point on the railroad, where road turns to Kelley's, 2 mile from railroad bridge, and 31 from Kelley's, and the rest of the command was ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice. At that time a force was reported to be at Bealeton, supposed to be their advance guard; and it was uncertain whether they would attempt to cross at Kelley's, railroad bridge, or move on towards Warrenton. The report that enemy's attack was made at Kelley's never reached me; and the first intimation I received from that point was at 7:30 A. M., to the effect that they had succeeded in crossing, capturing 25 of my sharpshooters who were unable to reach their horses. I moved my command at once down the railroad, taking up a position to await their approach, ordering my baggage-wagons and disabled horses to the rear towards Rapidan station. Some time elapsing and they not advancing, I determined to move upon them, and marched immediately for Kelley's. First met the enemy half a mile this side of ford, and at once charged them. Their position was a very strong one, sheltered by woods and a long, high stone fence running perpendicular to my advance. My men, unable to cross the fence and ditch in their front, wheeled about, delivering their fire almost in the faces of the enemy, and reformed again, facing about under a heavy fire from their artillery and small arms. The Third, in this charge, was in front, and First Lieutenant Hill Carter was very conspicuous in his behavior. From that time it was a succession of gallant charges by the various regiments, and once by the whole brigade in line, whenever the enemy would show his mounted men; they invariably falling back upon his artillery and sheltered dismounted skirmishers. Their total advance was 2 miles from the ford. At that time my artillery arrived, and they were driven back, recrossing the river about 7:30 P. M., with us in close pursuit. My whole command acted nobly. Sabres were frequently crossed, and fences charged up to, the leading men dismounting and pulling them down, under a heavy fire of canister, grape, and carbine balls.
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Table of Contents:
Battle of Kelleysville , March 17th , 1863 -Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee .
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee 's Army at the battle of Gettysburg -opinions of leading Confederate soldiers.
Letter from Gen J. A. Early .
Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg .
Letter from General E. P. Alexander , late Chief of artillery First corps , A. N. V .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
Letter from General John B. Hood .
Official Reports of the battle of Gettysburg .
Report of General Patton Anderson of operations of his division from 30th of July to 31st of August , 1864 , including the battle of Jonesboro , Georgia .
The peace Commission .-letter from Ex-President Davis .
Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin .
Farewell address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana brigade after the terms of surrender had been agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor , C. S. A. , and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby , U. S. A.
Reminiscences of torpedo service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel , Commander Confederate States Navy.
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