to attack at dawn on the morning of the 2nd, and that he had left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's troops to begin the attack at that time. I do not know what were the specific orders given to Longstreet, and in that respect I am as good a witness for him as either of those he has produced, who simply do not know what were the orders given, nor when they were given. These orders were manifestly given in person, and no living man can say precisely what they were, except General Longstreet, if he indeed recollects them. I was prompted to make the remarks I did make in my address at the Washington and Lee University from the fact that I had read Mr. Swinton's Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, and discovered that his criticisms on General Lee's conduct of the battle of Gettysburg, which are amplified in those now made in General Longstreet's name with a great similarity of expression in several respects, was based on information given by the latter to Mr. Swinton after the war. I here give some extracts from Swinton's book: On page 340 he says:
Indeed, in entering on the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that'he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him. Having, however, gotten a taste of blood in the considerable success of the first day, the Confederate commander seems to have lost that equipoise in which his faculties commonly moved, and he determined to give battle.There is a foot note to this statement as follows:
This and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee I derive from General Longstreet, who, in a full and free conversation with the writer after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct of Lee during this campaign.On pages 340-1, he says:
Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, had one flank securely posted on the Emmetsburg road, so that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, and by marching towards Frederick could undoubtedly have manceuvered Meade out of the Gettysburg position. This operation Gen. Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was anxious to hold General Lee to his promise, begged in vain to be allowed to execute.