preceded it; and to an unprejudiced and instructed mind it is vindicated by the soundest military reasoning.
But he failed to take Richmond
, it is said.
This is true; but it is equally true that this failure was no fault of his. To what causes it was due is set forth in the preceding pages, and especially in the concluding portion of General McClellan
's Report, copied into this chapter.
He never would have undertaken to capture Richmond
with a force so small as that to which he was finally reduced by the interference of the Administration with his plans, and their broken faith.
It is no disparagement to a general that, having only ninety thousand men, he did not succeed in an enterprise which he had undertaken upon the assurance that he should have a hundred and forty thousand.
Besides, he was forbidden to go on with it, and his army sent to General Pope
; with what result need not be repeated.
The Peninsular campaign
of 1862, as planned, was General McClellan
's; as executed, it was that of the President
and the Secretary of War
: and upon them the responsibility of failure must rest.
Had they kept their faith, had they sent to General McClellan
the reinforcements which again and again had been promised him, and which he again and again demanded, there is very little question that Richmond
would have been taken.
The military chances were greatly in favor of such a result.
Of course, as Richmond
in point of fact was not captured, the enemies of General McClellan