that I am mistaken in my forebodings!--I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country.The considerations urged by General Halleck in reply were as follows :-- The enemy's forces in and around Richmond were estimated at two hundred thousand. General Pope's army was only forty thousand; the Army of the Peninsula, effective force, about ninety thousand. The relative position of the enemy towards them was such that his command and that of Pope must be united; and they could not be united by land without exposing both to destruction. It was a military impossibility to send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula; and thus the only alternative was to send the Army of the Peninsula to Pope. A simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base would not demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves should assist in that demoralization,--which he is satisfied they would not. The political effect of the withdrawal might at first be unfavorable; but the public were beginning to understand the necessity of it, and they would have more confidence in a united army than in its separated fragments. It would be impossible to furnish the requisite reinforcements under several weeks. To keep the army in its present position until it could be reinforced would almost destroy it, in the sickly region where it then was. In the mean time,
This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.