Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 7.
Frank Moore, Ed.

the rebel army, after its expulsion from Middle Tennessee, crossed the Cumberland Mountains by way of the Tantallon and University roads, then moved down Battle Creek, and crossed the Tennessee River on bridges, it is said, near the mouth of Battle Creek, and at Kelly's Ferry, and on the railroad bridge at Bridgeport. They destroyed a part of the latter, after having passed over it, and retired to Chattanooga and Tyner Station, leaving guards along the river. On their arrival at Chattanooga, they commenced immediately to throw up some defensive field-works at that place, and also at each of the crossings of the Tennessee as far up as Blythe's Ferry.

Our troops, having pursued the rebels as far as supplies and the state of the roads rendered it practicable, took position from McMinnville to Winchester, with advances at Pelham and Stevenson. The latter soon after moved to Bridgeport in time to save from total destruction a saw-mill there, but not to prevent the destruction of the railroad bridge.

After the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Middle Tennessee, the next objective point of this army was Chattanooga. It commands the southern entrance into East-Tennessee, the most valuable, if not the chief sources of supplies of coal for the manufactories and machine-shops of the Southern States, and is one of the great gateways through the mountains to the champaign counties of Georgia and Alabama.

For the better understanding of the campaign, I submit a brief outline of the topography of the country, from the barrens of the north-western base of the Cumberland Range to Chattanooga and its vicinity.

The Cumberland Range is a lofty mass of rocks separating the waters which flow into the Cumberland from those which flow into the Tennessee, and extending from beyond the Kentucky line, in a south-westerly direction, nearly to Athens, Alabama. Its north-western slopes are steep and rocky, and scalloped into coves, in which [218] are the heads of. numerous streams that water Middle Tennessee. Its top is undulating, or rough, covered with timber, soil comparatively barren, and in dry seasons scantily supplied with water. Its south-eastern slope, above Chattanooga, for many miles, is precipitous, rough, and difficult all the way up to Kingston. The valley between the foot of this slope and the river seldom exceeds four or five miles in width, and, with the exception of a narrow border along the banks, is undulating or hilly.

The Sequatchie Valley is along the river of that name, and is a canon, or deep cut, splitting the Cumberland Range parallel. It is only three or four miles in breadth and fifty in length. The sides of this valley are even more precipitous than the great eastern and western slopes of the Cumberland, which have just been described. To reach Chattanooga from McMinnville, or north of the Tennessee, it is necessary to turn the head of this valley by Pikeville and pass down the Valley of the Tennessee, or to cross it by Dunlap or Thurman.

That part of the Cumberland Range between Sequatchie and the Tennessee, called Walden's Ridge, abuts on the Tennessee, in high, rocky bluffs, having no practicable space sufficient for a good wagon-road along the river. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad crosses that branch of the Cumberland Range, west of the Sequatchie, through a low gap, by a tunnel, two miles east of Cowan, down the gorge of Big Crow Creek to Stevenson, at the foot of the mountain, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, three miles from the Tennessee and ten from Bridgeport.

Between Stevenson and Chattanooga, on the south of the Tennessee, are two ranges of mountains, the Tennessee River separating them from the Cumberland. Its channel, a great chasm cut through the mountain masses, which in those places abut directly on the river. These two ranges are separated by a narrow valley through which runs Lookout Creek.

The Sand Mountain is next the Tennessee, and its northern extremity is called Raccoon Moun tain. Its sides are precipitous and its top barren oak ridges, nearly destitute of water. There are but few, and those very difficult, wagon-roads by which to ascend and descend the slopes of this mountain.

East of Lookout Valley is Lookout Mountain, a vast palisade of rocks rising two thousand four hundred feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt, rocky cliffs, from a steep, wooded base. Its eastern sides are no less precipitous. Its top varies from one to six or seven miles in breadth, is heavily timbered, sparsely settled, and poorly watered. It terminates abruptly upon the Tennessee, two miles below Chattanooga, and the only practical wagon-roads across it, are over the nose of the mountain, at this point, one at Johnson's Crook, twenty-six miles distant, and one at Winston's Gap, forty-two miles distant from Chattanooga.

Between the eastern base of this range, and the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta or Georgia State Railroad are a series of narrow valleys, separated by smaller ranges of hills or low mountains, over which there are quite a number of practicable wagon-roads running eastward toward the railroad.

The first of these ranges is Missionary Ridge, separating the waters of Chickamauga from Chattanooga Creek.

A higher range with fewer gaps, on the southeast side of the Chickamauga, is Pigeon Mountain, branching from Lookout, near Dougherty's Gap, some forty miles south from Chattanooga. It extends in a northerly direction, bearing eastward, until it is lost in the general level of the country near the line of the Chattanooga and La Fayette road.

East of these two ranges and of the Chickamauga, starting from Ottowah and passing by Ringgold, to the west of Dalton, is Taylor's Ridge, a rough, rocky range, traversable by wagon-roads only, through gaps generally several miles apart.

Missionary Ridge passes about three miles east of Chattanooga, ending near the Tennessee at the mouth of the Chickamauga. Taylor's Ridge separates the East-Tennessee and Georgia Railroad from the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad.

The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylor's Ridge, and west of the rough mountain region, in which are the sources of the Cossa River. This valley, only about nine or ten miles wide, is the natural southern gateway into East-Tennessee, while the other valleys just mentioned terminate northwardly on the Tennessee to the west of it, and extend in a southwesterly direction toward the line of the Cossa, the general direction of which, from the crossing of the Atlanta road to Rome and thence to Gadsden, is south-west.

From the position of our army at McMinnville, Tullahoma, Decherd, and Winchester, to reach Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee above it, it was necessary, either to pass north of the Sequatchie Valley, by Pikesville or Kingston, or to cross the main Cumberland and the Sequatchie Valley by Dunlap or Thurman and Walden's Ridge, by the routes passing through these places, a distance from sixty-five to seventy miles, over a country destitute of forage, poorly supplied with water, by narrow and difficult wagon-roads.

The main Cumberland Range could also have been passed, on an inferior road, by Pelham and Tracy City to Thurman.

The most southerly route on which to move troops and transportation to the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, was by Cown, University, Battle Creek, and Jasper, or by Tantallon, Anderson, Stevenson, Bridgeport, and the mouth of Battle Creek, to same point, and thence by Thurman, or Dunlap and Poe's Tavern, across Walden Ridge. The University Road, though difficult, was the best of these two, that by Cowan, Tantallon, and Stevenson being very rough between Cowan and Anderson, and much longer.

There were also three roads across the mountains [219] to the Tennessee River below Stevenson, the best, but much the longest, by Fayetteville and Athens, a distance of seventy miles.

The next, a very rough wagon-road from Winchester by Salem, to Larkinsville, and an exceedingly rough road by the way of Mount Top, one branch leading thence to Bellefont and the other to Stevenson.

On these latter routes little or no forage was to be found, except at the extremities of the lines, and they were also scarce of water. The one by Athens has both forage and water in abundance.

It was evident from this description of the topography, that to reach Chattanooga, or penetrate the country south of it, on the railroad,.by crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga, was a difficult task. It was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains, with subsistence, ammunition, at least a limited supply of forage, and a bridge-train; to cross Sand or Raccoon Mountain s into Lookout Valley, then Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges, Missionary Ridge, if we went directly to Chattanooga; or Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if we struck the railroad at Dalton, or south of it. The valley of the Tennessee River, though several miles in breadth between the bases of the mountains, below Bridgeport, is not a broad alluvial farming country, but full of barren oak ridges, sparsely settled, and but a small part of it under cultivation.

Prelimiinary operations of the army.

The first step was to repair the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, to bring forward to Tullahoma, McMinnville, Dechard, and Winchester needful forage and subsistence, which it was impossible to transport from Murfreesboro to those points over the horrible roads which we encountered on our advance to Tullahoma. The next was to extend the repairs of the main stem to Stevenson and Bridgeport and the Tracy City Branch, so that we could place supplies in depot at those points, from which to draw after we had crossed the mountains.

Through the zeal and energy of Colonel Innis and his regiment of Michigan engineers, the main road was open to the Elk River bridge by the thirteenth of July, and the Elk River bridge and the main stem to Bridgeport by the twenty-fifth, and the branch to Tracy City by the thirteenth of August.

As soon as the main stem was finished to Stevenson, Sheridan's division was advanced, two brigades to Bridgeport and one to Stevenson, and commissary and quartermaster stores pushed forward to the latter place, with all practicable speed. These supplies began to be accumulated at this point in sufficient quantities by the eighth of August, and corps commanders were that day directed to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for a general movement.

The Tracy City Branch, built for bringing coal down the mountains, has such high grades and sharp curves as to require a peculiar engine. The only one we had, answering the purpose, having been broken on its way from Nashville, was not repaired until about the twelfth of August. It was deemed best, therefore, to delay the movement of the troops until that road was completely available for transporting stores to Tracy City.

The movement over the Cumberland Mountains began on the morning of the sixteenth of August, as follows:

General Crittenden's corps in three columns, General Wood from Hillsboro by Pelham to Thurman, in Sequatchie Valley.

General Palmer from Manchester by the most practicable route to Dunlop.

General Van Cleve with two brigades from McMinnville, the third being left in garrison there, by the most practicable route to Pikeville, the head of Sequatchie Valley.

Colonel Minty's cavalry to move, on the left, by Sparta, to drive back Debrel's cavalry toward Kingston, where the enemy's mounted troops, under Forrest, were concentrated, and then, covering the left flank of Van Cleve's column, to proceed to Pikeville.

The Fourteenth army corps, Major-General George H. Thomas commanding, moved as follows:

General Reynolds from University by way of Battle Creek, to take post, concealed, near its mouth.

General Brannan to follow him.

General Negley to go by Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek, between Anderson and Stevenson.

General Baird to follow him, and camp near Anderson.

The Twentieth corps, Major-General A. McD. McCook commanding, moved as follows:

General Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Ford to Bellefont.

General Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson.

The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens, to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesbury up.

On his arrival in Sequatchie Valley, General Crittenden was to send a brigade of infantry to reconnoitre the Tennessee, near Harrison's Landing, and take post at Poe's Cross-Roads. Minty was to reconnoitre from Washington down, and take post at Smith's Cross-Roads, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry was to reconnoitre from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga, and be supported by a brigade of infantry which General Crittenden was to send from Thurman to the foot of the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge, in front of Chattanooga.

These movements were completed by the evening of the twentieth of August. Hazen's brigade made the reconnoissance on Harrison's Landing, and reported the enemy throwing up works there, and took post at Poe's Cross-Roads on the twenty-first. Wagner with his brigade supported Wilder in his reconnoissance on Chattanooga, [220] which they surprised and shelled from across the river, creating no little agitation.

Thus the army passed the first great barrier between it and the objective point, and arrived opposite the enemy on the banks of the Tennessee.

The crossing of the river required that the best points should be chosen, and means provided for the crossing. The river was reconnoitred, the pontoons and trains ordered forward as rapidly as possible, hidden from view in rear of Stevenson, and prepared for use. By the time they were ready, the places of crossing had been selected, and dispositions made to begin the operation.

It was very desirable to conceal to the last moment the points of crossing, but as the mountains on the south side of the Tennessee rise in precipitous rocky bluffs to the height of eight hundred or one thousand feet, completely overlooking the whole valley and its coves, this was next to impossible.

Not having pontoons for two bridges across the river, General Sheridan began trestle-work for parts of one at Bridgeport, while General Reynolds's division seizing Shellmount, captured some boats, and from these and material picked up, prepared the means of crossing at that point, and General Brannan prepared rafts for crossing his troops at the mouth of Battle Creek.

The laying of the pontoon-bridges at Caperton's Ferry was very handsomely done by the troops of General Davis, under the direction of General McCook, who crossed his advance in pontoons at daylight, driving the enemy's cavalry from the opposite side. The bridge was ready for crossing by eleven o'clock A. M. the same day, but in plain view from the rebel signal-stations opposite Bridgeport.

The bridge at Bridgeport was finished on the twenty-ninth of August, but an accident occurred which delayed its final completion till September second.

The movement across the river was commenced on the twenty-ninth, and completed on the fourth of September, leaving the regular brigade in charge of the railroad and depot at Stevenson until relieved by Major Granger, who was directed, as soon as practicable, to relieve it and take charge of the rear.

General Thomas's corps was to cross as follows: One division at Caperton's and one at Bridgeport, Reynolds at Shellmount in boats, and one division at Battle Creek on rafts. All were to use the bridge at Bridgeport for such portions of their trains as they might find necessary, and to concentrate near Trenton, and send an advance to seize Frick or Cooper's and Stevens's Gaps, on the Lookout Mountain, the only practicable routes leading down the mountains into the valley, called McLemore's Cove, which lies at its eastern base, and stretches north-westwardly toward Chattanooga.

General McCook's corps was to cross: Two divisions at Caperton's Ferry, move to Valley Head and seize Winston's Gap, while Sheridan was to cross at Bridgeport, as soon as the bridge was laid, and join the rest of his corps, near Winston's, by way of Trenton.

General Crittenden's corps was ordered down the Sequatchie, leaving the two advanced brigades, under Hazen and Warren, with Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry, to watch and annoy the enemy. It was to cross the river, following Thomas's corps, at all three crossings, and to take post on the Murphy's Hollow road, push an advance brigade to reconnoitre the enemy at the foot of Lookout, and take part at Wauhatchie, communicating from his main body with Thomas, on the right, up the Trenton Valley, and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout.

The cavalry, crossed at Caperton's and a ford near Island Creek, were to unite in Lookout Valley, take post at Rawlingsville, and reconnoitre boldly toward Rome and Alpine.

These movements were completed by McCook's and Crittenden's corps on the sixth, and by Thomas's corps on the eighth of September. The cavalry for some reason was not pushed with the vigor nor to the extent which orders and the necessities of the campaign required. Its continual movement since that period, and the absence of Major-General Stanley, the Chief of Cavalry, have prevented a report which may throw some light on the subject.

The first barrier south of the Tennessee being crossed, the enemy was found firmly holding the Point of Lookout Mountain with infantry and artillery, while our force on the north side of the river reported the movement of the rebel forces from East-Tennessee, and their concentration at Chattanooga. To dislodge him from that place, it was necessary to carry Lookout Mountain, or so to move as to compel him to quit his position, by endangering his line of communication. The latter plan was chosen.

The cavalry was ordered to advance on our extreme right to Summerville in Broomtown Valley, and General McCook was ordered to support the movement by a division of infantry thrown forward to the vicinity of Alpine, which was executed on the eighth and ninth of September.

General Thomas was ordered to cross his corps by Frick's or Cooper's and Stevens's Gaps, and occupy the head of McLemore's Cove.

General Crittenden was ordered to reconnoitre the front of Lookout Mountain, sending a brigade upon an almost impracticable path, called the Nickajack Trace, to Summertown, a hamlet on the summit of the mountain, overlooking Chattanooga, and holding the main body of his corps, either to support these reconnoissances, to prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose of Lookout, or to enter Chattanooga in case the enemy should evacuate it or make but feeble resistance. Simultaneously with this movement, the cavalry was ordered to push, by way of Alpine and Broomtown Valley, and strike the enemy's railroad communication between Resaca Bridge and Dalton. [221]

These movements were promptly begun on the eighth and ninth of September. The reconnoissance of General Crittenden on the ninth developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga the day and night previous, and his advance took peaceable possession at one o'clock P. M.

His whole corps with its train passed around the point of Lookout Mountain on the tenth, and encamped for the night at Rossville, five miles south of Chattanooga.

During these operations Gen. Thomas pushed his corps over the mountains at the designated points, each division consuming two days in the passage.

The weight of evidence, gathered from all sources, was that Bragg was moving on Rome, and that his movement commenced on the sixth of September. General Crittenden was, therefore, directed to hold Chattanooga with one brigade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to follow the enemy's retreat vigorously, anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold and Dalton.

