the exact locality of our positions. To gain time, and by a show of confidence and boldness, to make the enemy cautious, I resolved to attack him before daylight the next morning. Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Lyndsay, with five hundred and fifty men, in gallant style charged his lines, surprised and drove in his skirmishers, capturing a few prisoners and a large number of arms and accoutrements, and was only recalled after the enemy was revealed in a heavy and extended order of battle. Our object seemed to be accomplished, for it was not until late in the evening that he advanced, feeling his way cautiously, and, making no assault, invested our defences. My scouts had reported two corps d'armee in front of us (the Thirteenth and Sixteenth), Major-General Canby commanding. From information derived from the prisoners, and from drawings and maps captured with one of the engineers of the Sixteenth corps, I estimated the force to be not less than 20,000 muskets strong-perhaps much larger. On his first advance he succeeded at some points in pushing his skirmishers to within two hundred yards; on the center and right he was driven back. Our artillery fire was reserved until his light batteries came well up, when it was suddenly opened, and it appeared to be with decided effect. On the left the ground was more favorable to the enemy, and to this fact and the want of works may be ascribed the nearness with which he was enabled to establish himself. On the right and center he was held at bay to the very close of the operations, nor did he at any time gain any decided advantages without severe contests and heavy losses. He sat down before us and developed rapidly a system of regular approaches by parallels. He gradually converted his advanced lines into heavy works, and after the first week displayed an exceedingly large armament of artillery. The absolute necessity of first completing our lines and the smallness of my force, prevented the attempt to meet his approaches by any system of advance. There was a great deficiency of tools. Spades, axes, and every available instrument that could be of service in any way were kept busy night and day from the commencement~ to the close. In the first days of the investment (the third I believe) Thomas' brigade of Alabama Reserves was relieved by Holtzclaw's and Ector's brigades, both together exceeding Thomas' by about one
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Table of Contents:
Battle of Kelleysville , March 17th , 1863 -Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee .
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee 's Army at the battle of Gettysburg -opinions of leading Confederate soldiers.
Letter from Gen J. A. Early .
Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg .
Letter from General E. P. Alexander , late Chief of artillery First corps , A. N. V .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
Letter from General John B. Hood .
Official Reports of the battle of Gettysburg .
Report of General Patton Anderson of operations of his division from 30th of July to 31st of August , 1864 , including the battle of Jonesboro , Georgia .
The peace Commission .-letter from Ex-President Davis .
Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin .
Farewell address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana brigade after the terms of surrender had been agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor , C. S. A. , and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby , U. S. A.
Reminiscences of torpedo service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel , Commander Confederate States Navy.
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