reenforcements, and the “plan of campaign” defeated before being begun.
That was my first objection to it.1
I did propose what seemed to me a better one-to assemble at once all the troops promised, that we might defeat the enemy when he should attack us, that attack being inevitable, and then assume the offensive.
Instead of sixty or seventy thousand men, I had forty thousand four hundred and sixty four infantry and artillery and two thousand three hundred and ninety-two cavalry fit for service, subject to my orders at the opening of the campaign.
This is shown by the only authentic statement on the subject — the return sent to the Confederate
War-Office, prepared by Major Kinloch Falconer
of the Adjutant-General
's Department, from the reports of Lieutenant-Generals Hardee
, and Major
. General Sherman
states in his report that he commenced the campaign with above ninety-eight thousand men. But, as three of his four divisions2
of cavalry, probably not less than twelve thousand men, are not included in his estimate, it is not impossible that some infantry may have been omitted also.
The Army of Tennessee was certainly numerically inferior to that of Northern Virginia
, and General Bragg
's was superior in fighting force to Grant
's. But if the disparity of force was greater in General Lee
's case than in mine, I submit to the Southern
people that to condemn me alone of all those who served them in the field, for