the case of the right
hand,) as the exponent of that will — they are what is ordered in the case, and make the right.
Hence he condemns as “wretched mummery” the distinction admitted by M. Portalis
, between obedience to a command, and obedience to what is right and just in itself, and, on the same ground, pronounces it “highly improper” to say, with Mr. Locke
, “God has a right to do it: we are his creatures.”
For truly if his will be the ultimate genus
of right, then he can have no rights
, for there is certainly no superior to whose commands
he conforms in the acts of his will.
But precisely at this point let us take our stand.
I affirm on the authority of Scripture, no less than sound philosophy, (always in harmony,) that God has
rights, and that the distinction of M. Portalis
is in many instances correct; and that hence Tooke
, Dr. Paley
, (who also concurs in this view — see his article Rights, in his Moral Philosophy
,) Dr. Webster
, with many others of great distinction, strangely err, not in their etymology of this word, but in that hypothesis by which they make it a significate of the will of God
. We cannot agree with then that rights and duties which are reciprocal, are resolvable only into the will of God--have his will alone for their ultimate foundation.
I take ground back of this.
True, I say with them — and I claim full