Additional information, obtained during the afternoon and evening of the tenth of September, rendered it certain that his main body had retired by the La Fayette road, but, uncertain whether he had gone far, General Crittenden was ordered at one o'clock A. M., on the eleventh, to proceed to the front and report, directing his command to advance only as far as Ringgold, and order a reconnoissance to Gordon's Mill. His report and further evidence satisfied me that the main body of the rebel army was in the vicinity of La Fayette.

General Crittenden was, therefore, ordered to move his corps with all possible despatch from Ringgold to Gordon's Mill, and communicate with General Thomas, who had by that time reached the foot of Lookout Mountain. General Crittenden occupied Ringgold during the eleventh, pushing Wilder's mounted infantry as far as Tunnel Hill, skirmishing heavily with the enemy's cavalry. Hazen joined him near Ringgold on the eleventh, and the whole corps moved rapidly and successfully across to Gordon's Mill on the twelfth. Wilder, following and covering the movement, had a severe fight at Lett's tan-yard.

During the same day, the Fourth United States cavalry was ordered to move up the Dry Valley road, to discover if the enemy was in the proximity of that road on Crittenden's right, and open communication with Thomas's command, which, passing over the mountain, was debouching from Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps, and moving on La Fayette through Dry Gap of the Pigeon Mountain.

On the tenth, Negley's division advanced to within a mile of Dug Gap, which he found heavily obstructed, and Baird's division came up to his support on the morning of the eleventh. Negley became satisfied that the enemy was advancing upon him in heavy force, and perceiving that if he accepted battle in that position he would probably be cut off, he fell back, after a sharp skirmish in which General Baird's division participated, skilfully covering and securing their trains, to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap. On the twelfth, Reynolds and Brannan, under orders to move promptly, closed up to the support of these two advanced divisions.

During the same day General McCook had reached the vicinity of Alpine, and, with infantry and cavalry, had reconnoitred the Broomtown Valley to Summerville, and ascertained that the enemy had not retreated on Rome, but was concentrating at La Fayette.

Thus it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, behind the Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of La Fayette, while the corps of this army were at Gordon's Mill, Bailey's Cross-Roads, at the foot of Stevens's Gap, and at Alpine, a distance of forty miles from flank to flank, by the nearest practicable roads, and fifty-seven miles by the route subsequently taken by the Twentieth army corps. It had already been ascertained that the main body of Johnston's army had joined Bragg, and an accumulation of evidence showed that the troops from Virginia had reached Atlanta on the first of the month, and that reinforcements were expected soon to arrive from that quarter. It was, therefore, a matter of life and death to effect the

Concentration of the army.

General McCook had already been directed to support General Thomas, but was now ordered to send two brigades to hold Dougherty's Gap, and to join General Thomas with the remainder of his command with the utmost celerity, directing his march over the road on the top of the mountain. He had, with great prudence, already moved his trains back to the rear of Little River on the mountain, but unfortunately, being ignorant of the mountain road, moved down the mountain at Winston's Gap, down Lookout Val. ley to Cooper's Gap, up the mountain and down again, closing up with General Thomas on the seventeenth, and having posted Davis at Brooks's, in front of Dug Gap, Johnson at Pond Spring, in front of Catlett's Gap, and Sheridan at the foot of Stevens's Gap.

As soon as General McCook's corps arrived General Thomas moved down the Chickamauga toward. Gordon's Mill. Meanwhile to bring General Crittenden within reach of General Thomas, and beyond the danger of separation, he was withdrawn from Gordon's Mill on the fourteenth and ordered to take post on the southern spur of Missionary Ridge, his right communicating with General Thomas, where he remained until General McCook had effected a junction with General Thomas.

Minty with his cavalry reconnoitred the enemy on the fifteenth, and reported him in force at Dalton, Ringgold, Letts, and Rock Springs Church. The head of General McCook's column being reported near the same day, General Crittenden was ordered to return to his old position at Gordon's Mill, his line resting along the Chickamauga via Crawfish Springs. [222]

Thus, on the evening of the seventeenth, the troops were substantially within supporting distance. Orders were given at once to move the whole line north-eastwardly down the Chickamauga, with a view to covering the La Fayette road toward Chattanooga, and facing the most practicable route to the enemy's front.

The position of our troops and the narrowness of the roads retarded our movements. During the day, while they were in progress, our cavalry under Colonel Minty was attacked on the left, in the vicinity of Reed's Bridge, and Wilder's mounted infantry were attacked by infantry and driven into the La Fayette road.

It became apparent that the enemy was massing heavily on our left, crossing Reed's and Alexander's Bridges in force, while he had threatened Gordon's Mill.

Orders were therefore promptly given to General Thomas to relieve General Crittenden's corps, posting one division near Crawfish Spring, and to move with the remainder of his corps by the Widow Glenn's house to the Rossville and La Fayette road, his left extending obliquely across it near Kelly's house.

General Crittenden was ordered to proceed with Van Cleve's and Palmer's divisions to drive the enemy from the Rossville road, and form on the left of General Woods then at Gordon's Mill.

General McCook's corps was to close up on General Thomas, occupy the position at Crawfish Springs and protect General Crittenden's right while holding his corps mainly in reserve.

The main cavalry force was ordered to close in on General McCook's right, watch the crossing of the Chickamauga, and act under his orders.

The movement for the concentration of the corps more compactly toward Crawfish Springs was begun on the morning of the eighteenth, under orders to conduct it very secretly, and was executed so slowly that McCook's corps only reached Pond Spring at dark, and bivouacked, resting on their arms during the night. Crittenden's corps reached its position on the Rossville road near midnight.

Evidence accumulated during the day of the eighteenth that the enemy was moving to our left. Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted brigade encountered the enemy's cavalry at Reed's and Alexander's bridges, and toward evening were driven to the Rossville road. At the same time the enemy had been demonstrating for three miles up the Chickamauga. Heavy clouds of dust had been observed three or four miles beyond the Chickamauga, sweeping to the northeast.

In view of all these facts the necessity became apparent that General Thomas must use all despatch in moving his corps to the position assigned it. He was therefore directed to proceed with all despatch, and General McCook to close up to Crawfish Springs as soon as Thomas's column was out of the way. Thomas pushed forward uninterruptedly during the night, and at daylight the head of his column had reached Kelly's house on the Lafayette road, where Baird's division was posted. Brannan followed and was posted on Baird's left, covering, the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's bridges.

At this point Colonel McCook, of General Granger's command, who had made a reconnoissance to the Chickamuga the evening before, and had burned Reed's bridge, met General Thomas and reported that an isolated brigade of the enemy was this side of the Chickamauga, and the bridge being destroyed, a rapid movement in that direction might result in the capture of the force thus isolated.

General Thomas ordered Brannan with two brigades to reconnoitre in that direction and attack any small force he should meet. The advance brigade, supported by the rest of the division, soon encountered a strong body of the enemy, attacked it vigorously, and drove it back more than half a mile, where a very strong column of the enemy was found, with the evident intention of turning our left and gaining possession of the La Fayette road between us and Chattanooga.

This vigorous movement disconcerted the plans of the enemy to move on our left, and opened the

Battle of the nineteenth September.

The leading brigade became engaged about ten A. M. on the nineteenth, on our extreme left and extending to the right, where the enemy combined to move in heavy masses. Apprehending this movement, I had ordered General McCook to send Johnson's division to Thomas's assistance. He arrived opportunely.

General Crittenden, with great good sense, had already despatched Palmer's, reporting the fact to me and received my approval. The enemy returned our attack, and was driving back Baird's right in disorder when Johnson struck the attacking column in flank and drove it back more than half a mile, until his own right was overlapped and in imminent danger of being turned, when Palmer, coming in on Johnson's right, threw his division against the enemy and drove back his advance columns.

Palmer's right was soon overlapped, when Van Cleve's division came to his support, but was beaten back, when Reynolds's division came in and was in turn overpowered. Davis's division came into the fight then most opportunely, and drove the enemy, who soon, however, developed a superior force against his line, and pressed him so heavily that he was giving ground, when Wood's division came and turned the tide of battle the other way.

About three P. M. General McCook was ordered to send Sheridan's division to support our line near Wood and Davis, directing Lytle's brigade to hold Gordon's Mill, our extreme right. Sheridan also arrived opportunely to save Wood from disaster, and the rebel tide was thoroughly staid in that quarter.

Meanwhile the roar of musketry in our centre grew louder, and evidently approached headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, until musketballs [223] came near and shells burst about it. Our centre was being driven.

Orders were sent to General Negley to move his division from Crawfish Springs and above, where he had been holding the line of the Chickamauga, to Widow Glenn's, to be held in reserve to give succor wherever it might be required, at halfpast four P. M. He reported with his division, and as the indications that our centre was being driven became clearer he was despatched in that direction, and soon found the enemy had dislodged Van Cleve from the line, and was forming there even while Thomas was driving his right. Orders were promptly given Negley to attack him, which he soon did, and drove him steadily until night closed the combat.

General Brannan, having repulsed the enemy on our extreme left, was sent by General Thomas to support the centre, and at night took a position on the right of Reynolds.

Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry occupied during the day a position on the La Fayette road, one mile north of Gordon's Mill, where he had taken position on the afternoon previous, when, contesting the ground step by step, he had been driven by the enemy's advance from Alexander's bridge.

Minty's cavalry had been ordered from the same position about noon of the nineteenth to report to Major-General Granger at Rossville, which he did at daylight on the twentieth, and was posted near Mission Mills, to hold in check the enemy's cavalry on their right from the direction of Ringgold and Greysville.

The reserve corps covered the approaches from the Chickamauga toward Rossville, and the extension of our left.

The roar of battle hushed in the darkness of night, and our troops, weary with a night of marching and a day of fighting, rested on their arms, having everywhere maintained their positions, developed the enemy, and gained thorough command of the Rossville and Dry Valley roads to Chattanooga, the great objects of the battle of the nineteenth of September.

The battle had secured us these objects. Our flanks covered the Dry Valley and Rossville roads, while our cavalry covered the Missionary Ridge and the valley of Chattanooga Creek, into which latter place our spare trains had been sent on Friday the eighteenth.

We also had indubitable evidence of the presence of Longstreet's corps, and Johnson's forces, by the capture of prisoners from each.

And the fact that at the close of the day, we had present but two brigades, which had not been opportunely and squarely in action, opposed to superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were greatly outnumbered, and that the battle the next day must be for the safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga.

The battle of the Twentieth.

During the evening of the nineteenth, the corps commanders were assembled at headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, the reports of the positions and condition of their commands heard, and orders given for the disposition of the troops for the following day.

Thomas's corps, with the troops which had reinforced him, was to maintain substantially his present line, with Brannan in reserve.

McCook, maintaining his picket-line till it was driven in, was to close on Thomas, his right refused, and covering the position at Widow Glenn's house, and Crittenden to have two divisions in reserve near the junction of McCook's and Thomas's lines, to be able to succor either.

Plans having been explained, written.orders given to each, and read in the presence of all, the wearied corps commanders returned about midnight to their commands.

No firing took place during the night. The troops had assumed position when day dawned. The sky was red and sultry. The atmosphere and all the woods enveloped in fog and smoke. As soon as it was sufficiently light, I proceeded, accompanied by General Garfield and some aids, to inspect the lines.

I found General McCook's right too far upon the crest, and General Davis in reserve on a wooded hill-side west of and parallel to the Dry Valley road. I mentioned these defects to the General, desiring Davis's division to be brought down at once, moved more to the left and placed in close column by division doubled in the centre in a sheltered position.

I found General Crittenden's two divisions massed at the foot of the same hill, in the valley, and called his attention to it, desiring them to be moved further to the left.

General Thomas's troops were in the position indicated, except Palmer's line was to be closed more compactly.

Satisfied that the enemy's first attempt would be on our left, orders were despatched to General Negley to join General Thomas, and to General McCook to relieve Negley. Returning to the right I found Negley had not moved, nor were McCook's troops coming in to relieve him. Negley was preparing to withdraw his two brigades from the line. He was ordered to send his reserve brigade immediately and follow it with the others, only when relieved on the line of battle. General Crittenden, whose troops were nearest, was ordered to fill General Negley's place at once, and General McCook was notified of this order, growing out of the necessity of promptly sending Negley to Thomas.

Proceeding to the extreme right, I felt the disadvantages of its position, mentioned them to General McCook, and, when I left him, enjoined on him that it was an indispensable necessity that we should keep closed to the left, and that we must do so at all hazards.

On my return to the position of General Negley, I found to my astonishment that General Crittenden had not relieved him, Wood's division having reached the position of Negley's reserves. Peremptory orders were given to repair this, and Wood's troops moved into position, but this delay subsequently proved of serious consequence. [224] The battle began on the extreme left at half-past 8 A. M., and it was forty-five minutes past nine o'clock when Negley was relieved.

An aid arriving from General Thomas requesting that Negley's remaining brigades be sent forward as speedily as possible to succor the left, General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve with all possible despatch, to a position in the rear of Wood, who closed in on Brannan's right. General McCook was ordered to move up to close in on Wood, and fill an opening in the line.

On my return from an examination of the ground in the rear of our left centre, I found to my surprise that General Van Cleve was posted in line of battle on a high ridge, much too far to the rear to give immediate support to the main line of battle, and General Davis in line of battle in rear of the ridge occupied by General Negley's reserve in the morning. General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve at once down the hill to a better position, and General Davis was also ordered to close up the support of the line near Wood's right.

The battle, in the mean while, roared with increasing fury and approach from the left to the centre. Two aids arrived successively within a few minutes from General Thomas, asking for reenforcements. The first was directed to say that General Negley had already gone and should be nearly at hand at that time, and that Brannan's reserve brigade was available. The other was directed to say that General Van Cleve would at once be sent to his assistance, which was accordingly done.

A message from General Thomas soon followed that he was heavily pressed, Captain Kellogg, A. D. C., the bearer, informing me at the same time that General Brannan was out of line, and General Reynolds's right was exposed. Orders were despatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he should be supported, even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook.

General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and General McCook was advised of the state of affairs, and ordered to close his whole command to the left with all despatch.

General Wood, overlooking the direction to “close up” on General Reynolds, supposed he was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing to the rear of General Brannan, who, it appears, was hot out of line, but was in echelon, and slightly in rear of Reynolds's right. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and striking Davis in flank and rear, as well as in front, threw his whole division in confusion.

The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood before it had cleared the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, and two of his batteries, then in movement to a new division, were taken in flank and thrown back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then on the march to the left, throwing his division into confusion, from which it never recovered until it reached Rossville.

While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line, stretching beyond Sheridan's right, was advancing. Lerbold's brigade shared in the rout of Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades in movement toward the left, under orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the enemy's advancing column, but were thrown into disorder by the enemy's line advancing on their flank, and were likewise compelled to fall back, rallying on the Dry Valley road, and repulsing the enemy, but they were again compelled to yield to superior numbers, and retired westward of the Dry Valley, and by a circuitous route reached Rossville, from which they advanced by the La Fayette road to support our left.

Thus Davis's two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades, and one of Van Cleve's, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole effort to destroy them.

At the moment of the repulse of Davis's division, I was standing in rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook's corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the distance Davis's men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging. toward us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became imminent, and I hastened, in person, to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridges west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, and Major Bond, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape, canister, and musketry for two or three hundred yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support, by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our line, but found the routed troops far toward the left, and hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga, to give orders for the security of the pontoon-bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary disposition either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position.

General Garfield despatched me from Rossville, that the left and centre still held its ground. General Granger had gone to its support. General Sheridan had rallied his division, and was advancing toward the same point, and General Davis was going up the Dry Valley road to our right. General Garfield proceeded to the front, [225] remained there until the close of the fight, and despatched me the triumphant defence our troops there made against the assaults of the enemy.

The fight on the left after two P. M., was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least, have troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet-charges, often heard of, but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and regiments, in several of our divisions.

