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The origin of the series of papers on
Gettysburg which we have published since August last, was the following letter of enquiry which we have recently received permission from its distinguished author to publish.
We sent some twenty-five copies of this letter to leading Confederates who participated in the battle and were in position to know its inside history, selecting representatives of every corps and division of our army, and of every arm of the service.
The replies received we forwarded to the
Count of
Paris, and have published in our papers without note or comment of our own.
Besides these we have published at different times the official reports of
Generals R. E. Lee,
Longstreet,
A. P. Hill,
J. E. B. Stuart,
Rodes,
R. H. Anderson,
Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson,
Colonel W. W. White, commanding
Anderson's brigade,
Brigadier-General H. L. Benning,
Brigadier-Gereral J. B. Kershaw,
Colonel E. P. Alexander, and
Brigadier-General J. H. Lane.
The reports of
Generals Early, and
Ewell had been previously published in the
Southern Magazine, and the report of
General W. N. Pendleton,
Chief of Artillery, Army
Nothern Virginia, which is crowded out of this number, will be published hereafter.
These letters and official reports, and the other papers which we have published have made a series which has excited wide interest and attention, and called forth warm expressions as to their value and importance.
The
Count of
Paris says, in a recent letter concerning these papers: “I cannot say how valuable, how interesting for one who wishes to reach the truth, these letters are. As far as opinions go they do not always agree, and even where it is so, one may take a view different from those expressed by the writers; but they give, with a large number of unknown facts, a roost interesting insight into the way in which the campaign, and especially the
battle of Gettysburg was managed by
General Lee and his subordinates.”
It will be seen in the letter from our friend
Major Scheibert, of the
Prussian Royal Engineers, which we publish below, that he regards these papers as of the very highest interest and value.
We have thought proper to prefix these remarks to the letter which originated the series, which we now give in full as follows:
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Letter from the Count of Paris.
Dear sir: I am writing the account of the
battle of Gettysburg, and consider that chapter as the most important, the most difficult to write of the whole work which I have undertaken.
I share the opinion of those who think that the
Confederate cause was not a lost cause from the beginning; that it may have been successful; and therefore I seek with great care to find out why it did not succeed.
The
battle of Gettysburg, coupled with the surrender of
Vicksburg and
Port Hudson, is, in that respect, the turning point of the war.
The Army of Northern Virginia, when it invaded the
Northern States was more powerful than it had ever been before.
The issue of the invasion was disastrous for the
Confederate cause.
This is a mere fact which neither a Southerner nor a Northerner can dispute.
Therefore, I must show the causes of this disaster without any disparagement for the army or its leader, just as I pointed out the causes of the ill successes of
McClellan and
Burnside, and shall do the same for
Hooker.
At present, as far as my studies of this period go, my opinion on the question is this: The mistakes which brought upon the
Confederate arms the repulse at
Gettysburg with its fatal consequences were the following:
1st.
It was a mistake to invade the
Northern States at all, because it stirred up their military spirit.
The best chance of the
Confederacy was the pecuniary exhaustion of the
North, and not the exhaustion of its resources in men. The invasion was the deathblow to what has been called the Copperhead party.
It called under arms thousands of men who would never have enrolled otherwise, and who became experienced soldiers in ‘64, and, moreover, it diminished for one or two years the resisting powers of the Confederate army.
2d.
If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent until the Army of the Potomac should have been defeated.
It was a great mistake to bring her on the
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Northern soil, where they fought ten times better than in
Virginia.
A real invasion, viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in
Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an imniossibility as long as the
Federal army was not crushed.
The proof is, that as soon as the latter began to move,
Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on a too large scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where
Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeuvered in
Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the
Potomac.
3rd.
The way in which the fights of the 2nd of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the
Southern arms at
Gaines' Mill and
Chancellorsville.
4th. 1 do not understand why
Lee, having gained some success on the 2nd, but found the
Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger
Meade's communications with
Washington.
5th.
The heroic but foolish attack of
Pickett, on the 3rd, should never have been attempted.
Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by
Lee.
General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that
Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done if the attack had taken place early in the morning.
I hesitate very much between these two opinions.
I put these questions to you in a letter which I wish you to keep private, at least, not to publish; because, in my sincere desire to judge fairly the Confederate army, you may help me by putting the same questions to some of the
Confederate leaders who are still alive, and with whom you are in correspondence.
The opinion of
General Early, for whom I have the greatest consideration as a soldier, would be especially valuable for me. Of course I do not pledge myself to accept wholly any one's opinion, but it would be of the greatest importance for me to know what Confederate officers think now of the causes of their repulse at
Gettysburg.
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Letter from Maj. Scheibert, of the Prussian Royal Engineers.
[As the opinion of a distinguished foreigner who witnessed the
battle of Gettysburg and has manifested the liveliest interest in the discussion concerning it, the following letter will have an interest for all of our readers; but for those who knew the gallant Prussian, and appreciated his warm sympathy for our struggling people, it will have a peculiar interest.]
Dear sir: You will, perhaps, be surprised that a foreigner should desire to mingle in the discussion of the
battle of Gettysburg; but I have some reasons which urge me to give you
my opinion about that affair.
1. I was an impartial observer; 2.
I was, so far as I know, the only man on the
Southern side who could see everything going on in that battle, having climbed into the top of a very tall tree near
Gettysburg, which overlooked all the woody country.
I had so good a view that
Gen'l Lee himself came up to the tree twice to ask about the positions and movements of the enemy.
