that specially, as I propose to give a full, detailed account of the conference itself. The statement in reference to it contained in the memorandum is susceptible of the construction that General Lee wanted to go forward at dawn the next day, though Longstreet should not be up, and that Ewell, Rodes and myself opposed the proposition, and insisted that we should await Longstreet's arrival. Yet Gen. Lee has shown, again and again, especially in the extract from his report I have already given, that his purpose was to avoid a general engagement until his army was concentrated. Col. Taylor is under a serious misapprehension as to that conference, and as I am the only surviving person who was present at it, no one else being there but Generals Lee, Ewell, Rodes, and myself, I will state what occurred. I had ridden to ses about the condition of Hays' and Hoke's brigades, which were in uncomfortable proximity to the enemy's position on Cemetery Hill, and had to keep under cover from his artillery fire, as well as the fire of his sharpshooters, and maintain a constant lookout, and while there I was sent for by General Ewell. On reaching him I found General Lee, himself and Rodes in the porch, or, rather, I should say arbor, attached to the house already mentioned. No one else was there, and at that time all idea of advancing that night against the heights beyond Gettysburg for the purpose of attack had been abandoned, as it was then after sunset. I was soon given to understand that Gen. Lee's purpose was to ascertain our condition, what we knew of the enemy and his position, and what we could probably do next day. It was evident from the first that it was his purpose to attack the enemy as early as possible next day-at daylight, if practicable. This was a proposition the propriety of which was so apparent that there was not the slightest discussion or difference of opinion upon it. It was a point taken for granted. After we had given General Lee all the information we possessed, addressing us conjointly, he asked: “Can't you, with your corps, attack on this flank at daylight to-morrow?” I was the first to speak, for I had examined more thoroughly and critically than the others the enemy's position east of Gettysburg, extending along Cemetery Hill and the adjacent heights to Culp's Hill, as my two brigades immediately confronted it, and it was peculiarly my duty to do so. Moreover, I had been in Gettysburg the week before,
This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
Battle of Kelleysville , March 17th , 1863 -Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee .
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee 's Army at the battle of Gettysburg -opinions of leading Confederate soldiers.
Letter from Gen J. A. Early .
Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg .
Letter from General E. P. Alexander , late Chief of artillery First corps , A. N. V .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
Letter from General John B. Hood .
Official Reports of the battle of Gettysburg .
Report of General Patton Anderson of operations of his division from 30th of July to 31st of August , 1864 , including the battle of Jonesboro , Georgia .
The peace Commission .-letter from Ex-President Davis .
Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin .
Farewell address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana brigade after the terms of surrender had been agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor , C. S. A. , and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby , U. S. A.
Reminiscences of torpedo service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel , Commander Confederate States Navy.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.