After the yielding and severance of the division of the right, the enemy bent all efforts to break the solid portion of our line. Under the pressure of the rebel onset, the flanks of the line were gradually retired until they occupied strong, advantageous ground, giving to the whole a flattened crescent shape.

From one to half-past 3 o'clock, the unequal contest was sustained throughout our line. Then the enemy, in overpowering numbers, flowed around our right, held by General Brannan, and occupied a low gap in the ridge of our defensive position, which commanded our rear. The moment was critical. Twenty minutes more and our right would have been turned, our position taken in reverse, and probably the army routed.

Fortunately, Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to cover our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and a General, hearing the roar of battle on our left, and being beyond the reach of orders from the General Commanding, determined to move to its assistance. He advanced and soon encountered the enemy's skirmishers, whom he disregarded, well knowing that, at that stage of the conflict, the battle was not there. Posting Colonel Daniel McCook's brigade to take care of any thing in the vicinity and beyond the left of our line, he moved the remainder to the scene of action, reporting to General Thomas, who directed him to our suffering right.

Arrived in sight, General Granger discovered at once the peril, and the point of danger — the gap — and quick as thought he directed his advance brigade upon the enemy. General Steadman, taking a regimental color, led the column. Swift was the charge and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand of our brave men, killed and wounded, paid for its possession, but we held the gap.

Two divisions of Longstreet's corps confronted the position. Determined to take it, they successively came to the assault. A battery of six guns, placed in the gorge, poured death and slaughter into them. They charged to within a few yards of the pieces, but our grape and canister and the leaden hail of our musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys from cartridges taken, in many instances, from the boxes of their fallen companions, was too much even for Longstreet's men. About sunset they made their last charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, rushed on them with the bayonet, and they gave way to return no more.

The fury of the conflict was nearly as great on the fronts of Brannan and Wood, being less furious toward the left. But a column of the enemy had made its way to near our left and to the right of Colonel McCook's position. Apprised of this, General Thomas directed Reynolds to move his division from its position, and, pointing out the rebels, told him to go in there.

To save time, the troops of Reynolds were faced by the rear rank, and moved with the bayonet at a double-quick, and with a shout walked over the rebels, capturing some five hundred. This closed the battle of the twentieth. At nightfall the enemy had been repulsed along the whole line, and sunk into quietude, without attempting to renew the combat.

General Thomas, considering the excessive labors of the troops, the scarcity of ammunition, food, and water, and having orders from the General Commanding to use his discretion, determined to retire on Rossville, where they arrived in good order, took post before morning, receiving supplies from Chattanooga, and offering the enemy battle during all the next day, and repulsing his reconnoissance. On the night of twenty-first we withdrew from Rossville, took firm possession of the objective point of our campaign — Chattanooga — and prepared to hold it.

The operations of the cavalry during the battles on the nineteenth were very important. General Mitchell, with three brigades, covered our right flank along the line of the Chickamauga, above Crawfish Springs, against the combined efforts of the great body of the rebel cavalry, whose attempts to cross the stream they several times repulsed.

Wilder fought dismounted near the centre, intervening two or three times with mountain howitzers and Spencer rifles very opportunely.

On the twentieth, Minty covered our left and rear at Missionary Mills, and later in the day on the Ringgold road.

General Mitchell, with his three brigades, covered our extreme right, and with Wilder, after its repulse, extended over Missionary Ridge, held the whole country to the base of Lookout Mountain, and all our trains, artillery, caissons, and spare wagons, sent there for greater safety, retiring from the field. He was joined by Post's brigade of Davis's division, which had not closed on the army, and was not in action.

On the twenty-first the cavalry still covered our right as securely as before, fighting and holding at bay very superior numbers. The number of cavalry combats during the whole campaign have been numerous, and the successes as numerous, but the army could not have dispensed with those of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first.

Our artillery

fired fewer shots than at Stone River, but with even greater effect. I cannot but congratulate the country on the rapid improvement evinced in this arm of the service. Our loss of pieces is in part attributable to the rough wooded ground in which we fought and the want of experience in posting artillery, and partly to the unequal nature of the contest, our infantry being heavily outnumbered. [226]

For the details of these actions, the innumerable instances of distinguished bravery, skill, and gallantry displayed by officers of every rank, and above all for self-reliant, cool, and steady courage displayed by the soldiers of the army, in all arms, in many instances even shining above that of their officers, I must refer to the accompanying reports of the corps, division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders. The reports of the cavalry command are not in, for the best of all reasons, that they have been out nearly ever since, writing with their sabres on the heads and backs of the enemy.

The signal corps has been growing into usefulness and favor daily for the last four months, and now bids fair to become one of the most esteemed of the staff services. It rendered very important service from the time we reached the valley of the Tennessee. For its operations I refer to the report of Captain Jesse Merrill, Chief Signal Officer.

Our medical corps proved very efficient during the whole campaign, and especially during and subsequent to the battle. A full share of praise is due to Dr. Glover Perin, Medical Director of the Department, ably assisted by Dr. Grose, Medical Director of the Fourteenth, Dr. Perkins, Twentieth, and Dr. Phelps, Twenty-first army corps.

A very great meed of praise is due Captain Horace Porter, of the ordnance, for the wise system of arming each regiment with arms of the same calibre, and having the ammunition-wagons properly marked, by which most of the difficulties in supplying. ammunition where troops had exhausted it in battle were obviated. From this report will be seen that we expended two million six hundred and fifty thousand rounds of musket-cartridges, seven thousand three hundred and twenty-five rounds of cannon ammunition. We lost thirty-six pieces of artillery, twenty caissons, eight thousand four hundred and fifty stand of small arms, five thousand eight hundred and thirty-four infantry accoutrements, being twelve thousand six hundred and and seventy-five rounds less of artillery, and six hundred and fifty thousand rounds more of musketry than at Stone River.

From the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Wiles, Provost-Marshal General, it will be seen that we took two thousand and three prisoners. We have----missing, of which some six hundred have escaped and come in, and probably seven hundred or eight hundred are among the killed and wounded. Of our wounded about two thousand five hundred fell into the hands of the enemy, swelling the balance of prisoners against us to about five thousand five hundred.

It is proper to observe that the battle of Chickamauga was absolutely necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was fought in a country covered with woods and undergrowth, and wholly unknown to us. Every division came into action opportunely, and fought squarely on the nineteenth. We were largely outnumbered, yet we foiled the enemy's flank movement on our left, and secured our own position on the road to Chattanooga. The battle of the twentieth was fought with all the troops we had, and but for the extension and delay in closing in our right, we should probably have driven the enemy, whom we really beat on the field. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's loss largely exceeds ours.

It is my duty to notice the services of those faithful officers who have none but myself to mention them.

To Major-General Thomas, the true soldier, the prudent and undaunted commander, the modest and incorruptible patriot, the thanks and gratitude of the country are due for his conduct at the battle of Chickamauga.

Major-General Granger, by his promptitude, arrived and carried his troops into action in time to save the day. He deserves the highest praise.

Major-General McCook, for the care of his command, prompt and willing execution of orders, to the best of his ability, deserves this testimonial of my approbation.

I bear testimony, likewise, to the high-hearted, noble Major-General Crittenden. Prompt in the moving and reporting the position of his troops, always fearless in the field of battle, I return my thanks for the promptness and military good sense with which he sent his division toward the noise of battle on the nineteenth.

To Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, Chief of Staff, I am especially indebted for the clear and ready manner in which he seized the points of action and movement, and expressed in orders the ideas of the General Commanding.

Colonel J. C. McKibben, A. D. C., always efficient, gallant, and untiring, and fearless in battle.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Ducat, brave, prompt, and energetic in action.

Major Frank S. Bond, Senior A. D. C.; Captain J. P. Drouillard, A. D. C.; Captain R. S. Thoms, A. D. C., deserve very honorable mention. for the faithful and efficient discharge of their appropriate duties always, and especially during the battle.

Colonel James Barnett, Chief of Artillery; Lieutenant-Colonel S. Simmons, Chief Commissary; Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Hodges, Chief Quartermaster; Dr. G. Perin, Medical Director; Captain Horace Porter, Chief of Ordnance; Captain William E. Merrill, Chief Topographical Engineer; Brigadier-General J. St. Clair Morton, were all in the battle and discharged their duties with ability and to my entire satisfaction.

Colonel William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, and his command, have rendered very valuable services in keeping open communications and watching the movements of the enemy, which deserve my warmest thanks.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Ward, with the Tenth Ohio, Provost and Headquarter Guard, rendered efficient and valuable services, especially on the twentieth, in covering the movement of retiring trains on the Dry Valley road, and [227] stopping the stragglers from the fight. Captain Garner and the escort deserve mention for untiring energy in carrying orders.

Lieutenant-Colonel Goddard, A. A. G.; Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Wiles, Provost-Marshal General; Major William McMichael, A. A. G.; Surgeon H. H. Sexes, Medical Inspector; Captain D. G. Swaim, A. A. G., Chief of the Secret Service; Captain William Farear, A. D. C.; Captain J. H. Young, Chief Commissary of Musters; Captain A. S. Burt, Acting Assistant Inspector-General; Captain Hunter Brooke, Acting Judge-Advocate; Captain W. C. Margendant, Acting Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant George Burroughs, Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant William Porter, Acting A. D. C.; Lieutenant James Reynolds, Acting A. D. C.; Lieutenant M. J. Kelley, Chief of Couriers; Assistant Surgeon D. Bache, were on the field of battle, and there and elsewhere discharged their duties with zeal and ability.

I must not omit Colonel J. P. Sanderson of the regular infantry, who, having lately joined us, on those two days of battle acted as Aid-de-Camp, and carried orders to the hottest portions of the field.

Of those division and brigade commanders whose gallantry, skill, and services were prominent, individual special mentions accompany this report. A list of names of these, and others of every grade, whose conduct, according to the reports of their commanders, observes special praise, is also herewith sent.

General: I have the honor to report the operations of my corps from the first of September up to date, as follows, namely, General Brannan's (Third) division crossed the Tennessee River at Battle Creek; General Reynolds's (Fourth) division at Shellmound; General Baird ordered to cross his (First) division at Bridgeport, and to move to Taylor's Store; General Negley's (Second) division to cross the river at Culperton's Ferry, and to report at Taylor's Store also.

September 2.--General Baird's division moved to Widow's Creek. General Negley reports having arrived at Moore's Spring, one and a quarter miles from Taylor's Store, and two miles from Bridgeport. He was ordered to cross the mountain at that point, it being the most direct route to Trenton, in the vicinity of which the corps was ordered to concentrate.

September 3.--Headquarters of the Fourteenth army corps moved from Bolivar Springs at six A. M., via Culperton's Ferry to Moore's Spring, on the road from Bridgeport to Trenton. Baird's division reached Bridgeport but could not cross, in consequence of damage to the bridge. Negley's division marched to Warren Mill, on the top of Sand Mountain, on the road to Trenton. Brannan's division reached Graham's Store, on the road from Shellmound to Trenton. Reynolds's division marched six miles on the Trenton road from Shellmound.

September 4.--Negley's division camped at Brown's Spring, at the foot of Sand Mountain, in Lookout Valley; Brannan's division at Gordon's Mill, on Sand Mountain; Reynolds's division at foot of Sand Mountain, two miles from Trenton Baird's division crossed the river at Bridgeport, and camped at that point.

September 5.--Corps headquarters at Moore's Spring. First division (Baird's) arrived at Moore's Spring. Negley's division still in camp at Brown's Spring. He reports having sent forward a reconnoissance of two regiments of infantry and a section of artillery to scour the country toward Chattanooga, and secure some captured stores near Macon Iron-Works. They captured some confederate, army supplies. No report from Brannan's division. Reynolds's division in camp at Trenton; Brannan somewhere in the neighborhood. Corps headquarters at Warren's Mill.

September 6.--Baird's division encamped at Warren's Mill. Negley's division reached Johnson's Crook. Beatty's brigade was sent up the road to seize Stevens's Gap; met the enemy's pickets, and it being dark, did not proceed further. The Eighteenth Ohio, of Negley's division, went to the top of Lookout Mountain beyond Paine's Mills; met the enemy's pickets, and dispersed them. The head of Brannan's division reached Lookout Valley two miles below Trenton. Reynolds's division in camp at Trenton. Rumors of the enemy's design to evacuate Chattanooga. Corps headquarters at Brown's Spring.

September 7.--Baird's division closed up with Negley's in the mouth of Johnson's Crook. Negley gained possession of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the road. Brannan's division reached Trenton. Reynolds remained in camp at that place. Corps headquarters still at Brown's Spring.

September 8.--Baird's division remained in its camp of yesterday, at the junction of. Hurricane and Lookout Creeks. Negley's division moved up to the top of Lookout Mountain, at the head of Johnson's Crook, one brigade occupying the pass; another brigade was sent forward and seized Cooper's Gap, sending one regiment to the foot of the Gap to occupy and hold it. One re giment was also sent forward to seize Stevens's Gap, which was heavily obstructed with fallen trees. Brannan's division occupied the same position as last night. Reynolds's division headquarters at Trenton, with one brigade at Paine's Mill, three miles south of Trenton. Headquarters of the corps still at Brown's Spring.

September 9.--Baird's division moved across Lookout Mountain to the support of Negley. Negley's division moved across the mountain and took up a position in McLemore's Cove, near Rogers's farm, throwing out his skirmishers as far as Bailey's Cross-Roads. Saw the enemy's cavalry in front, drawn up in line. Citizens reported a heavy force concentrated in his front at Dug Gap, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Brannan's division in same camp as yesterday [228] Reynolds's division camped as yesterday. The Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry) sent on a reconnoissance toward Chattanooga, along the ridge of Lookout Mountain. Corps headquarters moved from Brown's Spring to Easeley's Farm, on Trenton and Lebanon road.

September 10.--General Negley's division, in front of or one mile west of Dug Gap, which has been heavily obstructed by the enemy and occupied by a strong picket-line. General Baird ordered to move up to-night to Negley's support. General Reynolds to move at daylight to support Baird's left, and General Brannan to move at eight A. M. to-morrow morning to support Reynolds. Headquarters of General Reynolds's division camped for the night at foot of the mountain. Brannan's division at Easeley's.

September 11.--Baird's division closed up on Negley's at Widow Davis's house, about eight A. M. Soon afterward, Negley, being satisfied from his own observations and from the reports of officers sent out to reconnoitre, and also from loyal citizens, that the enemy was advancing on him in very superior force, and that his train was in imminent danger of being cut off if he accepted battle at Davis's Cross-Roads, determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap. This movement he immediately proceeded to put into execution, and by his untiring energy and skill, and with the prompt cooperation of Baird, succeeded in gaining possession of the hills in front of Stevens's Gap, and securing his trains without losing a single wagon. For a detailed account of this movement see reports of Generals Negley and Baird, annexed, marked A and B. General Turchin, commanding Third brigade of Reynolds's division, was pushed forward, by way of Cooper's Gap, to Negley's support on the left, reaching his position about ten o'clock P. M. Orders were sent to General Brannan to close up as rapidly as possible. Corps headquarters at the top of Cooper's Gap.

September 12.--Brannan's division reached Negley's position by eight A. M., and took position next on the left, one brigade covering Cooper's Gap. Reports from citizens go to confirm the impression that a large force of the enemy is concentrated at La Fayette. A report from General McCook. confirms that fact. A later despatch from the same source says, it is reported that Bragg's whole army, with Johnston's, is at La Fayette. Generals Brannan and Baird, with part of their commands, went out on a reconnoissance toward Dug Gap at one o'clock P. M. to-day. General Brannan reports they advanced two miles beyond Davis's Cross-Roads without finding any enemy, with the exception of a few mounted men. Corps headquarters encamped at top of Stevens's Gap.

