the war, proves that the Confederacy
was too weak for offensive warfare, and is very strong evidence in favor of the course against which Southern writers have declaimed vehemently.
The authors of Alfriend
's “Life of Jefferson Davis
” seem to regard this tone of the Southern
press as evidence of Southern opinion on this question, and claim that “Mr. Davis
was far from approving the inaction which followed Manassas
He confidently expected a different use of the victory.... Indeed, before leaving Manassas
, President Davis
favored the most vigorous pursuit practicable.... The evidences of disorganization upon which General Johnston
dwells with such force and emphasis were indeed palpable, but Mr. Davis
confidently believed that an efficient pursuit might be made by such commands as were in comparatively good condition.
Such were his impressions then; and that he contemplated immediate activity, as the sequel of Manassas
, is a matter of indisputable record” (pp. 812-314).
These assertions are accompanied by no proofs, by no orders, nor even suggestions to the commander of the army by the President
while he was at Manassas Junction
, nor correspondence on the subject after his return to Richmond
The author cannot assume for him, as he does for Jackson
, that “his sense of official propriety sealed his lips.”
He came to the army as President
— to give instructions-and, if necessary, orders in such a crisis.
If he had been “far from approving the inaction that followed Manassas
,” he would have required action.