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Notes on Crampton's Gap and Antietam.
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Cavalry skirmishers. |
Between the 2d and 6th of September, the Sixth Corps remained in camp near
Alexandria and collected horses and transportation for ammunition and provisions, which were gradually disembarked.
On the latter date it marched to
Tenallytown, beyond
Georgetown, D. C., crossing the
Potomac by the
Long Bridge, and beginning the
Maryland campaign.
Its daily marches thereafter, to the date of the
battle of Antietam, were regulated by orders from
General McClellan, who, in turn, was in direct communication with
Washington.
It appears from the telegraphic correspondence which was carried on between
Halleck and
McClellan, that while the latter believed that
General Lee's object was the invasion of
Pennsylvania, the former could not divest himself of the notion that
Lee was about to play the
Union army some slippery trick by turning its left, getting between it and
Washington and
Baltimore, and then taking each city by a
coup-de-main.
The following are extracts from some of
General Halleck's dispatches:
Sept. 9.--“. . . I think we must be very cautious about stripping too much the forts on the Virginia side.
It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac.”
Sept. 11.--“I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared from here.”
1
Sept. 13.--“I am of opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania, so as to draw your forces in that direction; then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over.”
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Sept. 14.--“Scouts report a large force still on Virginia side of the Potomac, near Leesburg.
If so, I fear you are exposing your left flank, and that the enemy can cross in your rear.”
Sept. 16.--“I fear now more than ever that they [the enemy] will recross at Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. . . .”
On September 12th,
Mr. Lincoln telegraphed
General McClellan that he believed the enemy was recrossing the
Potomac, and said, “Please do not let him get off without being hurt.”
These dispatches demonstrate that it was
McClellan's duty as a subordinate to move slowly and cautiously in his advance, although he believed that the whole of
Lee's army was in his front.
And during the whole
Maryland campaign his army was nearer
Washington than was
Lee's.
On or before September 7th,
General McClellan advised that
Harper's Ferry should be evacuated
via Hagerstown, so as to hold the
Cumberland Valley against an advance toward
Harrisburg, and on the 10th of September he asked that the garrison at
Harper's Ferry should be ordered to join him.
General Halleck in answer to the last request stated, “There is no way for
Colonel Miles to join you at present; his only chance is to defend his works till you can open communication with him,” Yet during the night of September 14th two regiments of cavalry marched out of
Harper's Ferry to
Hagerstown without meeting any enemy; and the whole infantry and field-artillery force of the garrison might have escaped before the 14th had
General McClellan's advice of September 7th and 10th been followed.
So the Sixth Corps moved by easy marches toward the
Blue Ridge, under daily orders from the
commanding general, and on the 14th of September fought the battle of Crampton's Gap, gaining the completest victory gained up to that time by any part of the Army of the Potomac.
While
Burnside and
Hooker were forcing Turner's Gap to open the direct road to
Hagerstown, I was ordered to move by Crampton's Gap, five miles farther south, and gain
Rohrersville, in order to cut off
McLaws and
R. H. Anderson on
Maryland Heights, and to relieve
Harper's Ferry.
About noon on the 14th of September, the head of my column,
Slocum's division, came upon
Munford's brigade of cavalry, comprising the 2d and 12th Virginia regiments, with
Chew's battery and a section of the
Portsmouth battery of naval howitzers, supported by two regiments of
Mahone's brigade of
R. H. Anderson's division, under
Colonel William A. Parham.
General McLaws had also posted the remainder of
Mahone's brigade and the brigades of
Semmes and
Cobb of his own division within supporting distance, and ordered
General Howell Cobb to take command and to hold the pass against us. With the remainder of
Anderson's division and his own,
General McLaws occupied
Maryland Heights, distant five miles. I quote from my official report of the action which ensued:
The enemy was strongly posted on both sides of the road, which made a steep ascent through a narrow defile, wooded on both sides and offering great advantages of cover and position.
Their advance was posted near the base of the mountain, in the rear of a stone-wall, stretching to the right of the road at a point where the ascent was gradual and for the most part over open fields.
Eight guns had been stationed on the road and at points on the sides and summit of the mountain to the left of the pass.
It was evident that the position could be carried
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The Confederate sharp-shooters were behind their main line on higher ground, protected by trees and bowlders.
After Parham's troops retired, Cobb, who had just reached the field, assumed command.--Editors. |
only by an infantry attack.
Accordingly, I directed Major-General Slocum to advance his division through the village of Burkittsville and commence the attack upon the right.
Wolcott's 1st Maryland Battery was stationed on the left and to the rear of the village, and maintained a steady fire on the positions of the enemy until they were assailed and carried by our troops.
Smith's division was placed in reserve on the east side of the village, and held in readiness to cooperate with General Slocum or support his attack as occasion might require.
Captain Ayres's battery of this division was posted on a commanding ground to the left of the reserves, and kept up an uninterrupted fire on the principal battery of the enemy until the latter was driven from its position.
The advance of General Slocum was made with admirable steadiness through a well-directed fire from the batteries on the mountain, the brigade of Colonel Bartlett taking the lead, and followed at proper intervals by the brigades of General Newton and Colonel Torbert.
