already been carried out before the order was received, for I had, the night previous, taken possession of all the high ground in that vicinity, and it only remained for me to await the other contingencies — the arrival of Brigadier-General Morgan or the advance of Brigadier-General Hascall. I had made full preparations, and was awaiting accordingly, when, about 4 p. m., Major-General Palmer came up in person and asked me if my brigade was ready for the reconnaissance. I replied that no special mention had been made of sending out a brigade on that duty, and asked if he wished me to send one. He replied that he did, and I at once detailed Colonel Gleason's brigade for that purpose. The brigade was formed in the shortest possible time in two lines, with a strong skirmishing party in front, and at once moved out. The operation was vigorously conducted and two lines of skirmish pits captured. The party kept on until the location and character of the rebel main line was fully developed and a heavy fire of artillery and musketry drawn from it. This accomplished, and no movement whatever of the troops on our left having been made, and no tidings received of Brigadier-General Morgan, I at dark directed Colonel Gleason to bring his men back to their works, leaving his skirmishers in the first pits. Colonel Gleason and his officers and men deserve the highest praise for the manner in which this affair was conducted. They brought in 25 prisoners, and the brigade sustained a loss of 26 in killed and wounded. August 5, at 4.30 o'clock in the morning, I received, directly from Major-General Schofield, commanding the Twenty-third Army Corps, an order prescribing movements for the Fourteenth and Twenty-third Corps upon that day, embracing operations proposed for this division, and I at once. wrote a note to him stating that I knew of no authority under which he could assume to give orders to my division, which belonged to the Army of the Cumberland, but informing him that I would communicate his wishes to my commanding officer. As the order of Major-General Schofield detailed at length operations for all the troops acting on the right of the army, and being always anxious to perform my part in whatever may be calculated to promote the success of our arms, I immediately went to my troops to prepare them for the execution of the orders in case they should receive the proper sanction of my commander, or to be in readiness to co-operate, on my own responsibility, in any movement which the troops near me might undertake. The order from Major-General Schofield, alluded to above, directed me to move at 6 a. m., to push forward my whole line, conforming it to the direction of that of the enemy, and, driving in his skirmishers, to press on until I had drawn the fire of his line. The Second Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan, was directed to support my right in the movement and, if possible, to prolong my line when formed. I was also directed to move without reference to my connection with Brigadier-General Hascall, as Brigadier-General Cox would stand ready to fill any interval between us. It was 4.30 a. m. when I gave notice to Major-General Schofield that I did not recognize his authority, and both his headquarters and those of our corps were within a mile of mine, yet it was not until 6.30 a. m. that he wrote me another note, saying that my corps commander would communicate the order to me properly, and at about 7 a. m. notice was given me that the corps would act during the day under the direction of Major-General Schofield. About that same time I
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