could have won the field by different battle. It is equally out of sense to say that if my attack had been made “at'sunrise,” Ewell would have given me the co-operation that he failed to give in the afternoon when the attack really did come off. His orders, given in the morning after it was decided that I should lead the attack, were to remain in line of battle, ready to co-operate with my attack whenever it should be made. If he was not ready in the afternoon, it is folly to say that he would have been ready at sunrise. My opinion of the cause of the failure of the battle of the 2d, as given at the time, is very succinctly stated by Colonel Freemantle, on page 138 of his Three months in the South. He says, quoting me: “He said the mistake they made was in not concentrating the army more and making the attack on the 2d with 30,000 men instead of 15,000.” 1 I doubt now if 30,000 men could have made a successful attack, if Colonel Taylor is correct in his idea as to the manner in which General Lee would have fought them. He says that General Lee ordered that the column should go to the attack with its right flank exposed to the enveloping forces on the Federal left. Under this disposition I do not thi nk 30,000 men could have successfully made the attack. The battle should not have been made under the circumstances. We should have drawn everything up ot the night of the 1st and made a quick move by our right flank on the morning of the 2d so as to seize the Emmettsburg road. Had we done this we should either have been attacked — the very thing we had been hoping and mourning for-or we should have dislodged Meade from his position without striking a blow. If we had been attacked we should have certainly repulsed it. Had Meade deserted his position without striking a blow in its defence, the moral effect in our favor would have been tremendous. To show that one of these results would certainly have followed, I quote a dispatch sent in cipher from General Meade to General Halleck, just before my battle on the 2d. The dispatch reads: “If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster.” If, however, no decisive result had followed immediately upon the flank movement that should have been made on the night of the 1st or the morning of the 2d, the thirteen days that elapsed between our first rencontre and our recrossing of the Potomac would have surely given time and opportunity for different work and greater results than were had at Gettysburg. It is conceded by almost, if not quite, all authority on the subject that Pickett's charge on the 3d was almost hopeless. We had tested the enemy's position thoroughly on the day before, and with a much larger force than was given to Pickett. We had every reason to believe that the position was much stronger on the 3d than it was on the 2d. The troops that had fought with me the day before were in no condition to support Pickett, and beside they
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Table of Contents:
Fifth annual meeting of the Southern Historical Society , October 31st ., 1877 .
Address of General John T. Morgan , U. S. Senator from Alabama .
Fifth annual report of the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society , for year Ending October 31st , 1877 .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
General James Longstreet 's account of the campaign and battle.
Our Gettysburg series.
The true story of the capture of Jefferson Davis .
Letter from Admiral Semmes .
Letter from Colonel William Preston Johnston , late aid to President Davis .
A correction of General Patton Andersons report of the battle of Jonesboro , Ga.
Advance sheets of Reminiscences of secession, war, and reconstruction, by Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor .
Torpedo service in the Harbor and water defences of Charleston .
A review of the First two days operations at Gettysburg and a reply to General Longstreet by General Fitz. Lee .
Letter from General Winfield Hancock .
Letter from John B. Bachelder , Esq.
Letter from General R. Lindsay Walker .
Official report of General W. N. Pendleton , Chief of artillery , A. N. V .
Battle of Murfreesboro .
Letter from President Davis -reply to Mr. Hunter .
Decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the Confederacy was de jure as well as de facto-opinion of Judge Turney .
The bank of Tennessee v. Wm. B. Cummings , Adm'r.
Steuart 's brigade at the battle of Gettysburg .--a narrative by Rev. Randolph H. McKim , D. D. , late First Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp, Confederate army .
1 It seems from recent publications that my column of attack on the 2d was only about 12,000. It was given me as 15,000 men at the time.--F-E
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