It was the same tree upon which
Col. Freemantle sat (see
Gen'l Hood's letter) until the opening of the battle, when (longing to see a fight, which he had never seen before,) he left his position.
The questions of the
English author, whose name I do not know, lead me to suppose that either he is not a soldier or has never studied the war, and they remind me of the questions asked by the famous “Committee on the Conduct of the war,” which made the officers of our army smile.
But the result of those poor questions is a splendid, rich, military harvest, which will most deeply interest every
European soldier.
I cannot remember, notwithstanding my earnest studies in military history, one case where the history of a battle has been so fully illustrated and illuminated by individual reports given by all of the prominent leaders — not immediately after the battle, when personal impressions are conflicting, but after a lapse of more than ten years, when time and matured judgment have ripened the
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fresh sketch into a splendid picture.
The result is so impressive that if I were professor of military science, I would choose the
battle of Gettysburg for the special study of my students.
My personal impressions about the poor result of the
battle of Gettysburg have been exactly expressed by
Gen'l Heth, whose letter I fully endorse.
But he, as well as the other writers, has omitted one element which seems to me to be of the highest importance.
I refer to the individual character of
Gen'l Lee.
I have made the military character of this General, who has never had an admirer of such fervour as myself, my peculiar study, and have written a biographical sketch of him, which appeared in a German paper.
Lee was, in my opinion, one of the ablest leaders of this century in two great qualities.
He weighed everything, even the smallest detail, in making his general plan of battle, and he made the boldest dispositions with heroic courage and the most stubborn energy.
He gave to every link the right place in the construction of a chain which became a masterpiece of military workmanship.
He did not reach his conclusions, as
Jackson and
Stuart did, by an instinctive, sudden impulse; his plans did not come upon him like the lightning's flash followed by the thunder's crash: but he painfully and studiously labored in order to arrange those splendid dispositions fraught with the keenest and most hardy enterprises, and well worthy of the troops which were ordered to execute them.
General Lee, in speaking to me of his dispositions, said: “
Captain, I do everything in my power to make my plans as perfect as possible, and to bring the troops upon the field of battle; the rest must be done by my generals and their troops, trusting to
Providence for the victory.”
Thus he would successfully oppose immense odds, as the result of his thorough preparation, so long as he was minutely advised of the whereabouts, strength, and intentions of the enemy.
“The eyes” by which he saw these things, as my friend
Colonel Taylor justly observes, was his cavalry, and without these he was groping unsafely in the dark night.
But in all these cases
General Jackson (who had his special information coupled with his natural instincts, his sudden impulses, and his peculiar ideas,) came or was ordered to headquarters to
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give his personal opinions to the
Commanding-General, who linked the genial thoughts of
Jackson to his own beautiful chain:
e. g., before the
battle of Chancellorsville these famous leaders met on a hill near the
Aldrich house to mature those plans which resulted in the unequalled battles of the
Wilderness and
Chancellorsville.
Each of these generals was the supplement to the other; just as in the family,
both man and wife are necessary to keep up the hosehold.
When
Jackson fell,
Lee, as he himself said, lost his right arm, the army lost the mother, and thus the void which had been made was too great to be so soon closed, the wound which the army received too deep to be healed in four weeks. Thus the carefullyplanning general encountered the fearful odds at
Gettysburg without his faithful mirror, the cavalry, and without his ready counsellor,
General Jackson.
He himself felt this great loss in making his dispositions.
He felt uneasy, as
Hood justly remarks.
All who saw him on these two occasions,
Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg, will remember that
Lee at
Chancellorsville (where I had the honor of being at his side in the brunt of the struggle), was full of calm, quiet, self-possession, feeling that he had done his duty to the utmost, and had brought the army into the most favorable position to defeat the hostile host.
In the days at
Gettysburg this quiet self-possessed calmness was wanting.
Lee was not at his ease, but was riding to and fro, frequently changing his position, making anxious enquiries here and there, and looking care-worn.
After the shock of battle was over he resumed his accustomed calmness, for then he saw clearly and handled the army with that masterly ability which was peculiar to him. This uneasiness during the days of the battle was contagious to the army, as will appear from the reports of
Longstreet,
Hood,
Heth, and others, and as appeared also to me from the peep I had of the battle-field.
What a difference from the systematic advance of the army from the
Wilderness to the assault of the breastworks at
Chancellorsville, where a unity of disposition and a feeling of security reigned in all the ranks.
At
Gettysburg there was cannonading without real effect, desultory efforts without combination, and lastly, the single attack which closed the drama, and which I, from my outlook in the top of the tree, believed to be .only a reconnoisance in heavy force.
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Want of confidence, misapprehensions, and mistakes were the consequences, less of
Stuart's absence than of the absence of
Jackson, whose place up to this time had not been filled.
After this it was filled
by Lee himself, who, like a father when the mother dies, seeks to fill both her place and his own in the house.
He doubled his fighting qualities, he made the most judicious use of his cavalry, and the result was splendid, for the campaign of 1864 to the closing scene at
Appomattox was the most brilliant which
Lee ever fought.
We
European soldiers have only one wish, and that is that, like the battles of 1861 to 1863, the last campaign may find Southern authors and authorities to give special narratives and correct details of that famous series of battles, concerning which we are in comparative ignorance.
The
battle of Gettysburg would have been won by
Lee's army if it could have advanced at any time and on any part of the field to
one concentrated and combined attack on the enemy's position.
This is the impression I have received from my personal observation, and from the valuable details of your exceedingly interesting papers.