But we prefer to define it in the terms employed, as being more likely to be appreciated in the sense intended.
Are we correct in giving this wide compass of meaning to the principle in question?
Do we assume too much when we say that a man is not the less a captive, and subject to the control of the captor, because he voluntarily gives himself up as such?
Is a man then the less a slave who voluntarily consents to be controlled by the will of another?
The popular use of terms in all languages shows that mankind have conceded this point.
They all apply the idea of slave to such a case.
Nay, more, they furnish a constructive meaning of the term based upon this meaning.
They call a man a “slave to his passions,” who has voluntarily
given himself up to be controlled in his future volitions by his passions as the subjective motive of his actions.
“No bondage is more grievous than that which is voluntary,” says Seneca
“To be a slave to the passions is more grievous than to be a slave to a tyrant,” says Pythagoras
“No one can be free who is intent on the indulgence of evil passions,” says Plato
says, “All wicked men are slaves.”
, Rom. VI. 16, uses the term in the same sense, and with the greatest propriety: “Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants [δούλους, slaves
] to obey, his ”