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[72] usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions. General Lee was thrown from his balance (as is shown by the statement of General Fitzhugh Lee) by too great confidence in the prowess of his troops and (as is shown by General Anderson's statement) by the deplorable absence of General Stuart and the perplexity occasioned thereby. With this preface I proceed to say that the Gettysburg campaign was weak in these pointsadhering, however, to my opinion that a combined movement against Rosecranz in Tennessee and a march toward Cincinnati would have given better results than could possibly have been secured by the invasion of Pennsylvania: First, the offensive strategical but defensive tactical plan of the campaign as agreed upon should never have been abandoned after we entered the enemy's country. Second, if there ever was a time when the abandonment of that plan could have promised decisive results, it was at Brandy Station, where, after Stuart had repulsed the force thrown across the river, we might have fallen on that force and crushed it, and then put ourselves in position, threatening the enemy's right and rear, which would have dislodged him from his position at Fredericksburg and given us the opportunity for an effective blow. Third, General Stuart should not have been permitted to leave the general line of march, thus forcing us to march blindfolded into the enemy's country; to this may be attributed, in my opinion, the change of the policy of the campaign. Fourth, the success obtained by the accidental rencontre on the 1st should have been vigorously prosecuted and the enemy should have been given no time to fortify or concentrate. Fifth, on the night of the 1st the army should have been carried around to Meade's right and rear, and posted between him and his capitol, and we could have manoeuvered him into an attack. Sixth, when the attack was made on the enemy's left on the 2d by my corps, Ewell should have been required to co-operate by a vigorous movement against his right and Hill should have moved against his centre. Had this been done his army would have been dislodged beyond question. Seventh, on the morning of the 3d it was not yet too late to move to the right and manoeuver the Federals into attacking us. Eighth, Pickett's division should not have been ordered to assault Cemetery Ridge on the 3d, as we had already tested the strength of that position sufficiently to admonish us that we could not dislodge him. While the co-operation of Generals Ewell and Iill, on the 2d, by vigorous assault at the moment my battle was in progress, would in all probability have dislodged the Federals from their position, it does not seem that such success would have yielded the fruits anticipated at the inception of the campaign. The battle as it was fought would, in any result, have so crippled us that the Federals would have been able to

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