Upon fully determining the enemy's position, the skirmishers were withdrawn and Colonel Bartlett became engaged along his entire line.
He maintained his ground steadily under a severe fire for some time at a manifest disadvantage, until reenforced by two regiments of General Newton's brigade upon his right, and the brigade of Colonel Torbert and the two remaining regiments of Newton's on his left.
The line of battle thus formed, an immediate charge was ordered, and most gallantly executed.
The men swept forward with a cheer, over the stone-wall, dislodging the enemy, and pursuing him up the mountain-side to the crest of the hill and down the opposite slope.
This single charge, sustained as it was over a great distance, and on a rough
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ascent of unusual steepness, was decisive.
The enemy was driven in the utmost confusion from a position of strength and allowed no opportunity for even an attempt to rally, until the pass was cleared and in the possession of our troops.
When the division under General Slocum first became actively engaged, I directed General Brooks's brigade, of Smith's division, to advance upon the left of the road and dislodge the enemy from the woods upon Slocum's flank.
The movement was promptly and steadily made under a severe artillery fire.
General Brooks occupied the woods after a slight resistance, and then advanced, simultaneously with General Slocum, rapidly and in good order, to the crest of the mountain.
The victory was complete, and its achievement followed so rapidly upon the first attack that the enemy's reserves, although pushed forward at the double-quick, arrived but in time to participate in the flight and add confusion to the rout.
400 prisoners, from 17 different organizations, 700 stand of arms, 1 piece of artillery, and 3 stand of colors were captured. . . .
The gun was a 12-pounder howitzer belonging to the Troup artillery attached to
Cobb's brigade, and was captured by the 95th Pennsylvania,
Colonel Gustavus W. Town, of
Newton's brigade.
General Cobb says it was “lost by an accident to the axle,” but according to
Colonel Town's report the artillerists fled before his advance, “merely disabling it temporarily by throwing off one wheel from the limber, which was left with the horses near at hand.”
Two of the colors were captured by the 4th New Jersey regiment,
Colonel William B. Hatch, of
Torbert's brigade, and one by the 16th New York, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Joel J. Seaver, of
Bartlett's brigade.
A fourth stand of colors, belonging to the 16th Virginia regiment, of
Mahone's brigade, was taken by the 4th Vermont regiment,
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles B. Stoughton, of
Brooks's brigade.
No report appears to have been made by
Colonel Parham, who commanded
Mahone's brigade, nor by his division commander,
General R. H. Anderson, who was wounded at
Antietam, but the reports of
Generals Cobb and
Semmes and
Colonel Munford sufficiently indicate the effect of our advance upon the forces under their command.
Munford, who had eight guns, his two regiments of cavalry dismounted, and
Mahone's brigade, was driven from his position behind a stone-wall at the foot of the pass.
Cobb now came to his support, dividing his brigade to the right and left, but too late to change the result.
One regiment, the 10th Georgia, of
Semmes's brigade, also joined in
Parham's defense, while the remaining three regiments, with nine guns of
Manly's,
Macon's, and
Page's batteries, were posted for the defense of Burkittsville Gap, about a mile below toward our left, where the artillery is described, in the
Confederate reports, as having done “good service.”
General Cobb says:
As I was marching the last of the column, I received a message from you [McLaws] . . . that I must hold the gap if it cost the life of every man in my command. . . . Two of my regiments were sent to the right and two to the left to meet these movements of the enemy.
In this we were successful, until the center gave way, pressed by fresh troops of the enemy and increased numbers.
Up to this time the troops had fought well and maintained their ground against greatly superior forces.
The 10th Georgia regiment, of General Semmes's brigade, had been ordered to the gap from their position at the foot of the mountain and participated in the battle with great courage and energy.
After the lines were broken, all my efforts to rally the troops were unsuccessful.
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A battery going into action. |
General Semmes, who hurried forward to offer his assistance to
General Cobb, thus describes the scene he witnessed on the
Confederate side of the crest:
Arriving at the base of and soon after commencing the ascent of the mountain at Crampton's Gap, I encountered fugitives from the battle-field and endeavored to turn them back.
Proceeding farther up the mountain, the troops were met pouring down the road and through the wood in great disorder, where I found.
General Cobb and his staff, at the imminent risk of their lives, using every effort to check and rally them.
I immediately joined my efforts, and those of my staff who were with me, to General Cobb's, and cooperated with him for a considerable time in the vain effort to rally the men.
General McLaws moved
Wilcox's brigade of
R. H. Anderson's, and later
Kershaw's and
Barksdale's brigades of his own division, to the support of
Cobb, but not in time to take part in the engagement.
The report of
General McLaws shows that he accurately appreciated the effect of our success in completely shutting up his command on
Maryland Heights until the surrender of
Harper's Ferry opened the door for him, to cross into
Virginia.
Accepting the estimate of
Mr. Thomas White, who was chief clerk in the
adjutant-general's office at
General Lee's headquarters, and had charge of the returns, the whole available force under
McLaws was 8000 men, and mine, on the basis of the last returns, 12,300.