September 13.--Negley's, Baird's and Brannan's divisions remained in their camps of yesterday, awaiting the arrival of McCook's corps, which had been ordered to close to the left. Reynolds concentrated his division on the road from Cooper's Gap to Catlett's Gap. Two deserters from the Eighteenth Tennessee state that they belong to Buckner's corps. Buckner's corps consist of eight brigades and two batteries of six guns each, and was in the fight with Negley. They saw a brigade of Forrest's cavalry, commanded by Forrest himself, pass toward the fight on the eleventh. Miles's and Buckner's corps were both engaged. Bragg's army is concentrated at La Fayette. Headquarters moved by way of Cooper's Gap to the foot of the mountain.

September 14.--General Reynolds took up a position at Pond Spring with his two infantry brigades, and was joined by Wilder at that place. Turchin, of Reynolds's division, made a reconnoissance to the mouth of Catlett's Gap, with the Ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry; was opposed by rebel mounted pickets from Chickamauga Creek to the mouth of Catlett's Gap, at which place he found their reserve drawn up, also a strong line of skirmishers to the right of the road; but, having received instructions to avoid bringing on an engagement, he retired to camp with the regiment. General Brannan advanced one brigade of his division to Chickamauga Creek, east of Lee's Mills, one mile to the right and south of Reynolds's position at Pond Spring. A mounted reconnaissance was also pushed forward to within a mile of Blue Bird Gap, without encountering any of the enemy. A negro, who had been taken before General Buckner, yesterday, and released again, reports that Buckner and his corps are in Catlett's Gap, preparing to defend that place. A negro woman, lately from the neighborhood of Dug Gap, reports a large force of rebels between Dug Gap and La Fayette.

September 16.--Corps headquarters, and First and Second divisions, remain camped as last reported at foot of Stevens's Gap. Turchin's brigade of Reynolds's division, made a reconnoissance toward Catlett's Gap. The enemy fell back as he advanced, until he came upon a force strongly posted, with two pieces of artillery, in the roads. He made a second reconnoisance at two P. M. that day, with but little further result, as he could advance but a short distance further, the enemy being in force in his front.

September 17.--First, Second, and Third divisions changed their position from their camp yesterday: First division, with its right resting at Gower's Ford, and extending along Chickamauga Creek to Bird's Mill; Second division, with its right at Bird's Mill and its left connecting with Van Cleve's division, at Owen's Ford; Third division, on the right of the First, covering four fords between Gower's Ford and Pond Spring. One brigade of the Fourth division, thrown out in front of Pond Spring, on the Catlett's Gap road, covering the pass through the mountain; Wilder's brigade detached and ordered to report to department headquarters. The left of McCook's corps closed in, connecting with our right, near Pond Spring.

September 18.--At four P. M. the whole corps moved to the left along Chickamauga Creek to Crawfish Springs. On arriving at that place, I received orders to march on the cross-road leading [229] by the Widow Glenn's to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, and take up a position near Kelley's farm, on the La Fayette road, connecting with Crittenden on my right at Gordon's Mill. The head of the column reached Kelley's farm about daylight on the nineteenth, Baird's division in front, and took up a position at the forks of the road, facing toward Reid's and Alexander's bridges over the Chickamauga. Colonel Wilder, having informed me that the enemy had crossed the Chickamauga at those two bridges in force the evening before, and driven his brigade across the State road to the heights on the east of the Widow Glenn's house, this position of Baird's threw my right into close proximity to Wilder's brigade. The interval I intended to fill with the two remaining brigades of Reynolds's division on their arrival. General Brannan, closely following Baird's division, was placed in position on his left, on the two roads leading from the State road to Reid's and Alexander's bridges.

Colonel Dan McCook, commanding a brigade of the reserve corps, met me at General Baird's headquarters, and reported that he had been stationed the previous night on the road leading to Reid's Bridge, and that he could discover no force of the enemy except one brigade, which had crossed to the west side of Chickamauga at Reid's Bridge the day before, and he believed it could be cut off, because he had destroyed the bridge after they had crossed. Upon this information I ordered General Brannan to post a brigade within supporting distance of Baird, on the road to Alexander's Bridge, and with his other two brigades to reconnoitre the road leading to Reid's Bridge, to see if he could locate the brigade reported by Dan McCook, and if a favorable opportunity occurred, to capture them. His dispositions were made according to instructions by nine A. M. Gen. Baird was directed to throw forward his right wing so as to get more nearly in line with Brannan, but to watch well on his right flank. Soon after this disposition of these two divisions, a portion of General Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps took position to the right of General Baird's division. About ten A. M. Croxton's brigade of Brannan's division became engaged with the enemy, and I rode forward to his position to ascertain the character of the attack. Colonel Croxton reported to me that he had driven the enemy nearly half a mile, but that he was then meeting with obstinate resistance. I then rode back to Baird's division and directed him to advance to Croxton's support, which he did with his whole division, Starkweather's brigade in reserve, and drove the enemy steadily before him for some distance, taking many prisoners.

Croxton's brigade, which had been heavily engaged over an hour with greatly superior numbers of the enemy, and being nearly exhausted of ammunition, was then moved to the rear to enable the men to fill their boxes, and Baird and Brannan having united their forces drove the enemy from their immediate front. General Baird then halted for the purpose of readjusting line, and learning from prisoners that the enemy were in heavy force on his immediate right, he threw back his right wing in order to be ready for an attack from that quarter. Before his disposition could be completed, the enemy in overwhelming numbers assaulted Scribner's and King's brigades and drove them in disorder. Fortunately, at this time, Johnson's division of McCook's corps, and Reynolds's division of my corps, arrived, and were immediately placed in position, Johnson's preceding Reynolds's, his left connecting with Baird's right, and Palmer's being immediately placed on Johnson's right. Reynolds was placed on the right of Palmer, with one brigade of his division in reserve. As soon as formed, they advanced upon the enemy, attacking him in flank and driving him in great confusion for a mile and a half, while Brannan's troops shot them in front as they were pursuing Baird's retiring brigades, driving the head of their columns back and retaking the artillery, which had been temporarily lost by Baird's brigades. The enemy at this time being hardly pressed by Johnson's, Palmer's, and Rey, nold's divisions in flank, fell back in confusion on his reserves, posted in a strong position on the west side of Chickamauga Creek, between Reid's and Alexander's bridges. Brannan and Baird were then ordered to reorganize their commands and take position on commanding ground on the road from McDaniel's house to Reid's Bridge and hold it to the last extremity, as I expected the next effort of the enemy would be to gain that road and our rear.

This was about four P. M. After a lull of about an hour a furious attack was made on Reynolds's right, and he having called upon me for reenforcements, I directed Brannan's division to move to his support, leaving King's brigade of Baird's division in the position at which Baird and Brannan had been posted, the balance of Baird's division closing up to the right on Johnson's division. It will be seen, by reference to Major-General Reynolds's report, that a portion of Brannan's division reached his right just in time to defeat the enemy's efforts to turn Reynolds's right and rear. About five P. M., my lines being at that time very much extended in pursuing the enemy, I determined to concentrate them on more commanding ground, as I felt confident that we should have a renewal of the battle the next morning. I rode forward to General Johnson's position and designated to him where to place his division; also to General Baird, who was present with General Johnson. I then rode back to the cross-roads to locate Palmer and Reynolds on the prolongation of Johnson's line, and on the crest of the ridge. Soon after Palmer and Reynolds got their positions, and while General Brannan was getting in his position on the ridge to the west of the State road, near Dyer's house, to the rear and right of Reynolds, where I had ordered him as a reserve, the enemy assaulted first Johnson and then Baird in a most furious manner, producing some confusion; but order was soon restored, and the enemy repulsed in fine style, after which these [230] two divisions took up the positions assigned them for the night. Before adjusting the line satisfactorily, I received an order to report at headquarters, and was absent from my command until near midnight.

After my return, and about two A. M. on the twentieth, I received a report from General Baird that the left of his division did not rest at the Reid's bridge road, as I had expected. I immediately addressed a note to the General Commanding, requesting that General Negley be sent me to take position on General Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault. During the night the troops threw up temporary breast-works of logs, and prepared for the encounter which all anticipated would come off the next day.

Although informed by note from General Rosecrans that Negley's division would be sent immediately to take post on my left, it had not arrived at seven A. M. on the twentieth, and I sent Captain Willard of my staff to General Negley, to urge him forward as rapidly as possible, and to point out his position to him. General Negley, in his official report, mentions that he received this order through Captain Willard at eight A. M. on the twentieth, and that he immediately commenced withdrawing his division for that purpose, when the enemy was reported to be massing a heavy force in his front, sharply engaging his line of skirmishers, and that he was directed by General Rosecrans to hold his position until relieved by some other command. General Beatty's brigade, however, was sent under guidance of Captain Willard, who took it to its position, and it went into action immediately — the enemy at that time having commenced a furious assault on Baird's left, and partially succeeded in gaining his rear. Beatty, meeting with greatly superior numbers, was compelled to fall back until relieved by the fire of several regiments of Johnson's reserve, which were placed in position by General Baird, and which regiments, with the cooperation of Vandeveer's brigade of Brannan's division, and a portion of Stanley's brigade of Wood's division, drove the enemy entirely from Baird's left and rear.

To prevent a repetition of this attack on the part of the enemy, I directed Captain Gaw, my chief topographical officer, to go to the commanding officer of these troops and direct him to mass as much artillery on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, directly west of the State road, as he could conveniently spare from his lines, supported strongly by infantry, so as to sweep the ground to the left and rear of Baird's position. This order General Negley mentions in his report having received from Captain Gaw, but from his description of the position he assumed he must have misunderstood my order, and instead of massing the artillery near Baird's left, it was posted on the right of Brannan's division, nearly in the rear of Reynolds's right.

At the same time the assault just described was made on Baird, the enemy attacked Johnson and Palmer and Reynolds with equal flerceness, which was continued at least two hours, making assault after assault with fresh troops, which were met by my troops with a most determined coolness and deliberation. Having exhausted his utmost energies to dislodge us, he apparently fell back entirely from our front and we were not disturbed again until toward night, after the withdrawal of the troops to Rossville commenced.

Just before the repulse of the enemy on our left General Beatty came to me in person and asked for fresh troops, stating that most of those I had sent to him had gone back to the rear and right, and he was anxious to get at least another brigade before they attacked him again. I immediately sent Captain Kellogg to hurry up General Sheridan, whose division I had been informed would be sent to me. He soon after returned, reporting that in attempting to hurry up the troops that were ordered to report to me, he had met a large force of the enemy in the open corn-field to the rear of Reynolds's position, advancing cautiously, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out. He had met Colonel Harker, whose brigade was posted on a ridge a short distance to the rear of Reynolds's position, who also saw this force advancing upon him, but, with Captain Kellogg, was of the opinion that they were Sheridan's troops coming to our assistance. Hearing heavy firing to my right and rear through the woods, I rode to the slopes of the hill to ascertain its cause. Just as I left the woods, I met Colonel Harker and Captain Kellogg with the above information. I told Colonel Harker that I was expecting Sheridan's troops from that direction, but if these troops fired on him, seeing his flag, that he was to return their fire, and resist their further advance. He immediately ordered his men to commence firing, and skirmished with them from that point to the crest of the hill slightly in his rear, placing his right in connection with Brannan's division and portions of Beatty's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division, which had retired from the extreme left to that point.

I rode toward the crest of the hill, when I saw a body of our troops assembled in line of battle. On the way I met General Wood, who confirmed me in the opinion that the troops advancing upon us were the enemy, although we were not then aware of the disaster to the centre and right of our army. I then directed him to place his division on the prolongation of Brannan's, who, I had ascertained from wood, was on the top of the hill above referred to, and to resist the further advance of the enemy as long as possible. I sent my aid, Captain Kellogg, to notify General Reynolds that our right had been turned, and that the enemy was in his rear in force. General Wood barely had time to dispose his troops on the left of Brannan before another of those fierce assaults, similar to those made in the morning on my lines, was made on him and Brannan combined, and kept up by the enemy throwing in fresh troops as fast as those in their front were driven back, until near nightfall. [231]

About the time that Wood took up his position, General Gordon Granger appeared on my left flank at the head of Steedman's division of his corps. I immediately despatched a staff-officer to him, with orders to push forward and take position on Brannan's right, which order was complied with with the greatest promptness and alacrity, Steedman moving his troops into position with almost as much precision as if on drill, and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on Brannan's right, moved forward his artillery, driving the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting on him a most terrible loss in killed and wounded. This opportune arrival of fresh troops revived the flagging spirits of our men on the right, and inspired them with more ardor for the contest. Every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line. By this time the ammunition in the boxes of the men was reduced on an average to two or three rounds per man, and my ammunition-trains having been unfortunately ordered to the rear by some unauthorized person, we should have been entirely without ammunition in a very short time had not a small supply come up with General Steedman's command. This being distributed among the troops, gave them about ten rounds per man.

General Garfield, Chief of Staff of General Rosecrans, reached this position about four P. M., in company with Colonel Houston, of McCook's staff, and Captains Gaw and Barker, of my staff, giving me the first reliable information that the centre and right of our army had been driven. Soon after I received General Rosecrans's despatch from Chattanooga, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at Chattanooga and make all necessary dispositions for defence and then join me; also that he had sent out rations and ammunition to meet me at Rossville. I determined to hold the position until nightfall, if possible — in the mean time sending Captains Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammunition, Major Lawrence, my Chief of Artillery, having been previously sent to notify the different commanders that ammunition would be supplied to them shortly. As soon as they had reported the distribution of the ammunition, I directed Captain Willard to inform the division commanders on the left to withdraw their commands as soon as they received orders.

At half-past 5 P. M. Captain Barker, commanding my escort, was sent to notify General Reynolds to commence the movement, and I left the position behind General Wood's command to meet Reynolds and point out to him the position where I wished him to form line to cover the retirement of the other troops on the left. In passing through an open woods, bordering the State road, and between my last and Reynolds's position, I was cautioned by a couple of soldiers who had been to hunt water, that there was a large rebel force in these woods drawn up in line and advancing toward me. Just at this time [ saw the head of Reynolds's column approaching, and calling to the General himself, directed him to change the head of his column to the left, and form line perpendicular to the State road, his right resting on that road, and to charge the enemy, who were then in his immediate front. This movement was made with the utmost promptitude, and facing to the right while on the march. Turchin threw his brigade upon the rebel force, routing them and driving them in utter confusion entirely beyond Baird's left. In this splendid advance more than two hundred prisoners were captured and sent to the rear. Colonel Robinson, commanding Second brigade, Reynolds's division, followed closely upon Turchin, and I posted him on the road leading through the ridge to hold the ground while the troops on our right and left passed by. In a few moments General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, reported to me that his brigade was in position on a commanding piece of ground to the right of the ridge road. I directed him to report to General Reynolds and assist in recovering the retirement of our troops. Turchin's brigade, after driving the enemy a mile and a half, was reassembled and took its position on the ridge road with Robinson and Willich.

These dispositions being made, I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were attacked at the moment of retiring, but by being prepared retired without confusion or any serious losses. I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Granger and Garfield, and immediately prepared to place the troops in position at that point. One brigade of Negley's division was posted in the Gap on the Ringgold road and two brigades on the top of the ridge to the right of the road, adjoining the brigades in the road; Reynolds's division on the right of Negley's, and reaching to the Dry Valey road; Brannan's division in the rear of Reynolds's right as a reserve; McCook's corps on the right of Dry Valley road and stretching to the west, his right reaching nearly to Chattanooga Creek. Crittenden's entire corps was posted on the heights to the left of the Ringgold road, with Steedman's division of Granger's corps as a reserve behind his left, Baird's division in reserve and in supporting distance of the brigade in the Gap. McCook's brigade of Granger's corps was also posted as a reserve to the brigades of Negley's on the ridge to the right of the road. Minty's brigade of cavalry was on the Ringgold road about one mile and a half in advance of the Gap.

