Northern soil, where they fought ten times better than in Virginia. A real invasion, viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an imniossibility as long as the Federal army was not crushed. The proof is, that as soon as the latter began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on a too large scale, found himself so much endangered that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeuvered in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac. 3rd. The way in which the fights of the 2nd of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. 4th. 1 do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the 2nd, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington. 5th. The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett, on the 3rd, should never have been attempted. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done if the attack had taken place early in the morning. I hesitate very much between these two opinions. I put these questions to you in a letter which I wish you to keep private, at least, not to publish; because, in my sincere desire to judge fairly the Confederate army, you may help me by putting the same questions to some of the Confederate leaders who are still alive, and with whom you are in correspondence. The opinion of General Early, for whom I have the greatest consideration as a soldier, would be especially valuable for me. Of course I do not pledge myself to accept wholly any one's opinion, but it would be of the greatest importance for me to know what Confederate officers think now of the causes of their repulse at Gettysburg.
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Table of Contents:
Fifth annual meeting of the Southern Historical Society , October 31st ., 1877 .
Address of General John T. Morgan , U. S. Senator from Alabama .
Fifth annual report of the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society , for year Ending October 31st , 1877 .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
General James Longstreet 's account of the campaign and battle.
Our Gettysburg series.
The true story of the capture of Jefferson Davis .
Letter from Admiral Semmes .
Letter from Colonel William Preston Johnston , late aid to President Davis .
A correction of General Patton Andersons report of the battle of Jonesboro , Ga.
Advance sheets of Reminiscences of secession, war, and reconstruction, by Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor .
Torpedo service in the Harbor and water defences of Charleston .
A review of the First two days operations at Gettysburg and a reply to General Longstreet by General Fitz. Lee .
Letter from General Winfield Hancock .
Letter from John B. Bachelder , Esq.
Letter from General R. Lindsay Walker .
Official report of General W. N. Pendleton , Chief of artillery , A. N. V .
Battle of Murfreesboro .
Letter from President Davis -reply to Mr. Hunter .
Decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the Confederacy was de jure as well as de facto-opinion of Judge Turney .
The bank of Tennessee v. Wm. B. Cummings , Adm'r.
Steuart 's brigade at the battle of Gettysburg .--a narrative by Rev. Randolph H. McKim , D. D. , late First Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp, Confederate army .
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