interested as any one could be in bold measures for the relief of Vicksburg
, thought forty thousand men a minimum for the attempt.
, Honorables A. G. Brown
, D. F. Kenner
, E. Barksdale
, and W. P. Harris
thought thirty thousand more troops necessary, they being on the spot.
For the causes of Confederate disasters in Mississippi
, the reader is referred to pages 204-211.
The assertions concerning the little siege of Jackson
are contradicted by the very correspondence2
referred to, and in pages 207 and 208.
On the first day, July 9th, I telegraphed to Mr. Davis
that I should endeavor to hold the place.
On the 11th: “It” (the intrenched line) “is very defective; cannot stand a siege, but improves a bad position against assault.”
On the 13th: “The enemy's rifles (cannon) reached all parts of the town, showing the weakness of the position, and its untenableness against a powerful artillery. . . . If the position and works were not bad, want of stores, which could not be collected, would make it impossible to stand a siege.”
These were my only dispatches to the President
on the subject.
Stores were not lost, for we had none in Jackson
We were supplied by the railroad from the East
, and our depot was at its terminus east of Pearl River
, so that its contents were easily saved.
The soldiers were not dispirited by finding that their lives and blood were valued; but their confidence in the Government
, as well as that of the people of the State