About ten A. M. on the twenty-first, receiving a message from Minty that the enemy were advancing on him with a large force of infantry and cavalry, I directed him to retire through the Gap, and post his command on our left flank, and throw out strong reconnoitring parties across the ridge, to observe and report any movements of the enemy on our left front. From information [232] received from citizens, I was convinced that the position was untenable in the face of such odds as we had opposed to us, as the enemy could easily concentrate on our right flank, which, if driven, would expose our centre or left to be cut entirely off from our communications. I therefore advised the General Commanding to concentrate the troops at Chattanooga. About the time I made the suggestion to withdraw, the enemy made a demonstration on the direct road, but were soon repulsed. In anticipation of this order to concentrate at Chattanooga, I sent for the corps commanders, and gave them such general instructions as would enable them to prepare their commands for making the movement without confusion. All wagons, ambulances and surplus artillery carriages were sent to the rear before night. The order for the withdrawal being received about six P. M. the movement commenced about nine P. M., in the following manner:

Strong skirmish lines, under the direction of judicious officers, were thrown out to the front of each division, to cover their movement, with direction to retire at daylight, deployed and in supporting distance, the whole to be supported by the First division, Fourteenth army corps, assisted by Minty's brigade of cavalry, which was to follow after the skirmishers. Crittenden's corps was to move from the hills to the left of the road at nine P. M., followed by Steedman's division; next Negley's division was to withdraw at ten P. M., then Reynolds's after. Reynolds's and McCook's corps, by division, left to right, moving within supporting distance, one after the other. Brannan's division was posted at six A. M. on the road about half-way between Rossville and Chattanooga, to cover the movement. The troops were withdrawn in a quiet orderly manner, without the loss of a single man, and by seven A. M. of the twenty-second, were in the position in front of Chattanooga, which had been assigned to them previous to their arrival, and which they now occupy, covered by strong intrenchments, thrown up on the day of our arrival, and strengthened from day to day until they were considered sufficiently strong for all defensive purposes. It affords me, great pleasure to refer to the reports of the various division and brigade commanders for the names of those distinguished for bravery and good conduct.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

General: I have the honor to submit the following detailed account of the operations of the Twentieth army corps, from the date of constructing the pontoon-bridge over the Tennessee River, at Culperton's Ferry, on the twenty-seventh of August, 1863, until the occupation of Chattanooga by the army of the Cumberland:

At four A. M., August twenty-ninth, the pontoons were ready for the construction of the bridge. Keys's brigade of Davis's division of this corps was placed in the boats and crossed to the opposite bank to cover the construction, to drive away the enemy's pickets, and to seize the heights of Sand Mountain. This duty was well performed, and the bridges completed at fifteen minutes past nine P. M. Carlin's brigade, assisted by one hundred officers and men of the Pioneer corps, guarded the, bridge.

August thirtieth, General Davis crossed his remaining brigades, concentrating them at the foot of Sand Mountain.

Johnson's. division, stationed at Bellefonte, Alabama, marched to the ford at Crow Creek, and Davis's entire division encamped on the night of the thirtieth on the top of Sand Mountain.

Sheridan's division assisted in building a bridge at Bridgeport, to enable it to cross at that point. His line of march was to Trenton, Georgia, thence to Wills's Valley.

August 81.--Johnson's division crossed the river at Culperton's Ferry, and encamped at the foot of Sand Mountain.

September 1.--The headquarters of the corps were at Stevenson, Alabama.

On September second, Davis's division advanced and encamped at the foot of Sand Mountain in Wills's Valley; Johnson's division moved up the mountain, and encamped near the western summit, and Sheridan crossed at Bridgeport, and marched toward Trenton, Georgia.

On September third, Davis encamped in Wills's Valley, and Johnson marched to near the eastern summit of Sand Mountain. The headquarters of the corps were with this division. The First and Second divisions of cavalry passed this point at one P. M.

September 4.--Davis marched to Winston's, at the foot of Lookout Mountain, and seized the pass at that point. Johnson's division marched down Sand Mountain, and camped on the ground vacated by Davis.

Winston's is forty-two miles from Chattanooga, twenty-five from Culperton's Ferry, and forty-eight from Rome, Georgia.

September 5.--General Sheridan reported his command to be encamped a few miles south-west of Trenton, it having been delayed on its march by Negley's wagon-train.

September 6.--Sheridan encamped at Stearn's Mills, twelve miles distant from Winston's.

On September seventh, no movements.

September 8.--Johnson's division marched to Long's Springs, on the Trenton road, and two brigades of Davis's division were ordered into Broomtown Valley, to support Stanley's cavalry.

On September ninth, Carlin's brigade of Davis's division marched on Alpine, Ga., to support the cavalry. Heg's brigade, of the same division, marched toward Broomtown Valley by way of Wills's Gap. [233]

At forty-five minutes past six P. M., on the same day, I received information from the Commanding General stating that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga and was retreating southward, and ordering me to move rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville, Ga., in pursuit, to intercept his line of retreat, and attack him in flank.

On September tenth, Post's brigade of Davis's division, was ordered to remain at Winston to guard trains, etc., etc. Johnson marched at five P. M. from Long's Springs, and crossed Lookout Mountain, encamping at the base, near Henderson's. Sheridan's division marched at five A. M. from Stearn's Mills, and encamped at Little River, about two miles and a half from the western crest. Headquarters of the corps were moved to near Alpine, Ga.

On arriving at Alpine, I discovered that the enemy had not retreated very far from Chattanooga, and, not being able to communicate with General Thomas by way of the valley, I despatched couriers by way of Valley Head, and learned, to my surprise, that he had not reached La Fayette as ordered. His reasons for not having reached that place became more apparent as we progressed. Under the circumstances, I did not move upon Summerville as ordered. My corps was isolated at Alpine, and, had it moved upon Summerville, it would have been exposed to the entire rebel army, which reconnoissances soon convinced me was being concentrated at or near La Fayette, Georgia.

On September eleventh, at half-past 9 P. M., I received a communication from General Thomas, reporting his difficulties on the march, and that he could not reach La Fayette until the thirteenth. Believing that no cooperation could take place between General Thomas and myself by way of Broomntown Valley, I ordered all my wagons and materials not necessary for the troops to be returned to the summit of Lookout Mountain, there to await the result of the cavalry reconnoissance sent by General Stanley to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. The General Commanding was apprised of my movements and dispositions.

September 12.--My command rested in position near Alpine.

September. 13.--Orders were received from General Thomas at midnight, directing two divisions of my corps to be moved to his support and the other divisions to be left to guard the trains. This order was given by direction of General Rosecrans. It was my desire to join General Thomas by the Mountain road, via Stephens's Gap; but, not having any guide, and all the citizens concurring that no such road existed, and General Thomas also stating that the route by Valley Head was the only practicable one, I determined to join him by it.

A brigade from each division was detailed as a guard from my trains, and General Lytle placed in command. My corps was moved up the mountain at Alpine, Ga., on the night of the thirteenth, and on the night of the fourteenth it was again encamped in Lookout Valley, except the division guarding the trains, which was encamped at Little River, on the mountains.

Sheridan's division marched down Lookout Valley to Johnson's Creek, and encamped at the base of the mountain. Being informed that a good mountain road ran directly from Valley Head to Stevens's Gap, Generals Johnson and Davis were ordered to march on that road with the utmost expedition. By direction of the General Commanding, General Lytle was directed to move with two brigades toward McLemore's Cove to observe Dougherty's Gap.

On the seventeenth, my corps was concentrated in McLemore's Cove, Sheridan being posted at the foot of Stevens's Gap, Davis at Brooks's, in front of Dug Gap, and Johnson at Pond Spring, in front of Catlett's Gap, in Pigeon Mountains. My instructions were to concentrate my commands between Pond Springs and Gower's and Chickamauga Creek. It was impossible for. me to comply with these orders, as General Thomas occupied the ground. My instructions were subsequently modified. On the eighteenth, General Lytle arrived with his two brigades, and on the night of the eighteenth my corps was closed up compactly on the Fourteenth corps, with the exception of Post's brigade, Davis's division, which was, by direction of the General Commanding, ordered to hold Stevens's Gap in Lookout Mountains, at all hazards. Subsequently, Colonel Post was ordered to report to General R. B. Mitchell, commanding the cavalry, and he did not report to General Davis until his arrival at Chattanooga on the morning of the twenty-second.

On September nineteenth, at fifteen minutes past twelve A. M., I was ordered to move down to Crawfish Springs as soon as General Thomas's troops were out of the way. In compliance with this order General Johnson's division marched at early dawn, followed by Davis's and Sheridan's. I arrived at Crawfish Springs at an early hour, and reported in person to the General Commanding, who directed me to mass my troops at that place and await further orders. This was done as my command arrived.

At fifteen minutes past ten A. M. I was ordered to take command of the right and the cavalry, including Negley's division of the Fourteenth corps then observing the fords of the Chickamauga near Crawfish Springs, one brigade of this division being then engaged with the enemy. The same order directed me to send General Johnson's division forward to Widow Glenn's house to report to General Thomas. Immediately afterward I received orders to send General Davis's division to the same point to report to General Thomas or the General Commanding. These orders were at once complied with.

By this time the advance of General Sheridan's division came up, and as soon as he was posted to support the right of Crittenden's corps at Gordon's Mills, General Negley's division was withdrawn from the fords of Chickamauga Creek, and by direction of. the General Commanding, ordered to report to General Thomas, which it did [234] This left me with but one division (Sheridan's) and the cavalry, (which had not yet been heard from,) to take care of the right.

Learning from an aid-de-camp of General Wood, that General Wood's troops had been withdrawn from Gordon's Mills, and appreciating the great importance of that point, General Sheridan's division was at once ordered to take position there, and arrived just in time to prevent the enemy from crossing. Subsequently an order reached me from the General Commanding, to hold the position at Gordon's Mills.

At three P. M., I received an order to send two brigades of Sheridan's division, to the Widow Glenn's house, leaving the First brigade (General Lytle) at Gordon's Mills; also directing me, should the right be secure, to go forward in person and take command of the troops of the corps already engaged. General Mitchell reporting with his cavalry, I was enabled to obey this order at once, arriving upon the field at the close of the engagement of the nineteenth.

On the nineteenth General Johnson's division fought near the extreme left of the line. It fought gloriously, driving the enemy for more than a mile, capturing seven of the enemy's guns and a large number of prisoners.

General Davis's division fought on the right of Widow Glenn's house, against vastly superior numbers, maintaining the conflict gallantly until near nightfall, when it was relieved by Bradley's brigade of Sheridan's division, which was hastily thrown forward and gallantly drove the enemy from the open ground and across the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, after a sanguinary engagement, recapturing the Eighth Indiana battery, which had been previously taken by the enemy, and capturing also a large number of prisoners belonging to Hood's division of Longstreet's corps. Darkness coming on, the battle closed.

At midnight on the night of September nineteenth, I received the following order:

The date of this order should read forty-five minutes past eleven P. M.

This order was strictly complied with. Lytle's brigade, of Sheridan's division, was posted in the strong position in the rear of Glenn's house. Sheridan's other two brigades were posted on very strong ground to the right and rear of this position. Davis's division, consisting of two small brigades, was posted to the left and rear of this position, in reserve, his left resting on the right of Crittenden's corps. These movements were completed by daylight on the twentieth, when the General Commanding visited my position in person. Johnson's division was still retained near the extreme left of the line and not under my immediate orders.

At six A. M. Colonel Wilder, commanding a brigade of mounted infantry, reported in person to me, stating he had, with his troops, been ordered to join my command, and receive orders from me; also stating that he had two regiments, armed with the Spencer rifles, posted in the woods, on the right of Negley's position, which was to the left and front of General Lytle's The remainder of Wilder's command, with his artillery, was posted on strong ground immediately to Sheridan's right.

At about seven A. M., the following was received:

Immediately on the receipt of this order, Major-General Sheridan and myself rode to the position evacuated by General Negley. We found nearly all this space already occupied by General Wood's division. He informed me that his left rested upon General Brannan's right, and that his orders were to close up on General Brannan.

Discovering that a portion of the rude barricades on Wood's right were not occupied by our troops, I ordered General Sheridan to bring forward one of his brigades to fill up the space between Wood's left and Wilder. On turning from this position I met General Davis's division marching toward and about one hundred yards from the vacant barricade on Wood's right; he informed me that he had been ordered there by General Rosecrans. Seeing his position, and knowing the advantage of occupying the barricades at once, I directed him to place one brigade there, holding the other in reserve. On the arrival of the brigade from Sheridan's division, it was posted in column on Davis's right and rear, as his support. Davis's instructions were to keep well closed up to the left. These dispositions being just completed, the following order was received:

Within five minutes after the receipt of the above order and instructions given to carry it out, the following was received:

This order was executed at once. Two brigades of Sheridan's division — Lytle's and Walworth's — were taken from the extreme right and moved, at the double-quick, to the support of General Thomas. Simultaneously with this movement, and much to my surprise, Wood's division left the position it had in line of battle, on Davis's left, marching by the left flank, leaving a wide gap in the line. An attempt was made by General Davis to fill up the space thus vacated. Buell's brigade of Wood's division had scarcely marched more than its length when a most furious and impetuous assault was made by the enemy, in overwhelming numbers, on this portion of the line, the enemy's line of battle extending from a point beyond Brannan's right to a point far to the right of the Widow Glenn's house, and in front of the strong position just abandoned by General Sheridan's two brigades. To resist this attack I had just two brigades of Davis's division, numbering about one thousand two hundred men, and Colonel Laibold's brigade of Sheridan's division as a support.

Finding the enemy pouring through the interval between Davis and Brannan, Lytle's and Walworth's brigades are deflected from their line of march, and ordered to assist in resisting the enemy. Colonels Wilder and Harrison closed in with their commands on Sheridan's right as speedily as possible, and did good service. General Davis's command being overwhelmed by numbers, was compelled to abandon its position in order to save itself from complete annihilation or capture. Laibold's troops coming up to Davis's support, met with a similar fate. The other two brigades of Sheridan's division were illy prepared to meet such an attack. They struggled nobly, and for a time checked the enemy in their immediate front. But the position being turned far to the left, they were compelled to withdraw from the unequal contest.

It was thus that these five brigades of the Twentieth army corps were cut off and separated from the remainder of the army. No troops fought with more heroism, or suffered greater losses than these small five brigades; their loss being over forty per cent of the number engaged, in killed and wounded.

In regard to the numbers of the enemy that attacked on the right, I can make no estimate. General Sheridan captured prisoners from five different rebel divisions. The Fifty-first Illinois, of Walworth's brigade, captured the colors of the Twenty-fourth Alabama.

The troops of Generals Sheridan and Davis were rallied a short distance in the rear of the line of battle, and marched toward Rossville, to endeavor to form a junction with the troops of General Thomas. Their presence was reported to General Thomas by my Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston. They were placed in position by order of General Thomas, on the road leading from the battle-field to Rossville. During the night they withdrew to Rossville with the remainder of the army.

The Second division of the Twentieth corps, under General Johnson, fell back to Rossville with the. Fourteenth corps, Willich's brigade forming the rear-guard. On the night of the twentieth, the Twentieth corps was in good order united at Rossville.

On the morning of the twenty-first, a short time after daylight, the corps was again put in line of battle, the left resting on Mission Ridge, covering the Crawfish Spring road, the right extending toward Chattanooga Creek and Lookout Mountain. The corps remained in this position until two A. M. of the twenty-second of September, when it was withdrawn to Chattanooga with the rest of the army.

Since arriving at Chattanooga, the corps has been engaged in heavy guard-duty, and erecting strong lines of intrenchments, which, in my opinion, can only be taken by regular approaches.

My thanks are due to Colonel Joseph E. McKibben, Captain A. S. Bart, Captain R. S. Thorns, and Lieutenant George Burroughs, of General Rosecrans's staff, for valuable assistance in rallying portions of Sheridan's and Davis's divisions which had been overwhelmed. Brigadier-General J. St. Clair Morton, Chief Engineer of the army, being separated from his staff, reported to me for duty.