Couch's division (7219 men) of the Fourth Corps did not reach the field of the 14th until the fighting was over, and was detached from my command early the next morning.
But these figures are at least one-fifth, if not one-fourth, beyond the actual effective strength.
General Cobb estimates the Confederate forces actually engaged at 2200.
Mine can hardly have exceeded 6500; heavy odds, indeed, but so are stone
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walls and a steep mountain pass.
My losses were 533.
The losses in
Parham's (
Mahone's) brigade, spoken of as heavy, are not reported; those in
Cobb's and
Semmes's brigades are given as 749.
At the end of the fight, after nightfall, the division of the corps which had borne the brunt of the fight (
Slocum's), was, as it were, astride of the mountain.
Of the other division (
Smith's), the brigades of
Brooks and
Irwin were on the mountain, the reserve under
Hancock being at the eastern base.
Couch's division reported to me at 10 P. M.
2 Early the next morning,
Smith's division was sent into
Pleasant Valley, west of the
Blue Ridge, to begin the movement toward
Harper's Ferry.
Couch's division was sent, by order of the
commanding general, to occupy
Rohrersville.
Slocum was to support
Smith.
As I was crossing the mountain about 7 A. M., on September 15th, I had a good view of the enemy's force below, which seemed to be well posted on hills stretching across the valley, which is at this place about two miles wide.
When I reached
General Smith we made an examination of the position, and concluded that it would be suicidal to attack it. The whole breadth of the valley was occupied, and batteries swept the only approaches to the position.
We estimated the force as quite as large as ours, and it was in a position which, properly defended, would have required a much greater force than ours to have carried.
I am unable to give the numbers, but
McLaws, in his report of the operations of the day, states that he formed the line across the valley with the brigades of
Kershaw and
Barksdale, except one regiment and two guns of the latter, and the “remnants” of the brigades of
Cobb,
Semmes,
Mahone, and
Wilcox, which he afterward states were very small.
The only force available for an attack would have been
Smith's division of about 4500 men,
Slocum's division being in no condition for a fight that day. Reading between the lines of
General McLaws's report, he seems to have been disgusted that I did not attack him. The evidence before the court of inquiry on the surrender of
Harper's Ferry shows that the white flag was shown at 7:30 A. M., on the 15th, and the firing ceased about one hour afterward.
It is evident, therefore, that a fight between
General McLaws's force and mine could have had no effect upon the surrender of
Harper's Ferry.
Success on my part would have drawn me farther away from the army and would have brought me in dangerous nearness to
Jackson's force, already set free by the surrender.
McLaws's supports were three and a half miles from him, while my force was seven miles from the main army.
Later on that day the enemy withdrew from
Pleasant Valley and
Harper's Ferry toward
Sharpsburg.
Couch's division joined me, and the corps remained stationary without orders from
McClellan until the evening of the 16th, when I was ordered to march the next morning to join the army and to send
Couch's division to occupy
Maryland Heights.
Accordingly the corps started at 5:30 A. M., and the advance reached the field of
Antietam at 10 A. M., about twelve miles distant from the starting-point.
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General Smith's division arrived first and was immediately brought into action in the vicinity of the Dunker Church, repelling a strong attack made by the enemy at this point.
The details of the part borne by the corps in the battle are graphically given in the official reports.
While awaiting the arrival of
Slocum, I went to the right, held by
Sumner.
I found him at the head of his troops, but much depressed.
He
told me that his whole corps was exhausted and could do nothing more that day. It was lying in line of battle partly in a wood from which it had driven the enemy that morning.
About three hundred yards in its front, across an open field, was a wood nearer the bank of the river, strongly held by the enemy.
The corps had been driven back from an attack on this wood with great loss.
When
General Slocum arrived I placed two brigades of his division on
General Sumner's left and was awaiting the arrival of his third brigade, which was to be in reserve.
With the two brigades I intended to make an attack on the wood referred to, and
General Sumner was informed of my intention.
The two brigades were ready to move.
Just as the third brigade arrived,
General Sumner rode up and directed me not to make the attack, giving as a reason for his order, that if I were defeated the right would be entirely routed, mine being the only troops left on the right that had any life in them.
Major Hammerstein, of
McClellan's staff, was near, and I requested him to inform
General McClellan of the state of affairs, and that I thought the attack ought to be made.
Shortly afterward
McClellan rode up, and, after hearing the statements of
Sumner and myself, decided that as the day had gone so well on the other parts of the line it would be unsafe to risk anything on the right.
Of course, no advance was made by the division.
Later in the day
General McClellan came again to my headquarters, and there was pointed out to him a hill on the right, commanding the wood, and it was proposed that the hill should be occupied by our artillery early the next morning, and that after shelling the wood, the attack should be made by the whole corps from the position then held by it. He assented to this, and it was understood that the attack was to be made.
During the night, however, the order was countermanded.
I met him about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th.
He informed me that he countermanded the order because fifteen thousand
Pennsylvania troops would soon arrive, and that upon their arrival the attack would be ordered.
The troops, however, did not arrive, and the order was not renewed that day. On the 19th the corps entered the wood, expecting a fight, but the enemy had slipped off during the night.
