera Cruz
The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo
, some fifty miles west, on the road to Jalapa
, and went into camp at Plan del Rio
[Rio del Plan], about three miles from the fortifications.
reached Plan del Rio
with his division soon after Twiggs
The two were then secure against an attack from Santa Anna
, who commanded the Mexican
At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott
had remained at Vera Cruz
to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision.
at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by Santa Anna
and of the troops holding it.
is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of Jalapa
, and Santa Anna
had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army.
The road, said to have been built by Cortez
, zigzags around the mountainside and was defended at every turn by artillery.
On either side were deep chasms or mountain walls.
A direct attack along the road was an impossibility.
A flank movement seemed equally impossible.
After the arrival of the commanding-general
upon the scene, reconnaissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack.
These reconnaissances were made under the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee
, assisted by Lieutenants P. G. T. Beauregard
, Isaac I. Stevens
, Z. B. Tower
, G. W. Smith
, George B. McClellan
, and J. G. Foster
, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation.
The reconnaissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month.
This was accomplished without the knowledge of Santa Anna
or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible.
On the same day General Scott
issued his order for the attack on the 18th.
The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the Mexican
war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place.
Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them.
Animals could not. These had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy.
The engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed.
Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece.
In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes.
In this way Scott
's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved.
The attack was made, the Mexican
reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying
On the left General Pillow
's command made h formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory.
I am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated.
The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into Scott
's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores.
The prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed.
The battle of Buena Vista
was probably very important to the success of General Scott
at Cerro Gordo
and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz
to the great plains, reaching to the City of Mexico
The only Army Santa Anna
had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz
, was the one he had with him confronting General Taylor
It is not likely that he would have gone as far north as Monterey
to attack the United States troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south.
moved to Saltillo
and then advanced on to Buena Vista
, Santa Anna
crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott
in the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz
His attack on Taylor
was disastrous to the Mexican
army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to Cerro Gordo
, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before Scott
If he had been successful at Buena Vista
his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo
Had the battle of Buena Vista
not been fought Santa Anna
would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat.
After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa
, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast.
, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence.
It was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to reorganize and fortify in our front.
's division was selected to go forward to secure this result.
The division marched to Perote
on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains.
There is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town,
known as the Castle of Perote
This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament.
having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Vera Cruz
, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence.
The troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to Vera Cruz
should be cut off. It being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the City of Mexico
could possibly fall into the hands of the American
army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz
during the season of the vomito.
This reduced Scott
's force in the field to about five thousand men.
Early in May [May 8], Worth, with his division, left Perote
and marched on to Puebla
The roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs.
Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart.
Nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque — an easy day's march east of Puebla
— a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away.
A battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared.
On the 15th of May we entered the city of Puebla
was in command at Puebla
until the latter end of May, when General Scott
Here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself.
During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east.
On one occasion General Worth
had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days cooked rations in their haversacks.
He galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna
with an army vastly superior to his own. General Scott
arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna
and his myriads.
There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too
far out. These always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers.
After the arrival of General Scott
I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days march at least, to procure forage.
We had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger.
We procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more.
There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration.
A bill was before the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before it became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to Mexico
It was August before General Scott
received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance.
His moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by Generals Twiggs
There was also a cavalry corps under General [William S.] Harney
, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons.
The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs
's division in front.
The remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between.
The marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack.
I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land.
The contrast between the two was very marked.
never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort.
He moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation.
Often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed.
He was very much given to sit his horse side-ways — with both feet on one side-particularly on the battlefield.
was the reverse in all these particulars.
He always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all divisions and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general
might be expected.
This was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed.
On these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs.
His staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff-engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc.,
that could be spared-followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order.
Orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed.
In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics.
was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment.
was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences.
But with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic, and upright in all their dealings.
Both were pleasant to serve under-Taylor was pleasant to serve with.
saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders.
saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history.