If he had “expected a different use of victory,” he would have compelled me to attempt to fulfil that expectation.
He came to control both general and army.
If he thought that “an advance” would secure “immediate and consecutive triumphs,” and the certainty of “even more glorious and valuable achievements,” he violated his duty and his oath, by neglecting to compel an aggressive movement by the army, to accomplish such results.
He was with the army about forty hours-quite long enough to see what had been accomplished, and to learn if more could be done, but expressed none of the “views” and opinions ascribed to him in the biography, and gave me no orders for movements of troops, and discussed no matters concerning the army, except such as related to administration.
The fact that he gave no instructions in relation to the employment of the army, nor orders to make any aggressive movement nor even suggested such, proves conclusively that he thought none expedient, and was satisfied with the victory as it was. His dispatch of Sunday night, and the speech at the depot of the Central Railroad in Richmond
, express that satisfaction, and it only.
The President approved the course pursued after the victory at Manassas
, because he knew the discouragements of a march without sufficient food, the utterly inadequate supply of ammunition, the hopelessness of assailing a far more numerous enemy in strong intrenchments, and that the Potomac
At that time, too, defensive war was regarded by the Southern
leaders as our best policy,