Chickahominy, to take a position six or seven miles from Richmond. That ground being unfavorable, the present position was taken on the 17th. Had the enemy beaten us on the 5th, as he claims to have done, the army would have lost most of its baggage and artillery. We should have been pursued from Williamsburg, and intercepted from West Point. Our troops engaged, leaving Williamsburg on the following morning, marched but twelve miles that day; and the army on its march to the Cross-roads averaged less than ten miles a day. Had not the action of the 5th been, at the least, discouraging to the enemy, we would have been pursued on the road, and turned by way of West Point. About four hundred of our wounded were left in Williamsburg, because they were not in condition to be moved. Nothing else was left which we had horses to draw away. Five pieces, found by the chief quartermaster at the Williamsburg wharf, were abandoned for want of horses and harness. In the three actions above mentioned our troops displayed high courage, and, on the march, endured privations and hardships with admirable cheerfulness.
President to have the proper orders in the case given. It is needless to remind either of you of the mischief inevitable from divided command.