After ascertaining that the centre of our line had been broken, my first object was. to endeavor to find the General Commanding, to ascertain to what point he wished the rallied troops marched. Failing to find the General, and believing that an efficient stand could not be made by the army until it reached Chattanooga, the forces on the left retired toward Rossville. From statements of General Rosecrans's guides, and from observations made by General Morton, I was satisfied that the enemy was endeavoring to cut our army off from Rossville. At this juncture, Lieutenant-Colonel [236] Lyne Starling, of General Crittenden's staff, rode up and reported to me that his chief had gone to Chattanooga to report to General Rosecrans. I then decided to report to General Rosecrans at once for instructions, as my last orders from his headquarters required.

Finding the General Commanding at Chattanooga, he directed me to go out on the road to Rossville, collecting all the troops possible, and report to General Thomas. Leaving Chattanooga at midnight, I arrived at Rossville at about four A. M., on the morning of the twenty-first, when the line of battle above referred to was formed and strong barricades erected.

The conduct of the troops of the Twentieth corps was every thing that could be expected of men.

During the second day's battle, Johnson's division fought on the left, separated from the corps. All acknowledged the gallantry of this division. It never attacked that it was not successful, and the enemy never attacked it without being handsomely repulsed. I depend upon General Thomas and the official reports to do this gallant division justice.

The troops of Sheridan's and Davis's divisions behaved with great courage, never yielding, except to overwhelming numbers, when it would have been suicidal to have contested the ground longer.

To the families of the heroic dead the sympathies of the nation are due. Such names as Heg, Lytle, and Baldwin, Brigade Commanders, and Colonels Alexander, Gilmer, and McCreary, and many other distinguished field and line officers who fell upon this memorable battle-field, will make a radiant space in our history as a nation. These expressions should also extend to the many non-commissioned officers and privates who gave their lives in defence of their country and flag.

To Major-General Sheridan, commanding Third division; Brigadier-General Johnson, commanding Second division, and Brigadier-General Davis, commanding First division, of my corps, my thanks are due for their earnest cooperation and devotion to duty.

Major-General Sheridan is commended to his country, and Brigadier-Generals Johnson and Davis are commended to their country and recommended to my superiors for promotion.

Brigadier-General Aug. Willich, commanding First brigade. Second division, and Colonel W. W. Berry, Fifth Kentucky volunteers, commanding Third brigade, are strongly recommended by General Johnson for promotion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley, Fifty-first Illinois volunteers, commanding Third brigade, Third division, and Colonel Laibold, Second Missouri volunteers, commanding Second brigade, Third division, are strongly recommended for promotion by General Sheridan.

It affords me great pleasure to add my testimony as to the gallantry of these distinguished soldiers, and commend them to my superiors for promotion.

The Twentieth corps, during the two days battle, lost five pieces of artillery, and captured seven from the enemy; also, retaking the Eighth Indiana battery, lost on Saturday. Two guns lost by Johnson's division were so disabled by shot, and the killing of the horses, that it was impossible to move them. Davis's division did not lose a gun or wagon during the conflict.

To my staff--Lieutenant-Colonel G. P. Thurston, A. A. G. and Chief of Staff; Major Caleb Bates, A. D. C.; Captain B. D. Williams, A. D. C.; Captain F. J. Jones, A. D. C.; Captain J. M. Fisher, volunteer A. D. C.; Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Fisher, Assistant Inspector-General; Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Boyd, Quartermaster; Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Burton, Commissary of Subsistence; Major G. A. Hensel, Chief of Artillery; Captain A. C. McClurg, A. A. A. G. and Ordnance Officer; Surgeon J. Perkins, Medical Director; Captain A. T. Snodgrass, Provost-Marshal; Captain J. C. McElpatrick, Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant B. R. Wood, Signal Officer--my thanks are due for their devotion to duty, gallantry in action, and intelligence on the field.

For particular instances of individual bravery, I refer you to the inclosed reports of division and brigade commanders.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

In obedience to instructions I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the troops under my command, in the battles of the nineteenth and twentieth instant. The narrative commences with the crossing of the Tennessee River, September tenth, when the brigade consisted of the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers, Colonel O. H. Payne; Forty-first Ohio volunteers, Colonel Aquila Wiley; the Ninth Indiana volunteers, Colonel J. C. B. Suman; the Sixth Kentucky volunteers, Colonel George F. Shackelford; and battery F, First Ohio volunteer artillery, Lieutenant G. J. Cockerill; in all, an effective aggregate of one thousand five hundred and thirty-one officers and men.

My brigade moved to Graysville, and there joined its proper division on the eleventh. We reached Ringgold the same day, and the next day moved over to Gordon's Mills, skirmishing a portion of the way, losing two men and wounding and capturing three from the enemy. In the evening of this day the brigade made a reconnoissance about three miles in the direction of La Fayette, meeting the enemy and skirmishing briskly with him, when we returned to the Mills. The next day the division marched to Chattanooga Creek, and the day after, to Gowen's Ford on the West-Chickamauga, where we remained quietly until the morning of the seventeenth, when my pickets on the La Fayette road were vigorously attacked. They, however, repulsed the [237] enemy with a loss to him of one captain and several men. On the evening of this day we marched to within two miles of Crawfish Springs, and in the night of the eighteenth to a position one mile north of Gordon's Mills, where we formed in line of battle on the left of General Cruft, and near the La Fayette and Rossville road. Here we remained with an occasional shot in our front until about eleven o'clock A. M. of the nineteenth, when I received orders to move in the direction of the firing, then growing severe, about one and a half miles to our left, in front of General Thomas's position.

On reaching McNamus's house, on the La Fayette and Rossville road, the brigades of the division were formed in two lines facing the east, the second line being doubled by regiments on the centre. My brigade was on the left of the division, General Cruft being on my immediate right. The line was then moved forward in echelon by brigades, my brigade commencing the movement. The enemy was struck after advancing about three quarters of a mile, when a terrific contest here was added to the already severe battle on our left. The enemy gave ground freely, and the left at this juncture, making an advance, all the ground desired on the left was carried, extending to the right as far as the echelons of the Second division had been placed.

I was at this time relieved by General Turchin and ordered back to the road to fill my boxes with ammunition, already twice exhausted, and take charge of some batteries left there without supports. This I had just accomplished when a vigorous attack appeared to be going on upon that part of our line immediately to the right of the ground fought over by the last echelon of our division. I at once moved my brigade to the right, and forming it so as to face the sound of battle, moved forward and placed it in position as a support to some troops of General Reynolds, my left resting on the La Fayette and Rossville road, near McNamus's house, the right thrown forward, forming an angle of about forty-five degrees with the road. The battle neared my position rapidly. At this moment I met General Van Cleve, whose division the enemy had engaged, and who told me his men had given way and that he could no longer control them. The enemy continued to advance steadily, and the line in my front gave way. My own men then advanced to the top of the crest and withstood the shock until they were completely flanked upon their left, then obliqued well to the right and took position upon a high elevation of ground, confronting the left flank of that portion of the enemy which had broken our centre. The advance of the enemy was now steady and northward, nearly in the direction of the La Fayette and Rossville road. I found myself the only general officer upon that part of the field, and to check the farther advance of the enemy was of the utmost importance. I hastily gathered and placed in position all the artillery then in reach, including a portion of Standart's, Cockerill's, Cushing's, and Russell's batteries; in all, about twenty pieces, and with the aid of all the mounted officers and soldiers I could find, succeeded in checking and rallying a sufficient number of straggling infantry to form a fair line in support of the artillery. My brigade could not be brought into position in time, there being but about two minutes to make these dispositions before the blow came, when the simultaneous opening of all the artillery with grape checked and put to rout the confronting columns of the enemy. It is due Lieutenants Baldwin, First Ohio volunteer artillery, commanding Standart's battery, Cockerill of the same regiment, commanding battery, Cushing and Russell, Fourth United States artillery, commanding batteries, to state that for accuracy in manoeuvring and firing their guns in the immediate presence of the enemy on the occasion above referred to, the army and country are placed under lasting obligations.

Major-General Reynolds came to this position soon afterward and made further dispositions of troops, but the fight was closed for the day, except a fierce attack made at nightfall upon General Johnson. Soon after the above repulse, General Thomas came to this place, and took command of all the troops in this part of the field.

It would appear that all the troops, except General Johnson's division, had been withdrawn from the portion of the field he occupied, leaving him well advanced and entirely unsupported. When the attack was made upon him, my brigade was sent with the balance of the Second division to his support, but the firing ceased when we had marched some four hundred yards east of the La Fayette and Rossville road, opposite Kelley's house, and we were placed here in position for the fight of Sunday.

Although my losses this day had been great, including Colonels Payne and Shackelford severely wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Rockingham killed, besides the loss of four hundred and thirty-nine officers and men, the brigade, with the exception of the Sixth Kentucky, was in good condition with few absentees. The latter regiment from the great mortality among its officers, was very much broken, and its fragments attached to the other regiments of the brigade.

On the morning of the twentieth, the men were moved at three A. M. and directed to make coffee where they had water, and at daybreak a breastwork of logs and rails was commenced, which was taken up on my right and carried through one entire division and that of Reynolds on our right, and Baird and Johnson on our left. Wherever this work was done the line remained the entire day with firmness and little loss. At about eight o'clock the attack commenced upon the left of this line and swept along toward the right, arriving at my position about fifteen minutes afterward, passing on, but producing no effect until it had passed General Reynolds. This assault was kept up without interruption till about eleven o'clock A. M., with a fury never witnessed upon the field either of Shiloh or Stone River. The repulse was equally terrific [238] and finally complete. A few light attacks on this front were made up to one o'clock P. M., after which every thing was comparatively quiet. The value of this simple breastwork will be understood, since my loss behind it this day was only about thirteen men, during a period of more stubborn, fighting than at Shilon or Stone River, when the same brigade at each place lost over four hundred men. Our left flank was twice turned and partially driven this day, but the enemy was easily checked and our lines speedily restored.

At about ten o'clock A. M. our couriers for ammunition, previously prompt to return, did not come back, and it soon came to be believed that our trains had been captured. I at once cautioned my colonels, who fired only by volleys, not to waste a single round of ammunition, and my battery was similarly cautioned.

During the quiet that afterward settled upon us, several officers were struck by sharp-shooters from distant trees. Ascertaining the proper direction, I caused volleys to be fired into the tops of the trees, and thus brought several of them from their hiding-places, checking for a time this species of warfare. Skirmishers sent out along this front reported the execution of our arms during the engagement to have been terrible, beyond any thing before seen in this war, as I believe the fight from eight to eleven o'clock to have been.

The stillness that now hung over the battlefield was ominous. We had four divisions in line that, although they had withstood one of the most terrific assaults on record, had hardly felt the breath of the battle. There were four more upon our right with general Thomas, as fresh as we were. But the feeling that our ammunition was gone, was like a leaden weight in the breast of many. The men, however, were confident of success. It afterward appeared that the breaking up of the troops on our right had swept away our ammunition and much else along with their fragments to Chattanooga.

No new dispositions of troops on our part of the line were made, except that General Reynolds's right was somewhat withdrawn, to cover that flank. General Wood, General Brannan, and two divisions of the reserve corps were found in a line at right angles with, and directly in rear of the position before described, the left of this line being about one half mile from, and opposite Reynolds's right. At about three o'clock P. M. a fearful onslaught was made upon this line. The battle raged for an hour with apparently varying fortunes, when several general officers at our position expressed a sense of the necessity for a brigade to move over and strike the deciding blow. No one appeared to have any ammunition. I found upon examination that I still had forty rounds per man, and immediately moved my men over at double-quick with a front of two regiments. Arriving near the scene of action, I caused a partial change of direction to the left, and was quickly pouring in volleys, my second line alternating with my first. The action lasted but a few minutes, the enemy retiring.

There was no more fighting. At dusk I received orders from General Thomas to retire on Rossville, which I did quietly and in perfect order, the pickets of the enemy following mine closely as they were withdrawn, and confronting an officer, sent to see that it was thoroughly done.

There are several lessons to be learned from this fight, and to me, none more plainly than that the iron hand that strikes justly yet firmly, can alone make the soldier that can be relied upon in the hour of trial. The effect of firing by volleys upon the enemy has invariably been to check and break him. It further gives a careful colonel complete control of his fire. The effect of sending in fractions to battle with an entire army is to waste our own strength without perceptibly weakening the enemy.

My entire brigade has my warmest thanks for its services. Colonel O. H. Payne, One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers, and Colonel George F. Shackelford, Sixth Kentucky volunteers, both of whom fell early in the fight of Saturday, carried in their commands bravely and at the opportune moment. The One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers, although in its maiden engagement, bore itself gallantly and efficiently. Major Hampson, who commanded this regiment after the fall of its Colonel, bore his part with ability and success. Colonels Wiley, Forty-first Ohio volunteers, and Suman, Ninth Indiana volunteers, with their regiments, are veterans of so frequent trial that it would be mockery to praise them with words. The country cannot too highly cherish these men. Colonel Wiley had his horse shot from under him. The services of Lieutenant-Colonels Kimberly, Forty-first Ohio volunteers, and Lasselle, Ninth Indiana volunteers, were conspicuous and valuable. Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly had two horses killed under him.

Of the noble dead there are Lieutenant-Colonel Rockingham, Captains McGraw, Johnson, Marker, Lieutenants Lockman and Ewbanks, all of the Sixth Kentucky; Lieutenants Crisswell, Nickeson, and Parks of the Ninth Indiana, with a long list of others, as brave and true, but bearing no title. Many tears are shed for them.

My staff were efficient, performing every duty assigned them with promptness and accuracy.

Captain H. W. Johnson, Forty-first Ohio, Acting Quartermaster, was with me the entire day on Saturday, and at night brought upon the battle-field such portions of his train as were needed for the comfort of the command, taking them away before daylight the next morning. Captain John Crowell, jr., Assistant Adjutant-General, and my Aids, Lieutenants Wm. M. Beebe and E. B. Atwood, Forty-first Ohio; my Inspector-General, Captain James McCleery, Forty-first Ohio; my Provost-Marshal, Captain L. A. Cole, Ninth Indiana; my Commissary of Subsistence, Lieutenant F. D. Cobb, Forty-first Ohio; and my Topographical officer, Lieutenant A. G. Bierce, [239] Ninth Indiana, were with me at all times doing valuable service. My Surgeon, M. G. Sherman, Ninth Indiana, was, as he always is, in his place.

Of my orderlies, Waffee, Brise, Morrison, and Sweeney deserve special mention. Shepard Scott was particularly distinguished for bravery and good service. He on two occasions brought brigades to my assistance when greatly needed. His horse was shot, and he killed or captured. Should he be restored, I recommend that he be appointed a Second Lieutenant. Quite a number of horses were killed and disabled in the service of my staff.

The entire casualties of the brigade were as follows:

Regiments, etc.		Killed.	Wounded.	Missing	Aggregate.
Officers. Men.	Officers. Men.
124th Ohio,		15	4	88	34	141
41st Ohio,		6	5	95	9	115
9th Indiana,	3	22	6	59	13	108
6th Kentucky,	5	9	5	88	11	118
Bat'ry F, 1st O. V. A.,	1	1		8	2	12
Total,	9	53	20	338	74	494

The commander of the brigade was twice struck, but not injured. Two or three members of my staff were also struck, but without effect. Attention is called to accompanying reports of <*>egimental commanders.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

In compliance with your order I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this regiment in the operations terminating in the general engagement on the Chickamauga River on the nineteenth and twentieth instant.

