2,000 or 3,000; and even including Robertson's and Jones' brigades, it could not have exceeded that number more than a few hundred, if it reached it. It must be borne in mind that our march, all the time from the start, led us from the sources from which our ranks could be refilled, and hence, our losses were permanent for the entire campaign. I have made no allowance for the decrease after we crossed the Potomac; but we had some even then. Colonel Taylor gives our strength on the 20th of July, after we had returned to the valley, as 41,388 effective infantry and artillery, and 7,612 cavalry — in all 49,000; and, hence, he deduces our loss at about 19,000. This mode of estimating the loss may ascertain very nearly the real loss, that is, the number of men placed hors du combat; but it is calculated to give rise to misapprehension. The official reports show the losses in the infantry and artillery of the several corps above, as follows:
This is exclusive of the loss in the cavalry, which was not inconsiderable.
Add this reported loss of 22,735 to the 49,000, and it would give 71,735 as our force in the campaign.
Add the same loss to the effective infantry and artillery shown by the returns of July 20th, and it would give 64,125 as the strength of those arms; and deducting the artillery from this latter number, it would appear that we had about 60,000 infantry in the campaign, whereas the returns of May 31st show only 54,356.
Colonel Taylor omits to take into consideration the very large regiment of infantry, commanded by Colonel Wharton, the Fifty-first Virginia, which arrived at Winchester from Southwestern Virginia while we were in Pennsylvania, the convalescent wounded from the battle-fields of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg (Second), that had, by the 20th of July reached the valley, as well as my three regiments that were left behind, and the stragglers and disabled men who had come up. This omission gives rise to a
|In Longstreet's corps||7,659|