the wants of humanity; but, at the same time, his will and the good are different realities.
The one is an essential quality of his holy nature, and the other is, to a certain extent, an expression of this attribute in the form of volitions.
That the will of God did not make the right in itself, will readily appear.
Is it to be conceived that there ever was a period in eternity past, when truth was not truth, or when truth did not exist?
when the good
was not the good
, or when the good did not exist?
But does it not accord with the clearest teachings of reason, that the truth always was the truth, and ever will be the truth?
that the good always will be the good?
That two and two are equal to four; that to affirm a thing to be and not to be at the same time is an absurdity and a contradiction; and that things equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another, we say are all intuitive truths — we cannot be mistaken about them.
So also in morals: that the truth is good; that virtue is good; that a good action is not an evil action; and that to affirm that a good action is not a good action is an absurdity, a contradiction, we say, are all intuitions — we cannot be mistaken about them
. But is it not equally intuitive that these things were always so — that these truths were always truths — the good was always the good, just as certainly as that they are so