On the morning of September tenth, the regiment forded the Tennessee River at Friar's Island, at which place it had been on outpost duty for two days previous, and marched the same day to Tiner's Station, on the Knoxville and Chattanooga Railroad. On the eleventh it marched thence to Ringgold, via Graysville, at which place we joined the rest of the division. On the twelfth it marched from Ringgold to Gordon's Mills, acting as advance-guard of the division. During the day's march, a body of rebel cavalry attempted to cut off a portion of the advance-guard by charging on its flank, but the vigilance of Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly, commanding it, frustrated their object, a volley from the skirmishers — killing one horse and wounding one man, who, with two others, fell into our hands — caused them to retreat precipitately. After going into bivouac the same day at Gordon's Mills, the enemy's cavalry exhibiting great audacity in approaching our position, the brigade was ordered on a reconnoissance, the regiment again forming the advance. Four companies deployed, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly, drove them easily, and without loss, a distance of two and a half miles, when we were ordered to return to camp. Remained in bivouac on the thirteenth at Gordon's Mills, marched thence to Chattanooga Valley on the fourteenth, thence on the fifteenth to a position on the Chickamauga River, about five miles from Gordon's Mills, and — miles from Lafayette; remained in bivouac here, receiving supplies of clothing, etc., until the evening of the seventeenth, when we went into position in line of battle about three miles further north on the same road. In the night of the eighteenth took up a new position about four miles further north on the same road; bivouacked here in line of battle, covering the front of the regiment with skirmishers. On the nineteenth the engagement began still further on the left. As the firing of musketry became brisk, the regiment, with the rest of the brigade, was again moved to the left. About one P. M. we advanced in line of battle to the attack, being on the right of the first line of the brigade, with two companies deployed as skirmishers. passing through an open wood, our skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy, and drove them. On emerging from the wood, we came to an open field about four hundred yards in width with another skirt of woods beyond. Through this wood the enemy started in line across the field to meet us. Near the middle of this field, and a little to our left, was a narrow strip of timber. The enemy had advanced but a short distance when he delivered his fire, and then sought to gain the cover of this strip of timber. We were too quick for them, gaining it first, and delivering our fire by battalion at short-range, sent them back to the woods from which they started. As soon as they began to retreat, a battery planted in the edge of the wood opened fire, inflicting considerable loss. As soon as the retreating forces gained the cover of the woods a heavy infantry fire was also opened on us. This position this regiment maintained till about four P. M., replying to the enemy's fire and repelling their attempt to dislodge us. In repelling their last assault we were supported and assisted by two companies of the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth O. V. I. The regiment was then relieved by the Sixth Kentucky and ordered to retire to procure ammunition and clean their arms. While replenishing our boxes, we were again ordered forward to the right to the support of a portion of Van Cleve's division. We had barely got into position in rear of the line when it began to fall back. The regiment remained in position until the troops to whose support we had gone had retired. Those on the left retiring toward the left created an interval through which the enemy advanced. We fired our volley by battalion and then retired slowly, halting, facing about, and firing by battalion as soon as the regiment had loaded, and effectually holding the enemy in check in our front. Finally the advance of the enemy on the left having been checked, and the troops to whose support we had been sent having [240] been reinforced, on a ridge in our rear, the regiment again moved off to the left and joined the rest of the brigade. It was now sundown, and our part in the engagement for the day was ended. The regiment bivouacked for the night in the first line, on a ridge on the east side of the road, and maintained the same position on the twentieth till about three P. M. A small parapet of logs, hastily constructed on the morning of the twentieth, enabled us to repel two assaults on the position during the day, without loss to ourselves. About three P. M. it was moved to the right to the support of a portion of Harker's brigade, Wood's division, which was in position on the crest of a hill which the enemy was endeavoring to carry. The possession of the hill was maintained, the regiment losing about a dozen wounded in this part of the action. As soon as it became dark we withdrew from this position, marched to Rossville, where the regiment bivouacked, and on Monday morning again went into position in the first line on Missionary Ridge, throwing up a parapet of rails and covering our front with skirmishers. The enemy soon afterward engaged our skirmishers, and later in the day opened with artillery, evidently for the purpose of feeling our position; the main line, however, did not become engaged, and at night we were again withdrawn, and the next day took up the position in the present line, which we now occupy.

The following is the list of casualties:

Killed — Men, six. Wounded — Officers, five; men, ninety-five. Missing — Men, nine. Aggregate — Killed, six; wounded, one hundred; missing, nine. Number engaged — Officers, twentythree; men, three hundred and thirty-seven; aggregate, three hundred and sixty.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberly had two horses and Major J. H. Williston one horse wounded and disabled in the engagement. My own horse was killed.

I cannot speak too highly of the gallantry and fortitude of both officers and men, nor of the enthusiasm, that two days hard fighting and their thinned ranks failed to depress. My thanks are especially due Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Kimberly and Major J. H. Williston, as well for their untiring vigilance and zeal as for their gallantry in action. Lieutenant Fisher, Acting Adjutant, deserves and has my thanks for promptness in communicating orders under severe fire. Late on the nineteenth he was severely and it is supposed mortally wounded while going to the rear to bring up ammunition. He is supposed to be in the hands of the enemy. Lieutenant J. N. Clark performed the duties of Adjutant during the remainder of the engagement and deserves mention for zeal and gallantry. Among company officers, while I can commend all for their cheerful and steady courage throughout the engagement, Lieutenant C. W. Hills deserves special mention for deliberation and coolness which attracted my attention in the heat of the engagement on Saturday, and for the obstinacy with which he held his ground on Monday while commanding a line of skirmishers that was vigorously attacked by the enemy. Corporal Strock, of company E, also deserves notice for pursuing and bringing in two prisoners who took refuge in a house when the regiment repelled the last attack on their position on Saturday afternoon. They belonged to the Twelfth Tennessee, Colonel Watkins, Smith's brigade, Cheatham's division. Corporal Strock's name had previously been placed upon the roll of honor, and his conduct in this engagement shows that the confidence of his comrades has not been misplaced.

Of the nine men “missing,” should any prove skulkers or cowards, I shall take the same interest in having them punished that I shall always take in securing to good soldiers the reward due gallant and noble conduct.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

On the ninth of September, it became definitely known that the movement of General Rosecrans against Chattanooga had been successful in compelling the enemy to evacuate the place without fighting, and orders were given for the advance of all forces not designed for garrison duty at the several points on the Tennessee River. The position of the army at the time was: the right corps, under McCook, at Winston's Springs, in Lookout Valley, forty-five miles south of Chattanooga, separated from the enemy's line of retreat by the Lookout Mountains; the centre corps, under Thomas, thirteen miles nearer Chattanooga, in the same valley; and the left corps, under Crittenden, in the lower part of the valley, the left resting upon the Tennessee River, not more than eight miles from Chattanooga. Two brigades of Crittenden's corps were yet west of the Tennessee; Wagner's at the crossing of Waldron's Ridge, on the Thurman Road, and Hazen's at Poe's Tavern, the former five miles from Chattanooga, the latter ten miles from there up the river. These brigades, with Wilder's mounted brigade, and Minty's brigade of cavalry, watched the various fords for thirty miles above Chattanooga, and made constant demonstrations at various points. Van Cleve's division (two brigades) had been at Piketon, thirty-two miles above Poe's, but was withdrawn a few days previous to the ninth. These forces crossed the Tennessee on the ninth and tenth, and on the eleventh, having met the enemy's cavalry in considerable force, Crittenden's corps reached Ringgold, Georgia, fifteen miles south-east from Chattanooga. The corps, except the brigades that had been watching the fords above Chattanooga, had marched southward on the Rossville road. At Rossville, Wood's division, leaving the main column to proceed to Ringgold, marched southward to Gordon's Mills, ten and a half miles south of Chattanooga. Arriving at Gordon's Mills on the evening of the eleventh, Wood came unexpectedly upon the ground where, the night before, the rebel General Polk's corps had bivouacked, and at once apprised General Crittenden [241] of the close proximity of the formidable rebel force. The enemy had evacuated Chattanooga and its vicinity without destroying bridges or track on the railroads, and left large quantities of supplies in the country about. He had had abundant time and opportunity to remove these supplies, and if he was to transfer his line of defence to Dalton, it would certainly have been worth his while to render the railroads immediately unserviceable.

On the morning of the twelfth, Crittenden's divisions, at Ringgold, were put in march for Gordon's Mills, to join Wood, and diminish the distance isolating him from the rest of the army. Near Gordon's the enemy's cavalry was again encountered, and, although they gave ground readily before the infantry advance on the march and in a subsequent reconnoissance from Gordon's toward La Fayette, still their spirit of enterprise, while hovering constantly about, and boldly venturning between the infantry columns, indicated a confidence in substantial supports close at hand. Their cavalry was evidently performing its duty in a way little like its ordinary manner of covering a retreat. On the morning of the thirteenth, the corps crossed to the west side of the creek and took position.

A reconnoissuance toward La Fayette met a stubborn resistance, at a distance of two miles from the Mills, the enemy using artillery. On the fourteenth, two divisions marched westward to the Chattanooga Valley, and in the afternoon found Thomas's corps some miles further up the valley; the left and centre were now together, but the right corps was far up the valley, and without supporting distance.

General Thomas had pushed Negley's division across Lookout Mountain, at Stephens's Gap, about sixteen miles from Gordon's. On the eighth and ninth, his whole corps crossed. On the tenth, Negley was sent forward to the passes of Pigeon Mountain, which closes Chattanooga Valley, a few miles south of Stephens's Gap.

Here Negley found the enemy strong and active, and was obliged to fall back upon the corps, the enemy manifesting much enterprise in attacking his trains during the movement. Development since the battle shows the isolation of Crittenden's corps during the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth to have been hazardous in the extreme; while it was at Gordon's Mills it was reported that the rebel General Polk, with a strong corps, was near Rock Spring, three miles from the Mills, meditating an offensive movement. Rebel officers, now prisoners, confirm this, and state that Hindman's division was ordered to seize Stephens's Gap, in Lookout Mountains, to prevent the junction of Crittenden with Thomas. Hindman failed to execute this order in proper time; the junction was made, General Polk's forces were withdrawn, and the concentration of Bragg's army, and the reenforcements sent him from Virginia and elsewhere, were made at La Fayette. For his failure here Hindman is said to be now in arrest. An attack by Polk at daylight on the thirteenth would have been disastrous to Crittenden, and without doubt have left the road to Chattanooga, and the rear of the entire army with its lines of communication, unobstructed. Leaving Wood's division in position at Gordon's Mills, General Crittenden on the fifteenth, moved his corps to the left and front, taking position on Chickamauga River, to the left of Thomas, seven miles north of Gordon's. During the sixteenth and seventeenth, the position was not materially changed. On the night of the seventeenth, the line moved to Crawfish Springs. Developments since the battle are to the effect that the isolation of McCook was as dangerous as that of Crittenden. When ordered to join the army at Crawfish Springs, McCook recrossed the Lookout Mountains and came down Lookout Valley, crossing again into Chattanooga Valley at Stephens's Gap. Had he attempted to join by moving down the east side of Lookout, as was expected, he would, say prisoners whose rank entitles them to credit, have encountered a force sufficient to overpower him. During the eighteenth, heavy clouds of dust east of Chickamauga River, and demonstrations upon General Wood at Gordon's, indicated that the enemy was moving toward our left. Toward evening the movement of General Rosecrans's army to its left commenced, and early on the morning of September nineteenth, the disposition and the ground were as follows:

From Gordon's Mills to Chattanooga (ten miles） the road runs nearly north, for six miles nearly parallel to, and one to two miles from Missionary Ridge, which it crosses by a pass at Rossville.

At Gordon's Mills the Chickamauga River is close upon the road, and runs parallel to it for half a mile northward, where it makes a sudden bend to the right and gradually increases the distance between it and the road. The ridge is high, and in many places very steep and impracticable.

The river at Gordon's runs in a bed with rocky, precipitous banks, impassable for artillery, except at the established fords, north of the Mills; though not always impracticable, it is a good obstacle, and crossing is difficult if contested.

The country between the ridge and river is generally level but rolling, thickly wooded, with comparatively little cleared land. Too much wooded for artillery, the ground is yet open for manoeuvre.

Crittenden's corps, its left in the strong position at Gordon's, was in line parallel with the road and east of it. Thomas was on his left, at Owen's Ford, two miles south of the Mills. The line followed the road, not the river, though the left was considerably beyond the road, while the right was upon it. Two of McCook's divisions were yet on the march from Crawfish Springs. There was a ford at the river in front of the left, but it was unguarded, and there were other practicable points on the stream toward the Mills.

A division of the reserve corps, under General Granger, was at Rossville, four miles from the left of the line, and on Saturday morning a brigade from this force advanced on the Ringgold road, [242] and burned the bridge at the Chickamauga River.

From Crawfish Springs it had been a race, both armies marching by the flank. The movement of Rosecrans's whole line on the night of the eighteenth, until the right rested where the left had been, was supposed to have put him again in front of the enemy, and for the present saved his line of operations. Of the several enterprises the enemy might undertake, the most probable was that he would concentrate as far to his right as possible, if he fought; for the Federal left was in a much weaker position than the right, and an attack here afforded the tempting prospect of securing Rosecrans's line. To allow the enemy to bring across the river a portion of his force to attack, and then, with the obstruction in their rear, preventing alike a good retreat and a prompt reenforcement, to fall violently upon and overwhelm them by striking on front and flank, was an operation of rich promise, but requiring great vigilance and correct judgment in determining the moment for assuming the offensive.

Of course it is not pretended that this plan was in view during the confused night march of the eighteenth, and the still more confused movements of the nineteenth.

Until late in the morning of the nineteenth, every thing was quiet on the rebel side. At length the brigade from General Thomas's left was sent forward to the ford mentioned as being in front of that point. This force encountered a rebel brigade, drove it from its position, and reached the river. Almost immediately, however, it was in turn attacked and driven back.

Whatever force the enemy may have crossed previous to this time, he now maintained the fight much in advance of the river, and brought his forces into action so rapidly that all attempts to drive him back upon the river were futile, and no advantage of ground lay with either side. Thomas's left divisions (Brannan's, Baird's, and Johnson's) were found insufficient to force the enemy, and Crittenden's left division (Palmer's) was ordered to the ground to strike the enemy's left flank. Palmer went to the left of Thomas's right division, (Reynolds's — not then engaged,) but came full in the face of the enemy, not on his flank. Soon after Reynolds became engaged, but still the Federal right did not outflank the abundant foe. Van Cleve, commanding Crittenden's next division, was sent in, and his leading brigade (Beatty's) formed within half musketshot of a rebel force preparing to flank the Federal right, ran over and captured, almost without fighting, a rebel battery, but was immediately hurled violently back. The last division at hand (Wood's, of Crittenden's corps, which formed the right of the line) was then thrown in to find the flank of that rebel line which had grown so alarmingly that it now covered the whole front of the Federal army. The fine position at the Mills, the cover of the right flank, was abandoned by this movement, but subsequently temporarily reoccupied by one of McCook's brigades, (Lytle's.) Wood sent in his brigades as ordered, but almost upon the ground where they went into line, they were nearly enveloped on the instant by the swarming enemy, and could of course accomplish nothing. It was even necessary to send to this point, as they came up, McCook's two divisions, Davis's and Sheridan's. This force sufficed to hold the ground only, and the attempt to strike the enemy's left flank was of course at an end — the whole Federal force being now engaged with his front. The enemy had made his battle, suffering nothing from the disadvantage of having to cross the river almost within rifle-shot of the Federal lines, had maintained a superiority in force, and fought upon equal ground. Late in the afternoon, coming heavily upon Reynolds and Van Cleve, he drove them furiously back, and penetrated the line. Palmer's brigades, attempting to assist Reynolds, were sent back with him. Nearly the whole force was in confusion, and the enemy bearing strongly down upop the broken flank to his right, had like to have swept in reverse the entire Federal line left of the break, when twenty pieces of artillery, hastily posted by General Hazen, and rapidly served with canister, brought him to a stand, and he withdrew from the interval. After dusk an energetic attack, maintained with some promise of persistency, upon Johnson's division, but successfully resisted, closed the battle for the day. Had the enemy, after penetrating Reynolds's line, followed with proper force the movement stopped by the artillery, he would have had probably little to do on the twentieth, to make his victory decisive.

