what a damper it would be to their enthusiasm to be withdrawn from the position they had gained by fighting, as it might appear to them as if a reverse had occurred somewhere and we had not gained much of a victory after all. Moreover; there were some of my wounded not in a condition to be removed, and I did not like the idea of leaving those brave fellows to the mercy of the enemy; and there were a great many muskets stacked in the streets of Gettysburg which I did not want to lose. So I replied at once to General Lee, and assured him that he need not fear that the enemy would break throuh our line, and that we could repulse any force he could send against us. The fact was, that on that part of the line it was more difficult for the enemy to come down from the heights to attack us than for us to ascend them to attack him, as difficult as the latter would have been. Ewell and Rodes again argued with me, and urged views of their own, the fact being that I merely spoke first. I do not recollect that during all this time Longstreet's name or corps was mentioned. If it was, it was only on the assumption that he would certainly be up during the night, of which neither of us doubted. We knew that Longstreet had been at Chambersburg when Gen. Lee had sent the order to Ewell at Carlisle for the concentration of the army, and that Ewell had then sent it to me at York, with the information that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was moving north. York is thirty-two miles from Gettysburg by the direct route, the McAdamized road, while I believe Chambersburg is only twenty-five, certainly not more than thirty from the same place. After getting my orders by the circuitous route mentioned, I had moved from York, by the way of Heidlersburg, several miles further than by the direct route, and Rodes had come from Carlisle, and we had both reached Gettysburg in time to participate in the first day's fight, which closed about 4 P. M. We, therefore, had no thought but that Longstreet would be up in time to begin the battle at dawn next morning; and that question did not enter at all into the considerations that governed us in our views. The first mention of Iongstreet's name in connection with the attack was in this wise: When General Lee had heard our views, both in regard to attacking from our flank and our being removed towards the right, he said, in these very words, which are indelibly impressed on my memory: “Well, if I attack ”
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Table of Contents:
Battle of Kelleysville , March 17th , 1863 -Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee .
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee 's Army at the battle of Gettysburg -opinions of leading Confederate soldiers.
Letter from Gen J. A. Early .
Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg .
Letter from General E. P. Alexander , late Chief of artillery First corps , A. N. V .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
Letter from General John B. Hood .
Official Reports of the battle of Gettysburg .
Report of General Patton Anderson of operations of his division from 30th of July to 31st of August , 1864 , including the battle of Jonesboro , Georgia .
The peace Commission .-letter from Ex-President Davis .
Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin .
Farewell address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana brigade after the terms of surrender had been agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor , C. S. A. , and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby , U. S. A.
Reminiscences of torpedo service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel , Commander Confederate States Navy.
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