truth. But to return to return to Dr. Bates: iHe quotes the “return” of the Federal army on June 10th, as given by Gen. Butterfield in his testimony. On that day the infantry corps numbered 78,255, and Dr. Bates shows that the cavalry and the reinforcements received before July 1st, increased this number to 99,000. It is unnecessary to quote Butterfield's testimony at length; but it is evident from it, as given on pp. 427-8, vol. I, Rep. on Conduct of the War, 1865, that the above “return” only included effectives. HIe is comparing the strength of the Federal army before the battle with its strength after, and having given the estimates of the corps commanders of their force on July 4th (51,514 infantry), and cautioned the committee that this was only a rough estimate the day after the fight, he then gives the strength on the 10th of June, which was seemingly the date of the last exact “return” in his possession. It is impossible to believe that he meant any thing but those “present for duty” in both instances. Again, Gen. Meade in his testimony about Gettysburg before the committee on the conduct of the war, replies to the question: “What was' your strength upon. That battle-field?” “Including all arms of the service, my strength was a little over 100,000 men-about 95,000.” In the face of both Butterfield and Meade, Dr. Bates assumes that these figures “represent the numbers borne upon the rolls, but by no means show the true numbers standing in the ranks. In this record (Butterfield's ‘return’ ), the First corps is credited with 11,350; but we know that on the morning of the 1st of July it could muster but 8,200. If the difference in all the corps, between the number borne upon the rolls and number present to go into battle, was as great as in this, the sum total was reduced to 72,000.” Now is it credible that Gen. Meade testified, under oath, that his strength upon that battle-field was 95,000 men, when it was only 72,000? When, too, there was no conceivable reason for an exaggeration of his numbers, but the contrary? Gen. Meade was not capable of being influenced by
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Table of Contents:
Battle of Kelleysville , March 17th , 1863 -Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee .
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee 's Army at the battle of Gettysburg -opinions of leading Confederate soldiers.
Letter from Gen J. A. Early .
Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg .
Letter from General E. P. Alexander , late Chief of artillery First corps , A. N. V .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
Letter from General John B. Hood .
Official Reports of the battle of Gettysburg .
Report of General Patton Anderson of operations of his division from 30th of July to 31st of August , 1864 , including the battle of Jonesboro , Georgia .
The peace Commission .-letter from Ex-President Davis .
Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin .
Farewell address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana brigade after the terms of surrender had been agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor , C. S. A. , and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby , U. S. A.
Reminiscences of torpedo service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel , Commander Confederate States Navy.
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