There had been gallant fighting on both sides, and both had suffered severely. Little artillery had been lost, but the Federals had made the gain, three guns. What advantage generally had been gained, however, was with the rebels. They had successfully overcome the obstacle of the river in their front on Sunday morning forcing the Federal line from it at every point, until it lay in a country almost destitute of water. Not enough could be had for the men's coffee, and what was obtained was from springs several miles distant. During the day Negley's division had been withdrawn from Owen's Ford, and in the afternoon Lytle's brigade, which had reoccupied Gordon's Mills after Wood was withdrawn, was recalled, so that the whole army was in the line. There was, indeed, little need of detachments now, for there was left nothing south of Rossville to hold, except the plain country, which the enemy shared. The force and position of both armies had, it was safe to assume, been well developed, and with this knowledge the night was before the hostile commanders for tactical dispositions, if it was decided to fight on the morrow. On the Federal side there was less reason for retreat than in the morning; all uncertainty as to the rebel position had vanished, and it only remained to look to his movements during the night. Gordon's Mills having been abandoned, there was but one great strategic point to claim attention — the pass at Rossville, on the Chattanooga road. With this in possession [243] of the enemy, a retreat other than disastrous could hardly be hoped for. During the night of the nineteenth, the Federal force was thus disposed, commencing at the left and proceeding to the right. Baird's division of Thomas's corps was in line four hundred yards east of the Chattanooga road, the left of course refused; next Johnson's division of McCook's corps, then Palmer's, of Crittenden's corps, then Reynolds's, of Thomas's corps. As this part of the line subsequently became isolated, it is particularly described. The first line occupied a very slight crest in a forest which prevented a view in front of more than one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards. Along this line a slight breastwork of rails, logs, etc., commenced first in Hazen's brigade, had been carried. shortly after daylight. It proved invaluable during the day. In rear of Johnson's, Palmer's, and part of the lines of the other divisions, was an open field, extending as far as the road, to which the line was parallel at a distance of about four hundred yards. The northern part of the open-ground was a cornfield, much of the standing stalk having been consumed during the night; the southern part was a fallow field. Beyond the road looking to the rear were dense woods. Next on the right of Reynolds, was Brannan's division of Thomas's corps, which had been brought up from the extreme left on Saturday evening, at the time the enemy penetrated the centre; then Negley's division, Thomas's corps, its right making a crotchet to the rear; and the line across the Chattanooga road toward Missionary Ridge was completed by Sheridan's and Davis's divisions of McCook's corps. Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions of Crittenden's corps, were in reserve at a proper distance in rear of the angle in the line. It will be seen that the divisions of the three corps were much scattered, no corps being complete on the line. It was daylight before the divisions had all taken position, and when this was accomplished, there was begun the closing of the line to the left, the divisions moving successively, and apparently in obedience to orders not from a general on the ground, so tardily was it done.

While the closing up of the line was still in progress, the attack commenced upon the left, and gradually progressed toward the right. Baird maintained his ground for a time, but was finally forced backward; The reserves of the left divisions were, however, sufficient to recover the ground — Willich's brigade, of Johnson's division, being taken in with much effect. The attack travelling toward the right, fell furiously but vainly upon Palmer and Reynolds, whose breastworks served them well. While this was in progress, Negley's division, forming the crotchet in the line, was ordered to the extreme left by General Rosecrans, to support that portion of the line. Wood's division, from the reserve, was sent to occupy the ground left vacant by Negley. In the, mean time the attack had reached Reynolds, and the process of closing up the line to the left had gone as far as Brannan, on Reynolds's right. At this time Wood received an order from General Rosecrans to close well up on Reynolds, and support him. Wood's skirmishers were already firing, and to withdraw, leaving an interval at that important point, seemed hazardous, but the order was positive. Wood marched to the rear, to pass to the left behind Brannan, who was between him and Reynolds, and almost instantly a heavy column of the enemy entered the interval. Van Cleve's, the other reserve division sent to support Brannan, was posted behind the latter, very close to him. The enemy, pressing briskly through the interval left by Wood, at once caught Sheridan and Davis in reverse and upon the flank, compelling a confused retreat.

Brannan was struck upon the flank, and with Van Cleve, his support, driven violently back. The latter division was not again formed on the field. Wood, taken on the march, resisted as he fell backward, and at length sending Harker's brigade at them at a charge, cleared his front, and after holding the ground a short time, fell back to a strong ridge, which he held. Here Brannan re-formed his division, being with Wood all that remained of the right of the army, if some fragments of regiments be excepted. Four or five batteries of reserve artillery, which were left in position when the reserve divisions were. ordered up to the line, being directly in the enemy's course as he came through the interval above described, fared as might be expected. Almost without warning, a rebel line marched quietly upon the astonished gunners without receiving a shot, and seventeen pieces were captured. The rebels turned their pieces toward Wood, and their shells, flying high, burst in rear of the extreme left, killing the wounded in a hospital in rear of Palmer's division, and firing the building. A few words will end the story of the right.

Swarming through the woods in confused masses, the men of Sheridan's, Davis's, and Van Cleve's divisions, with some from Brannan's, passed backward. Headquarters, which had been in rear of the position of the reserve, was caught up by the multitude and carried back. To those in the crowd the disaster appeared irremediable; apparently the whole army was in confused flight. Even the Commanding General, after a vain effort to arrest the foremost of the crowd as they came up to his position, and the commanders of the Twentieth and Twenty-first corps, were carried away by the living tide, and cut off from the remainder of the army. There was no panic among the retreating mass; but they were not stopped, though unpursued, until they reached Rossville. Sheridan indeed rallied his men and essayed a stand, but could not hold his ground; with much dexterity, however, he avoided the enemy and brought his division, almost complete, to Rossville. Negley, who, it has been mentioned, was withdrawn from the right and ordered to the left, by some unexplained fatality was in the retreating mass with two brigades, his other brigade having been formed on the left of Baird's division [244] The disaster had been terrible; the ammunition trains were gone, no one knew whither, and the troops that remained upon the field were rapidly exhausting their cartridges. Four divisions, complete; save one brigade, were effectually out of the fight.

While some of the events above narrated were yet in progress, the battle was critical upon the left. Baird's division, the extreme left, flanked and sorely pressed, was driven back until its line and that of Johnson's formed a right angle with the line of Palmer's and Reynolds's. The enemy pressed on as if determined to make his final effort to possess Rosecrans's line of retreat. Indeed he was already upon the Chattanooga road behind Baird's original position, when relief came. Brannan's reserve (Vandeveer's brigade) came down the road from the right, and quickly forming, dashed upon the victorious enemy at a charging pace. They could not be withstood, and Baird and Johnson, with one of Palmer's brigades, (Grose's,) promptly following the advantage, restored the line. In front of Palmer and Reynolds the enemy made furious attempts to force his columns upon the line, but the steady volleys from the breastworks dismayed his troops, and they went back with loss. These four divisions were now isolated, and there was no corps commander present. Reynolds was obliged to refuse his right flank, which had become exposed by the falling back of Brannan.

At about one o'clock of the day, it became known here that some grievous disaster had befallen the right. Staff-officers sent for ammunition reported none to be found, and that the line ended with Reynolds's division; if there were more troops beyond this, there was an interval too great for cooperation between the separated forces. The enemy failing to carry the breastworks, had filled the trees in front with sharp-shooters, and these now worked around Reynolds's right, until, from the woods in the very rear of the whole position, their balls came whizzing at the backs of the men. Several shells coming from the right and rear, had also taken Palmer's line full in reverse. Still there were here four good divisions, their organization intact, and when it was learned that Brannan's and Wood's divisions were in position a mile to the right, and that Steedman's division, from General Granger's reserve corps, had come up, the feeling of despondency passed away, and officers and men thought it was not in the fates that their gallant and successful struggles of two days should be wholly without reward. The fighting ceased, but evidently only to allow time for fresh dispositions of the enemy. Brannan's and Wood's position, upon which the next attack fell, was on the crest of a ridge half a mile behind Reynolds's right. General Thomas was also at this position. It was mostly wooded, and toward the right trended backward until it ran nearly at right angles with the line of Reynolds, Palmer, etc. Through the wooded interval between this line and that of Reynolds ran the Chattanooga road, which, looking directly to the rear from Thomas's position, came into view again beyond the left of Baird's division, which was the left of the entire army. General Thomas had here one brigade (Harker's) of Wood's division; Brannan much reduced in strength but with organization complete; and two brigades of Steedman's division, (Whittaker's and Mitchell's,) reserve corps, with whom came General Granger. Steedman arrived at ten minutes past two o'clock, and at once sent these brigades upon the enemy at a charge. The enemy was driven, but came back in great force, inflicting heavy losses. Several attacks had been repulsed by these forces, and the day was drawing to a close, when the enemy prepared for a final attempt. The sharp crack of the musketry, announcing the bursting of the new storm, was heard with apprehension at the position of the four left divisions, and the necessity of sending relief admitted. In the consultation to determine what portion of the line could best spare a part of its force, General Hazen offered to send his brigade (of Palmer's division) across the interval to General Thomas's support. The offer was accepted, and Hazen safely crossed and formed on the left of General Thomas's line. The enemy attacked with great vigor, but was unable to bring his men up to the crest under the rapid volleys that swept the slope, and finally he abandoned the contest.

Just before dark, the withdrawal of the four left divisions was commenced, Reynolds moved back first, and without molestation; then Palmer commenced his movement, then Johnson, and lastly Baird. Palmer, however, had not gained the road in his rear, when the enemy appeared at the breastworks just abandoned. The withdrawal of the two remaining divisions was necessarily hurried. Indeed, before Palmer was out of reach, the enemy had opened upon him with artillery. One of Baird's brigades, (King's,) the last to move, was caught by the oncoming foe, and lost some hundred prisoners. No sooner was it dark, than the entire army, moving quietly on an unfrequented road along Missionary Ridge, retreated in good order to Rossville. The enemy, though following the withdrawing skirmishers at one hundred yards, in his eagerness to occupy the abandoned ground, did not fire a shot at the troops that left Thomas's position, and did not follow the retreat.

At daylight of September twenty-first, a new line was formed on Missionary Ridge at Rossville, and after lying during the day without attack, the army that night continued its retreat to Chattanooga.

From the above facts it is just to draw conclusions. The first is, that the junction of Crittenden with Thomas, on the fourteenth, was due to a failure in the rebel plan, not to any adequate provision for such a contingency by the Federal commander. That McCook effected his junction successfully, is probably due to his own correct judgment in recrossing the mountain to Winston's Springs, even at the expense of a [245] day's delay in the concentration of the army, instead of attempting to come down on the east side of Lookout.

The movement of the army from the Tennessee River seems to have proceeded upon the supposition that the enemy was unable to make a stand against a single corps, and without a suspicion that he was only retiring to meet his reenforcements, as proved to be the case. It was a matter of remark at the time, that the abundant supplies left at various points, and the neglect to destroy bridges or obstruct roads, indicated the enemy's confidence in his ability to repossess the country quickly.

When the battle commenced on Saturday, the nineteenth, there was probably no great disparity of numbers in the two armies. But one of Longstreet's divisions (Hood's) was present, and but three brigades of that. Statements of prisoners, and previous information of the rebel organization, fail to give more than thirty-four brigades; and this, at the fair allowance of one thousand five hundred to a brigade, would make the rebel strength between fifty thousand and fifty-five thousand, exclusive of cavalry. General Rosecrans had very nearly the same number of men in his army. This, it will be remembered, is the estimate for the Saturday's battle; the enemy had reenforcements on the march, including the Georgia militia, some part of Longstreet's corps, and others, which arrived before the close of Sunday's fight. Rosecrans got into that fight only the two brigades of Steedman's division, in addition to what he had on Saturday. Probably it will be found necessary to look farther than the assertion of “overwhelming numbers,” for an explanation of the disaster to the Union arms. At all events, it is certain that seven divisions, after losing heavily on Saturday, were able, with all the disadvantages of a divided line and open position, and after the disastrous retreat of four divisions, with the loss of twenty pieces of artillery, ammunition, etc., to hold the battle-ground against the entire Southern army during Sunday afternoon, and then at night retreat, not at all as if they felt themselves whipped by the enemy. To indicate, in this connection, the spirit of the rebels, it may be stated that in an attempt to feel the Federal position on Missionary Ridge, on the afternoon of the twenty-first, although they vigorously engaged and drove back the skirmishers, they could not be made to follow far enough to discover the Federal line, despite the liberal curses of their officers within hearing of the Federals.

Finally, credit for saving the army from the most disastrous defeat, if not practical annihilation, is due to no corps alone, not to any General exclusively; but more than to any other cause to the sturdy fighting qualities of the army, which, properly controlled, was able to have whipped “the whole Southern Confederacy,” if (as has been asserted) that was the force in front of it on September nineteenth and twentieth, 1863.

Since the battle, the General commanding the army, two corps commanders, McCook and Crittenden, and two division commanders, Negley and Van Cleve, have been relieved from their commands.

Addenda.

It has often been asserted, and the opinion is evidently gaining ground, that the advance from Chattanooga to the Chickamauga was necessary to the possession of the former place. In other words, that General Rosecrans, having compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga by throwing McCook's and Thomas's corps up Lookout Valley, was obliged to concentrate his army at Chickamauga to get it safely back to Chattanooga. This is said to relieve the responsible party of blame for not resting at Chattanooga until the reenforcements, etc., came up, and if it be true, it is of course conclusive on that point. The facts are these: As early as September sixth, indications of a purpose to evacuate Chattanooga were observed, and the event was confidently looked for every day thereafter. On the ninth, the order to advance beyond Chattanooga had reached the extreme detached command, thirty miles from Chattanooga by the ordinary means of couriers. It would appear then that the enemy's movement from Chattanooga was known at headquarters at least as early as the night of the eighth, and it remains to note the position of the army at that date. Crittenden's corps was principally in Lookout Valley, and could march into Chattanooga in two hours. Thomas's corps was near Stephens's Gap, some twenty miles southward in Lookout Valley, and McCook in the same valley, a little more than twenty miles further south. Between the army thus situated and the enemy's line of retreat was Lookout Mountain, “a perpendicular wall of limestone over which no wheel could pass.” It is very evident that on the ninth, while Crittenden marched into Chattanooga, and commenced the work of strengthening the place, Thomas could have marched back down Lookout Valley without molestation; but McCook would have been endangered, without some further provision. Thomas was on the ninth in Stephens's Gap, the only point at which the enemy could pass Lookout between McCook and Chattanooga to cut him off. A division would have been ample to secure this Gap until McCook, marching down the valley for Chattanooga, should have passed it. By night of the tenth, Crittenden's corps and at least two divisions of Thomas's would have been fortifying Chattanooga, while McCook's and Thomas's other divisions, separated and protected from the enemy by the “perpendicular wall” of Lookout Mountain, and holding its only pass, would have been marching with what speed was possible to join them.

Instead of this, Crittenden was sent south-easterly to Ringgold, a point further from Thomas than Chattanooga was, leaving the Chickamauga River, Missionary Ridge, and Lookout Mountain, between Crittenden and the rest of the army. To effect the concentration on the Chickamauga the left corps marched thirty miles, the centre corps sixteen miles, and the right corps twenty-seven miles, the two latter corps crossing a difficult [246] mountain, and each of the three corps being during its movements completely isolated. To effect a concentration at Chattanooga by the Lookout Valley the left corps would have marched six miles, (or into Chattanooga;) the centre corps twenty miles, and the right corps forty miles; but the two former would have effected a junction in twenty-four hours instead of five days, as at Chickamauga, and the right corps, marching down the valley instead of over the mountains, might have accomplished its forty miles in two days instead of eight. The several corps, too, pending their march down Lookout Valley, would have been safe from attack in detail, for the reason that neither could be attacked over Lookout Mountain.