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The Seven Pines, looking East, after a rough sketch made during the War. |
here the
Williamsburg “old stage” road is intersected by theNine-mile road, at a point seven miles east of
Richmond, was fought the first great contest between the Confederate Army of
Northern Virginia and the
Federal Army of the Potomac.
The junction of these two roads is called
Seven Pines.
About one mile from
Seven Pines, where theNine-mile road crosses the
Richmond and the York River Railroad, there is a station called
Fair Oaks.
Before the action ended there was a good deal of fighting near the latter place.
The Federals called the action of May 31st and June 1st the
battle of Fair Oaks.
Before describing this contest, a sketch will be given of the movements of the two armies from the time the
Confederates withdrew from
Williamsburg.
It is well, however, to say here that, in preparing an account of the battle, I have felt constrained to refer to some important matters in more detail than would have been considered essential, if there was not such direct conflict of “high authorities” in regard to them.
For instance, nearly all the descriptions of this action heretofore published give as the intention of the
Confederate commander that
Longstreet's division was to move to the
Williamsburg road and support
D. H. Hill's division on that road.
In “asserting” that this is an error, I have felt that, under the circumstances, it is incumbent on me to prove what I say on that subject.
It is broadly stated by many authorities that
General Johnston intended
Huger's division should attack the
Federal left flank and rear,
Huger's attack to be followed by
D. H. Hill's division falling on the
Federal front; and it is claimed by many that the slowness of
Huger's division caused the failure of complete Confederate success the first day. In refutation of these statements and claims, I have felt constrained to give proofs, and not leave these questions to be decided by mere “assertion.”
The position of the
Confederate troops at dark, May 31st, has been erroneously stated by
General Johnston, and in such particularity of detail as at the time to satisfy me that, in the main, he was correct.
But the “Official records,” recently published, show beyond question that
General Johnston is in error on this point.
It has, therefore, been considered necessary in this article to give definite proof in regard to the position of the
Confederate
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forces when the command of the army devolved upon me, by reason of
General Johnston's being wounded.
His statement of the reasons for my not having ordered the attack to be renewed the next morning (June 1st) calls for specific proof that I did order the attack to be renewed, and for a detailed exhibit of
General Longstreet's battle-field notes to me on that day.
Without specifying further, at this time, in regard to the “misunderstanding,” misapprehension, and other causes that have led to erroneous published accounts of important events in this battle,--to some extent on the
Federal, but more on the
Confederate, side,--it may be added that the recent publication of the “
Official Records,” when carefully studied, throws a great deal of light upon these events, the accounts of which have heretofore been nearly as dark and confusing as were the dense, tangled wood and swamps in which most of the close and desperate fighting took place.
The Federal accounts, as now officially published, are full; they embrace the reports of nearly every regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander engaged; but many of the
Confederate reports are missing, those in
D. H. Hill's division being the only ones that are complete in regard even to brigade commanders.
There are, however, enough others, when taken in connection with the full Federal reports, to give quite a clear understanding of the main facts on both sides.
THEaffair at
Williamsburg, May 5th, was an incident in the withdrawal of the Confederate army from its fortified lines, near
Yorktown, to the open country between the
Pamunkey and the
Chickahominy rivers, where
General Johnston intended to halt, near the Richmond and York River Railroad, and contest the farther advance of
General McClellan's army.
From
Williamsburg,
Longstreet's and
Hill's divisions, both under
General Longstreet, moved on the
Charles City road, which crosses the
Chickahominy at
Long Bridge; the division of
G. W. Smith and
Magruder's forces — commanded by him before
Johnston's army arrived at the
Yorktown lines — moved on the road that passes through
Barhamsville and New Kent Court House and crosses the
Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge.
All the
Confederate troops on the latter road were under my command, and they were followed by the
Federal army.
Excepting occasional collisions between our rear-guard and the
Federal advance-guard, nothing of special interest occurred after we left
Barhamsville, near which place, below
West Point, the
Federals landed quite a large force, and seemed disposed to move out against us.
General Johnston ordered nearly the whole of his army to
Barhamsville, and came there in person.
The next day, May 7th, the
Federal skirmishers advanced, but their main force gave us no opportunity to cut them off from their gun-boats.
At this point there was a good deal of sharp fighting for several hours.
2 From this time
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the
Confederates were more worried by the deep mud through which they were patiently trudging than they were by any movements of the
Federals.
In a letter to me from
Palo Alto, on the
Charles City road, dated Headquarters, Second Corps, May 8th,
General Longstreet says:
If your road can beat this for mud, I don't want to see it. “” If you see the General [Johnston] , say to him that we are as happy as larks over here, till we get 126 wagons [the total number] up to the hub at one time.
“” I don't fear McClellan or any one in Yankeedom.
When my command had passed the Baltimore Cross-roads, four and a half miles west of New Kent Court House, and had reached position about half-way between the
Pamunkey and
Chickahominy rivers, on good ground, they were halted.
Longstreet's corps was again within easy supporting distance of mine, and
General Johnston intended in that vicinity to contest the further advance of
McClellan's army.
We remained there about five days. The troops, having rested from the tiresome service in the trenches near
Yorktown, and the fatiguing march, were now furnished with abundant supplies from
Richmond, and were elated at the prospect of meeting the enemy on an open field of battle.
General Johnston then supposed that something effective had been done by the
Government for the local defense of
Richmond, during the month that had elapsed since his army moved from there to the peninsula.
On the 14th of May he learned, through his chief engineer, that little or nothing — either in the way of fortifications or of troops — had been provided; and that the enemy, on the
James River, were above
City Point, and threatening
Drewry's Bluff, as well as the obstruction in the
Appomattox, four and a half miles below
Petersburg.
This report closed with the remark: “The danger is on the south side of
James River.”
On the same day
General Johnston received intelligence of the destruction of the Confederate iron-clad
Virginia--called by the
Federals the
Merrimac.
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The next day news was received of the attack on
Drewry's Bluff [see p. 271], and of the confusion and fright in
Richmond.
In this state of affairs,
General Johnston decided that it was expedient to cross the
Chickahominy and take position nearer the city, rather than continue to wait, north of that stream, for the advance of
McClellan from the
Pamunkey.
Accordingly, orders were issued that night for
