that, I may say, the point in the enemy's lines to be seized was most admirably selected, and could it have been successfully held their line would undoubtedly have been forced back, General Meade, the Federal commander, admitting it was the key to his position. The prosecution of the attack on our part upon the 3d, was not in accordance, I believe, with the sound judgment of General Lee, though he admits a belief that it might have succeeded. He told the father of the writer (his brother) that he was controlled too far by the “great confidence felt in the splendid fighting qualities of his people,” and who begged simply “to be turned loose,” and the assurances of most of his higher officers, who believed the position in his front could be carried. I think our trouble was in not making proper allowance for the great natural strength of the Federal position, immeasurably increased by the thousands of hands unweariedly working with but short intervals from the night of the 1st to the afternoon of the 3d, and defended by an army outnumbering ours by some 30,000 soldiers. I am inclined to the opinion that after the 2d no assault we could have made would have succeeded, however wisely the dispositions for it were executed — however gallantly performed. I do not see either, how, in such close proximity to a largely superior force-skirmish line against skirmish line-“General Lee could have extended his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington,” as suggested by ----. He would have exposed himself to an attack in turn which might have proved fatal — an examination of military history showing such moves can be rarely made, save when superior to your enemy in numbers and protected by favorable ground. After the night of the 2d the alternatives presented to General Lee were to await an attack by the enemy, to attack him, or withdraw from his immediate front in the direction of hi.s own rear. And now, having answered the questions asked, I hope you will pardon me if I go further and say that if I should be asked “to what can the failure of that campaign on our part be ”
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Table of Contents:
Battle of Kelleysville , March 17th , 1863 -Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee .
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee 's Army at the battle of Gettysburg -opinions of leading Confederate soldiers.
Letter from Gen J. A. Early .
Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg .
Letter from General E. P. Alexander , late Chief of artillery First corps , A. N. V .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
Letter from General John B. Hood .
Official Reports of the battle of Gettysburg .
Report of General Patton Anderson of operations of his division from 30th of July to 31st of August , 1864 , including the battle of Jonesboro , Georgia .
The peace Commission .-letter from Ex-President Davis .
Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin .
Farewell address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana brigade after the terms of surrender had been agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor , C. S. A. , and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby , U. S. A.
Reminiscences of torpedo service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel , Commander Confederate States Navy.
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