was not less than 1,000 men; of whom nearly 300 were killed outright, and more than 500, including the wounded, taken prisoners.1
Meantime, Gen. Stone
had directed Gen. Gorman
to throw across the river at Edwards's Ferry a small force, which made a cautious reconnoissance for about three miles on the road to Leesburg
, when, coming suddenly upon a Mississippi regiment, it exchanged volleys and returned.
's entire brigade was thrown over at this point during the day; but, as it did not advance, its mere presence on the Virginia
side of the Potomac
, so far from the scene of actual combat, subserved no purpose.
After the disaster was complete, Gen. Stone
, about 10 P. M., arrived on the ground from which our ill-starred advance was made; as did Gen. Banks
at 3 next morning, and Gen. McClellan
on the evening of that day. But it was now too late.
No relief was sent while relief could have availed.
retired from Dranesville
southward on the day of the fatal fight.
has been widely blamed for rashness in this conflict, and even for disregard of orders — it would seem most unjustly.
The following orders, found in his hat after his death, deeply stained with his life-blood, are all the foundation for this charge:
The second order was received on the battle-field, by the hand of Col. Cogswell
, an hour before the death of Col. Baker
, who had put it in his hat without reading it. It is as follows:
to “push” 4,000 men with 1,900, in an advanced and unsupported position, where the 4,000 might at any moment be increased to 10,000 or to 20,000, is not obvious.
And why was not Gorman
sent forward to come up on their flank, at any rate; without waiting for 1,900 men to “push” 4,000 beyond Leesburg
to a good point for covering that place?
As to Col. Baker
's reading or not reading this dispatch, it must be considered that he was at that moment engaged with a superior force, and