Between the middle of June, when we moved from Harper's Ferry
, to the 18th of July, when we moved from Winchester
, nine regiments1
were sent to the army in the Valley
, and the President
thought more urgently required.
If I had been professing to be able to crush Patterson
, those regiments would not have been sent to me, nor would the President
so earnestly why he did not send more.
This when Beauregard
needed them greatly.
Not even a suggestion to move to Manassas
was sent to me before the telegram of July 17th, received on the 18th.
On the contrary, the President
's instructions to me in General Cooper
's letters of June 13th, 18th, and 19th, and in his own of June 22d, and July 10th and 13th, prove that he had no such thought.
And these letters prove that in all the time between the march from Harper's Ferry
, and that to Manassas
, the intended that the Army I commanded should be employed in the defense of the Valley
In the letter quoted, General E. K. Smith
wrote: “As second in command and your adjutant-general, possessing your confidence, my position was one that made it exceedingly improbable that any orders could have been received at headquarters without my cognizance.
No order in my recollection was received, either authorizing or directing you to join General Beauregard
, other than that of July 17th, which was promptly complied with.”
No imperative and repeated order to reinforce