William A. Crafts, Life of Ulysses S. Grant: His Boyhood, Campaigns, and Services, Military and Civil.

[62] wasting efforts for the sake of himself. So through his whole career, while there was an enemy of his country in his front, he did not turn back to fight his personal enemies in the rear. And never did he undertake to defend himself against the misrepresentations and plots of unscrupulous men, until in himself the safety and welfare of the country were assailed, and the fruits of all his victories were endangered.

But Grant's resources were not exhausted. He had yet another plan, to which, from the beginning, he had anticipated he might resort when the waters had sufficiently subsided. This was to move his army, which was now large and well organized, partly by water through the bayous on the west side of the river, and partly by a wagon road to New Carthage, and thence across the Mississippi below Warrenton, or to a point still farther down the river, and thence across to Grand Gulf. Admiral (then Commodore) Porter at the same time was to run by the rebel batteries with several of his gunboats, and some transports laden with supplies. These gunboats and transports, with such small steamers as could pass through the bayous, were to transport the troops across the river, and a movement was then to be made to the rear of Vicksburg. To this movement Grant's most trusted and able officers, such as Sherman and McPherson, were strongly opposed, as dangerous in the extreme. The army, they represented, would abandon its base of supplies, and would be entirely cut off from the North and all aid in case of any failure; and if not entirely successful, for which the chances were far from equal, the movement would be disastrous. But Grant had weighed the subject